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 A U-2 pilot gazes at the horizon from high altitude. (U.S. Air Force)
vINTRODUCTION  
A Cold War Necessity 
“There is a certain feeling of courage and hope when you work 
in the field of the air. You instinctively look up, not down. You 
look ahead, not back. You look ahead where the horizons are 
absolutely unlimited.”
– Robert E. Gross, Lockheed Chairman/CEO 1932–1961
On a summer day in 1955, ominous clouds darkened the skies over a remote 
desert valley in the Western United States, reflecting international tensions 
between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In what had 
become known as the Cold War, the two superpowers vied for supremacy in 
the wake of World War II, waging a high-stakes game of brinksmanship as 
each strove to discover the other’s strengths and weaknesses through overt and 
covert means. The next bold step for the U.S. involved a spindly silver airplane, 
innocuously designated U-2, undergoing preparations for its maiden flight in 
the skies above central Nevada. Although this event took place without fanfare 
and in utter obscurity, it heralded the beginning of an aeronautical technology 
program that spanned more than six decades and showcased innovative aircraft 
design and manufacturing techniques. Little did anyone realize at the time that 
what had begun as a tool of Cold War necessity would evolve into a versatile 
reconnaissance and research aircraft.
The U-2 program originated with a national requirement, an unsolicited 
proposal, and studies championed by a panel of notable scientists tasked with 
advising President Dwight D. Eisenhower on how the Nation might defend 
itself against the threat of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack. To do this required as 
much intelligence as possible on Soviet capabilities, but the Russian-dominated 
USSR was a closed society that was virtually inaccessible to the outside world.1 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle, 
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.”2
 1. Chris Pocock, “Early History of the U-2 Dragon Lady,” Code One Online, February 2002, http://
www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=103, accessed January 15, 2013.
 2. Winston Churchill, Maxims and Reflections (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), p. 55.
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The most promising avenue toward solving this riddle was through observa-
tion from high above. In a November 1954 memorandum to Allen W. Dulles, 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Dr. Edwin Land, founder of 
the Polaroid Company, advocated for development of a reconnaissance aircraft 
to be operated by the CIA with Air Force support. The vehicle, already under 
development by Lockheed Aircraft Company, was described as essentially a 
powered glider. It would accommodate a single pilot and require a range of 
3,000 nautical miles. It would carry a camera capable of resolving objects as 
small as an individual person. To ensure survivability against Soviet surface-to-
air missiles, the airplane would need to attain altitudes above 70,000 feet. Such 
a platform, he suggested, could provide locations of military and industrial 
installations, allow for a more accurate assessment of the Soviet order of battle, 
and allow estimates of Soviet ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. 
Land recognized that the airplane’s apparent invulnerability was limited. “The 
opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years,” he wrote, “because 
the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses 
for the 70,000-foot region.”3
Designed as a stopgap measure to provide overhead reconnaissance capabil-
ity during the early years of the Cold War, the versatile U-2 has since evolved to 
meet changing requirements well into the 21st century. Though many authors 
have documented the airplane’s operational history, few have made more than 
a cursory examination of its technical aspects or its role as a NASA research 
platform. This volume includes an overview of the origin and development of 
the Lockheed U-2 family of aircraft with early National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics (NACA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) involvement, construction and materials challenges faced by design-
ers and builders, releasable performance characteristics and capabilities, use of 
U-2 and ER-2 airplanes as research platforms, and technical and programmatic 
lessons learned.
 3. Edwin H. Land, memorandum to Allen W, Dulles, November 5, 1954, http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-03.pdf, accessed January 23, 2013.
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The Martin RB-57D was based on the B-57 light, twin-engine bomber, but with improved 
engines and a longer wingspan. (U.S. Air Force)
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Designing for High Flight
Air Force officials had been pursuing the idea of high-altitude reconnaissance 
since January 1953, when Bill Lamar and engine specialist Maj. John Seaberg 
of the Wright Air Development Center (WADC) in Ohio drafted a request for 
a design study to develop a highly specialized aircraft that would be produced 
in small numbers. Surprisingly, they recommended bypassing such prominent 
aircraft manufacturers as Lockheed, Boeing, and Convair and instead focusing 
on Bell Aircraft Corporation and Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation. 
Their superiors at Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) head-
quarters agreed that because a relatively small production run was envisioned, 
these smaller companies would likely give the project a higher priority. In order 
to provide an interim, near-term option, they also asked officials at the Martin 
Company to study the possibility of modifying the manufacturer’s B-57 light 
jet bomber with a longer wingspan and improved engines. The three compa-
nies were asked to submit results by the end of the year. The study project, 
dubbed Bald Eagle, called for a subsonic aircraft with an operational radius of 
1,500 nautical miles that would be capable of attaining an altitude of 70,000 
feet and carrying a single crewmember and a payload of between 100 and 700 
pounds. It was to be equipped with available production engines (modified, if 
necessary) and have as low a gross weight as possible.1
All three companies had submitted their respective studies by January 1954. 
Martin’s modified B-57 (designated Model 294) featured lengthened wings, 
accommodations for cameras and sensors, and uprated twin engines. Fairchild’s 
M-195 design was powered by a single engine and featured an over-the-fuselage 
intake and stub-boom mounting for the vertical and horizontal tail surfaces. 
Bell offered a delicate-looking, lightweight, twin-engine airplane called the 
Model 67.2
 1. Chris Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005), pp. 10–11.
 2. Jay Miller, The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45 (Hinckley, U.K.: Midland Publishing, 2001), pp. 207–208.
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Martin Model 294
In order to expedite construction and testing of an interim reconnaissance 
platform, the Model 294 was built using the standard Martin B-57 light, 
twin-engine bomber as a starting point. Under project Black Knight, designers 
at Martin replaced the stock J65-W-5 engines with two 10,000-pound-thrust 
Pratt & Whitney J57-P-9 turbojets. The airplane’s wingspan was extended 
from 64 feet to 106 feet, expanding the gross wing area to 1,500 square feet. 
By April 1955, the Model 294 had been officially designated the RB-57D and 
an initial order for six airframes had been increased to 20. Three versions were 
built, including the first 13 airframes as a single-seat model equipped with 
several cameras and additional sensor gear located in a bay behind the pilot’s 
station. Martin also built a single RB-57D-1 capable of carrying the AN/
APQ-56 high-resolution, side-looking radar for both daylight and nighttime 
radar-mapping reconnaissance. The final six airframes, designated RB-57D-2, 
carried a second crewmember to operate sensors for gathering electronic intel-
ligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) data.3
Martin engineers designed an innovative aluminum honeycomb wing struc-
ture that was both strong and lightweight. Unfortunately, it proved vulnerable 
to water seepage and wing stress. An accelerated flight-test program in 1955 
and 1956 revealed that the wing spar and some of the skin panels were prone 
to cracking and needed strengthening. The spar was not designed for long 
service life of high dynamic loads, and engineers initially estimated the fatigue 
life of the RB-57D to be fewer than 1,000 flight hours. In fact, several aircraft 
were retired after their wings separated following landing. Fortunately, no such 
incident occurred in flight.4
Fairchild M-195
During the General Configuration Study, designers at Fairchild initially consid-
ered a wide variety of possible configurations, from subsonic turboprop-powered 
airplanes with high-aspect-ratio wings to supersonic rocket and ramjet-powered 
vehicles. The supersonic configurations were quickly eliminated due to the 
projected length of time required for design and development. In a prelimi-
nary analysis, Fairchild engineers narrowed wing loading to between 10 and 30 
pounds per square foot, and they studied configurations powered by two J57, 
 3. Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2 (Austin, TX: Aerofax, 1983), p. 16.
 4. Ibid., pp. 16–17.
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J67, or J73 engines. This resulted in designs with straight, high-aspect-ratio 
wings and an operational ceiling between 65,000 and 67,200 feet.5
Taking into consideration overall structural weight versus aerodynamic 
gains, the design team ultimately chose a single-engine, J57-powered configu-
ration. It was to be constructed from aluminum using conventional methods 
and as many off-the-shelf components as possible for use with internal electrical 
and environmental control systems. The M-195 featured a pressurized cockpit 
equipped with an ejection seat. A sensor bay was designed to accommodate two 
36-inch equivalent-focal-length (EFL) oblique cameras and two 6-inch EFL 
oblique cameras. The two main landing gear wheels retracted into the wing 
roots in typical fashion, but instead of a nose wheel, the airplane was equipped 
with a steerable tail wheel. The wings, set low on the fuselage, were equipped 
with a gust relief system to elevate the flaps and ailerons when necessary. The 
powerplant installation was highly unconventional for the time, incorporating 
a dorsal inlet just behind and above the cockpit. This arrangement minimized 
intake and exhaust duct lengths to maximize use of available thrust, and at the 
same time, it permitted short pressurization ducts to the cockpit and sensor 
bay, reducing weight and improving efficiency.6
 5. Ibid., p. 15.
 6. Ibid.
Fairchild M-195. (Jay Miller collection) 
Unlimited Horizons
4
Weight remained a critical factor. Fairchild engineers estimated the empty 
weight of the airframe, including payload and powerplant, to be 10,943 
pounds. Including crew, fuel, and lubricants, the total gross takeoff weight was 
approximately 19,000 pounds. This would allow the M-195 to follow a mis-
sion profile that called for initial ascent to 61,100 feet at 150 knots indicated 
airspeed over a distance of 139 miles. The pilot would then climb to an opera-
tional cruising altitude of 65,000 feet over a distance of 161 miles. After level-
ing off and setting a cruise speed of 390 knots true airspeed, the airplane would 
have a range of 1,200 miles to its target. The return trip would be at cruising 
altitude, followed by a spiraling descent as close to home base as desired. The 
landing weight was projected to be approximately 12,106 pounds.7
Bell Model 67
The third entry in the design study was Bell’s Model 67, which eventually came 
to be known as the X-16. Though the Martin RB-57D offered a rapid, low-risk 
response to the need for high-altitude reconnaissance, it was only intended to 
fill the gap until a more capable new design could be fielded. Fairchild’s M-195 
met the proposed requirements, but it was neither as capable as Bell’s entry nor 
less risky than the RB-57D. The X-16 soon emerged as the leader of the pack.
Following official approval by the Air Force in May 1954 and the signing 
of a contract in September, Bell prepared to complete a prototype within 18 
months, followed by production of 27 additional airframes. Led by the com-
pany’s chief project engineer, Richard Smith, the Bell team designed the X-16 
to cruise at 70,000 feet with an unrefueled range of 3,300 miles. A payload 
of two 12-inch EFL cameras or two 36-inch EFL cameras would permit pho-
tography of everything along a flight path 50 miles wide and up to 795 miles 
long. The extremely lightweight airframe featured high-aspect-ratio wings and 
was powered by two Pratt & Whitney J57-P-31 turbojet engines modified 
for enhanced performance at high altitudes. To reduce weight, the airplane 
had a centerline bicycle landing gear configuration with outrigger wheels to 
provide balance on takeoff and landing. Weight restrictions necessary to sup-
port altitude and range requirements further resulted in an extremely flexible 
airframe. This meant that the X-16 had an extremely low structural-dynamic 
envelope that was rated between +3 g’s and –1 g during maneuvering flight. 
Due to structural flexibility, engineers predicted that the wings—spanning 
nearly 115 feet—would suffer aeroelastic divergence as they reached critical 
 7. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
  Designing for High Flight
5
Mach number.8 The designers attempted to mitigate this concern by giving 
the wings a quarter-chord sweep angle of 15 degrees and moving the aile-
rons inboard from the wingtips. The pressurized cockpit was equipped with 
standard instruments, an ejection seat, a periscopic sextant for navigation, a 
control stick like in a fighter plane, and all necessary equipment for operating 
the reconnaissance systems. Empty weight was expected to be 23,330 pounds, 
with a gross takeoff weight of 36,200 pounds fully fueled.9
Construction of the X-16 prototype progressed smoothly for the first 12 
months, but events in Washington, DC, and Burbank, CA, were about to have 
a profound effect on the airplane’s future and that of Bell. First, CIA officials 
had learned of the Air Force study and argued that clandestine reconnaissance 
over denied territory should be a function of a civilian intelligence agency 
rather than of a military service. Second, Lockheed chief designer Clarence 
L. “Kelly” Johnson had also learned of the project and decided to submit an 
unsolicited proposal of his own.10
 8. The lowest Mach number at which local airflow over some point on the airfoil reaches the speed 
of sound, even though the aircraft itself has an airspeed less than Mach 1.0.
 9. Miller, Lockheed U-2, pp. 17–18.
10. Miller, The X-Planes, pp. 208–209.
A model of the Bell X-16 with an F-86 fighter for comparison. (Jay Miller collection)
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Lockheed CL-282
Shortly after Lamar and Seaberg drafted their request, someone at the Pentagon 
informed Johnson of the Air Force study and Lockheed’s exclusion from it. He 
managed to get a copy of the program requirements and quickly developed 
a concept for an airplane capable of attaining a maximum altitude of 73,000 
feet with an operating radius of 1,400 miles from the beginning of a cruise 
climb starting at about 65,000 feet. Gross takeoff weight was to be just 13,768 
pounds, including a 600-pound camera payload. To reduce weight, the airplane 
would have no undercarriage, taking off from a ground cart and landing on 
a skid attached to the lower fuselage. In December 1953, Johnson assigned 
engineers Phil Coleman and Gene Frost to develop procedures for lightening 
the airframe and increasing its wing area for maximum altitude capability.11 
They were soon joined by Henry Combs, a talented structural engineer and 
accomplished sailplane pilot.12
Johnson’s new design, called the CL-282, was based on his XF-104 fighter 
interceptor. Although the fighter was optimized for high-speed flight in the 
Mach 2 range, Johnson realized that he could save time and expense by maxi-
mizing use of the original XF-104 design and manufacturing experience. He 
simply eliminated all unnecessary requirements such as fighter load factor, 
armament, and landing gear, while retaining the general fuselage and tail 
configuration. Johnson completely redesigned the wings and shortened the 
fuselage, but this resulted in only minor local changes to the loft lines, and 
it was possible to reuse all of the basic XF-104 tooling jigs as well as most 
of the detail jigs.13
The greatest challenge was reducing overall structural weight in order to 
allow the airplane to perform the desired mission while carrying a 600-pound, 
non-jettisonable payload. Structurally, the CL-282 fuselage was virtually iden-
tical to that of the XF-104 except for the deletion of a 62-inch section of the 
fuselage behind the cockpit. Since the CL-282 was designed for a maneuvering 
load factor of 2.5 g’s as compared to 7.33 g’s on the XF-104, fuselage strength 
requirements were reduced, allowing for reduced material gauges (i.e., aircraft 
11. Kelly Johnson, “Log for Project X,” Lockheed California Company, December 1953. This was the 
designer’s personal diary of activities during design and development of the U-2. All information 
is from the author’s copy, retyped from a copy in the Chris Pocock collection.
12. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 11–12.
13. Jay Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1993), p. 213. 
Appendix I of Miller’s book contains the entire text of Kelly Johnson’s “CL-282 High Altitude 
Aircraft,” Lockheed Report LR-9732, 1954.
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skin and structural members could be manufactured from thinner aluminum 
stock). Shortening the fuselage eliminated 3,990 pounds of fuel weight and, 
along with the removal of armament, necessitated moving the engine forward 
562 inches to compensate for the change in the center of gravity. With the 
powerplant located in line with the wings (which also contained the fuel load), 
the 1-g bending moments of the fuselage were well below those of the XF-104, 
and tail loads were reduced. Elimination of landing gear bays also made it easier 
to shift the engine forward, but it was necessary to alter the shape and position 
of the inlet ducts to accommodate the change in engine position and improve 
airflow efficiency at lower airspeeds. The forward bulkhead of a 75-gallon sump 
tank between the inlet ducts also served to transfer fuselage shear loading to the 
outside contour of the duct assemblies. Basic fuselage joints, including those 
for mating the wings and tail, remained the same as on the XF-104, and the 
CL-282 retained the fighter’s T-tail empennage configuration. The speed brakes 
were also retained. In place of landing gear, the airplane was equipped with an 
abrasion-resistant scuff strip approximately 15 inches wide and extending the 
full length of the bottom of the fuselage.
In the forward fuselage, the crew accommodations were radically revised. 
The original XF-104 cockpit included a downward ejection seat that, in the 
event of an emergency, could be jettisoned through an escape hatch. Because 
bailout velocities were expected to be low for the CL-282, the ejection seat 
The Lockheed CL-282 was based on the F-104 Starfighter but had a significantly longer wing-
span. (Lockheed Martin)
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and escape hatch were eliminated altogether and replaced with a simple 
bucket seat. This meant that the pilot would have to open the hinged canopy 
and climb out. The cockpit was pressurized to provide an equivalent pressure 
altitude of 25,000 feet when the airplane was operating above 70,000 feet. 
Pressurization was supplied by bleed air from the engine. Since a cockpit alti-
tude of 25,000 feet necessitated the pilot’s use of a pressure-demand oxygen 
system throughout the flight, the pilot was equipped with a partial-pressure 
suit and a 7-hour supply of oxygen.14
Johnson conducted a limited study of wing configurations in search of 
the optimum planform. While considering the airplane’s overall weight and 
balance characteristics, he sought to determine the minimum area and aspect 
ratio necessary for achieving a maximum altitude of 75,000 feet. The result 
was a configuration featuring thin, straight, high-aspect-ratio wings spanning 
70 feet, with a total area of 500 square feet. Unlike in most conventional 
designs, the wings lacked a carry-through structure and were simply bolted 
onto the fuselage ring frames. This limited the airplane’s maneuver load 
factor considerably, but Johnson included an innovative span-load distribu-
tion control system. When flying at higher speeds or in turbulent conditions 
at altitudes up to 35,000 feet, the wing control surfaces could be raised (4 
degrees for flaps and 10 degrees for ailerons) to reduce bending moments and 
tail loads by moving the wing’s center of pressure inboard. Otherwise, the 
wing was of a conventional two-cell construction with the beam located at 
approximately 48 percent of chord. It was designed to resist bending moment 
in each surface by way of spanwise stringers originating at the main fuselage 
frame joints. A structural rib in the wing root distributed wing torsion to 
the fuselage frames. The wings also contained nylon bladder fuel tanks with 
internal ties to prevent deformation of the airfoil with changes in vapor 
pressure. Small, replaceable wingtip skids provided protection for the ends 
of the wings, and the ailerons, during landing.
Three engine candidates were considered in lieu of the stock General 
Electric J79 turbojet. The General Electric J73-X-52 weighed 3,150 pounds 
and produced 8,920 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel con-
sumption (pounds per hour/pounds of thrust) of 0.917. At 75,000 feet and 
Mach 0.75, it would have provided 398 pounds of thrust and a specific fuel 
consumption of 1.377, giving the airplane a maximum speed of 495 knots 
at cruise altitude. The Rolls Royce Avon RA.14 weighed 2,897 pounds and 
produced 9,500 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel consumption 
of 0.840. At maximum cruise conditions, it would have provided 385 pounds 
14. Ibid.
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of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.372. Finally, the Wright TJ3B1 
weighed 2,720 pounds and produced 7,800 pounds of thrust at sea level, with 
a specific fuel consumption of 0.880. At cruise, it would have provided 339 
pounds of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.340. Although the Rolls 
Royce engine demonstrated superior performance on the basis of sea level static 
ratings, Johnson selected the J73-X-52 because of its superior performance at 
altitude and ease of adaptation to the XF-104 fuselage.15
Johnson submitted his CL-282 design study to Col. Bernard Schriever at 
the Pentagon in March 1954. Schriever expressed great interest and requested 
a more specific proposal. A month later Johnson met with senior Pentagon 
officials, including several Air Force generals who were not particularly enthusi-
astic. ARDC Commander Lt. Gen. Donald Putt and his staff had completed an 
evaluation of industry studies that had been generated by the Bald Eagle proj-
ect, and they agreed with Maj. Seaberg’s recommendation that the proposed 
airplane be equipped with two engines. The CL-282 had only one, as did the 
Fairchild M-195. Shortly after the April meeting, Martin was given immediate 
approval to proceed with the RB-57D. In early June 1954, despite lobbying by 
advocates within the Air Force Development and Advanced Planning office, 
Air Force Headquarters rejected the Lockheed proposal because it was too 
unconventional and had only a single engine, and they were already commit-
ted to the Martin program.16
All was not lost, however. Trevor Gardner, assistant secretary of the Air 
Force for Research and Development, had been most impressed with Johnson’s 
CL-282 presentation. In May 1954, Gardener and two colleagues briefed lead-
ing CIA intelligence analyst Philip Strong on the CL-282 and the Bald Eagle 
designs. They asked him if the CIA might be interested in the CL-282 even if 
the Air Force was not. Strong subsequently discussed the idea with members 
of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 
some of whom thought the RB-57D was too heavy and that a lighter, single-
engine design might be better suited to the proposed mission. With Cold 
War tensions high, the Eisenhower administration commissioned a panel of 
top-level experts to study the Soviet threat. The intelligence subpanel chaired 
by Edwin Land included Jim Baker of Harvard University Observatory and 
physics Nobel Laureate Ed Purcell from Harvard. Strong briefed the Land 
Panel on the CL-282 and soon found allies.17
15. Ibid.
16. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 13.
17. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
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In September, Bell Aircraft received a contract to build the X-16. During 
a visit to the Bell plant, Baker and Allen Donovan from Cornell Aeronautical 
Laboratory were not impressed. Donovan felt that, by comparison, the 
Lockheed design offered the same or better overall performance at almost one-
third the gross weight. Meanwhile, Land lobbied aggressively for the CL-282 
while encouraging innovative ideas for reducing payload weight. Every extra 
pound meant 2 feet of altitude lost.18
Donovan briefed members of the Intelligence Systems Panel on the merits 
of the CL-282 and defined three requirements for a high-altitude spy plane: a 
single engine, a sailplane-type wing, and low structural load factors. Air Force 
proponents of the X-16 had argued that a second engine would allow the pilot 
to keep the plane aloft in the event of a single engine failure, but Donovan 
argued that it could only do so at an altitude that made it vulnerable to hos-
tile ground fire. Single-engine aircraft were both lighter and historically more 
reliable than multi-engine aircraft. Stressing the absolute need to fly above 
70,000 feet in order to avoid intercept, he noted that in the thin upper atmo-
sphere, the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6 percent of its 
sea-level thrust. The solution, he said, was to incorporate a high-aspect-ratio, 
low-induced-drag wing of the type used on sailplanes. Finally, he added that 
low structural load factors would reduce the airplane’s overall gross weight. 
Donovan explained that aircraft built to military standards were engineered 
for combat maneuvers. Strengthening wings and other structures to withstand 
high speeds and sharp turns would add extra weight to the airframe and would 
be unnecessary considering the proposed mission profile. In short, a success-
ful design required a delicate balance of thrust, lift, and weight. The Air Force 
study had resulted in designs that were altogether too conventional to meet 
the necessary requirements. The only viable candidate, Donovan insisted, was 
Lockheed’s CL-282.19
Donovan’s arguments won support for the CL-282, but that did not gen-
erate funds for Lockheed to pursue the concept. The Air Force was already 
committed to the Martin and Bell programs, so funding for Lockheed had to 
come from another source. The Land Panel offered a solution.20
Land and Gardner met with CIA Director Allen Dulles in late October in 
an effort to convince him that not only was it imperative that the CL-282 be 
built, but that its development and operation should not be entrusted to the 
18. Ibid., p. 16.
19. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974 
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 25–26.
20. Ibid., p. 26.
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Air Force. Dulles was initially skeptical that the agency should involve itself 
with such a major technical development effort, but Land insisted that the CIA 
had a right to pioneer scientific techniques for intelligence collection. Further, 
he emphasized that the civilian agency would be better suited to conducting 
covert reconnaissance missions. Land noted the urgency of proceeding swiftly, 
since “the opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years, because the 
Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses for 
the 70,000-foot region.”21
Next, Land and Presidential science advisor James Killian met with 
President Eisenhower. Despite knowing of the Air Force commitments, the 
president approved development of the CL-282. Eisenhower agreed that the 
new reconnaissance program should be controlled by the CIA and stipulated 
that it should be handled in an unconventional way so as to avoid bureaucratic 
entanglements and interservice rivalries. The strong advocacy of Killian and 
the distinguished scientists of the various advisory committees, combined with 
Eisenhower’s support, ultimately won over Dulles, but some Air Force officials 
feared the decision to build the CL-282 put both the RB-57 and X-16 in 
jeopardy. The Air Force had already rejected Lockheed’s design because of its 
single engine and because the X-16 offered a more conventional configuration 
as well as a more versatile platform that could be used in multiple military roles. 
Following additional discussions with Allen Donovan, Gen. Putt met with 15 
scientists from the Technological Capabilities Panel and Maj. Seaberg from 
WADC, who briefed the group on all four aircraft proposals. Comparing their 
capabilities, Seaberg noted that the Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were 
comparable aerodynamically and that Martin’s modified airframe was some-
what less capable overall. He stated that in his opinion, the CL-282’s General 
Electric J73 engine would be insufficient for attaining the necessary altitude. 
Replacing the J73 with the Pratt & Whitney J57, however, would make the 
CL-282 competitive with both the Bell and Fairchild entries. One significant 
advantage of Lockheed’s design was that Kelly Johnson had promised that his 
airplane would be flying by August 1955. Bell was not expected to deliver the 
first X-16 until the spring of 1956. Ultimately, Johnson was authorized to go 
ahead with the CL-282, but the Air Force did not abandon the X-16 until 
Lockheed’s airplane completed its first flight.22
21. Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward The Unknown (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2000), p. 17.
22. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 33–35.
Unlimited Horizons
12
Building the Team
On November 26, 1954, Allen Dulles assigned his special assistant, Richard 
Bissell, to take charge of the CL-282 development effort, which was designated 
Project Aquatone. Among Bissell’s first tasks were arranging for money from 
the CIA’s Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project started and finding ways 
to divert Air Force materiel to the program. Because security was paramount, 
he made the Aquatone project staff self-sufficient with its own contract man-
agement, administrative, financial, logistical, communications, and security 
personnel. Col. Osmond J. 
Ritland was assigned as Air 
Force liaison to the proj-
ect and worked closely with 
Bissell. With Ritland’s help, 
a number of J57 engines pro-
cured by the Air Force for use 
in the B-52, KC-135, F-100, 
and RB-57 were diverted for 
use in the CL-282 in order 
to prevent a separate con-
tract with Pratt & Whitney 
from jeopardizing program 
security.23 Kelly Johnson 
had promised Bissell that 
he could deliver the first air-
plane in just 8 months, but he 
had also been pressured into 
making significant design changes. The final configuration had been scaled up 
from the original CL-282 and now included landing gear. The sharply pointed 
XF-104 nose had been blunted and the XF-104’s T-tail replaced with a more 
conventional arrangement. The new design eventually received a deceptive 
designation identifying it as a utility aircraft: U-2.24
In early December, Johnson began assembling a team of engineers and 
manufacturing personnel. He assigned Dick Boehme to assist him as project 
engineer and supervisor, and together they selected two dozen engineers for 
specialized design work. The task was made more difficult because they had 
to pull these workers from other Lockheed projects without being able to tell 
23. Ibid., p. 40.
24. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 18.
The CIA placed Richard Bissell in charge of the 
Aquatone program. (CIA)
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their former supervisors why.25 Each worker was selected for a particular spe-
cialty. Chan Engelbry worked out the aerodynamics while Carl Allmon and 
Alvin Jensen drafted the airplane’s loft lines. Henry Combs, Ray McHenry, and 
Richard Hruda were tasked with calculating stress, and Lorne Cass calculated 
loads. Bob Wiele, Bill Bissell, Robert Kelly, and Royal Dow designed the wing 
structure. Two men were assigned to design the tail assembly, Herb Nystrom 
(vertical stabilizer) and Rod Kreimendahl (horizontal stabilizer). Ed Baldwin, 
Leroy English, Jack Painter, and Ray Kirkham designed various parts of the 
fuselage with additional help from Dave Robertson, who also developed the 
fuel system. Dan Zuck designed the cockpit. Cornelius Gardner designed the 
airplane’s unique landing gear. The systems group included Vern Bremberg 
(hydraulics), Cliff Rockel and Sam Murphy (electrical), Vic Sorenson and 
George Ellison (controls), Ed Martin (reconnaissance systems), Doug Cone (air 
conditioning), and Elmer Gath (propulsion). Pete Gurin, John Henning, and 
Richard Lutz performed static testing. Leon Gavette designed various ground 
handling equipment, and Bob Charlton wrote the first technical manuals. Art 
Vierick was in charge of the manufacturing group, which included assembly 
foreman John Wanamaker, Bob Hunter, Charles Van Der Zee, and Tommy 
McCoy.26 Johnson’s team initially toiled 45 hours per week, but even after the 
staff grew to more than 80 people, work increased to 65 hours per week.27
Due to the need for extreme secrecy, the original U-2 manufacturing team 
worked within Lockheed’s Advanced Development Projects division, infor-
mally known as the Skunk Works.28 This elite organization had been established 
during World War II to develop the P-80 Shooting Star, one of the Nation’s 
first jet aircraft, and eventually served as the company’s rapid prototyping and 
development unit. Its early success was due in large part to Kelly Johnson’s insis-
tence that his engineers and draftsmen be located not more than 50 feet from 
the assembly floor. Construction difficulties and other problems could then be 
immediately brought to the attention of the appropriate design or manufactur-
ing personnel. Paperwork was kept to a minimum, with no emphasis on neatly 
typed memorandums. In order to keep the project moving quickly, engineers 
simply made pencil notations directly on their original drawings. As a result, 
25. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 43.
26. Henry G. Combs, “U-2 Design and Fabrication,” in Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel, 
the U-2 History Symposium, National Defense University, Fort McNair, DC, September 1998, pp. 3–5.
27. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 43.
28. The Skunk Works was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known as the Skonk Works in 
Al Capp’s Lil’ Abner cartoon strip. The nickname, coined by Lockheed engineer Irv Culver, was 
altered slightly to avoid copyright infringement.
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Kelly Johnson, center, believed that managers, engineers, and shop personnel should interact as 
closely as possible in order to solve problems quickly. (Lockheed Martin)
Manufacturing crews assemble U-2 components. For security reasons, staffing was kept to a 
minimum. (Lockheed Martin)
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problems could be resolved in a matter of hours rather than days or weeks.29 
This management technique was ideally suited to the U-2 design effort and 
became a hallmark of Lockheed’s future programs.
Performance and payload were the driving factors behind the U-2 design. 
To ensure that the airplane would meet required specifications, for example, 
Al Robinson had to address challenges of reducing airframe and equipment 
weight. The U-2 configuration’s higher gross weight compared to that of the 
original CL-282 threatened altitude performance. Lamenting this problem, 
Johnson once told his engineering staff that he would trade his grandmother for 
a 10-pound weight reduction. Subsequently, Robinson and the other engineers 
started referring to pounds as “grandmothers,” as they struggled to eliminate 
unnecessary weight from the airframe and systems.30 The desired gross weight 
needed to be 1.5 times the weight of the powerplant. Ultimately, even with 
the addition of a drag chute for landing, a 300 percent increase in the oxygen 
supply capacity, improved brakes, and an autopilot, the final gross takeoff 
weight was within 10 pounds of the original proposal.31
Henry Combs was impressed by the skill and efficiency demonstrated by 
various team members. To keep things moving, estimates were used when 
firm data were unavailable. As soon as more accurate data became available, 
work based on the estimates was modified as necessary. Staffing was kept to 
the absolute minimum necessary to accomplish any given task, and workers 
were allowed to do their jobs with as little interference as possible. Combs also 
admired the supervisory skills of Johnson’s “backup genius,” Dick Boehme, 
noting that his “engineering judgment was excellent and his ability to keep 
everyone in harmony with Kelly was extremely important.”32
Building the Plane
Having promised delivery of 20 flyable airframes to the CIA at a cost of $22.5 
million, Johnson next addressed challenges posed by the need for secrecy and 
the logistics involved in constructing the revolutionary airplane. Program secu-
rity was ensured through various means. First, the original U-2 manufacturing 
29. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 45.
30. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 18.
31. Don Downie and Jim Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel, a 16-millimeter film documentary 
produced by Hycon Mfg. Co. for the CIA in April 1957. Declassified in 2006, Roadrunners 
Internationale collection.
32. Combs, “U-2 Design and Fabrication,” pp. 3–5.
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and development team was segregated in a remote corner of the Lockheed 
plant in Burbank, CA. Production facilities there were limited, so when the Air 
Force ordered 25 airframes, a second manufacturing plant was established at 
Oildale, near Bakersfield. Security constraints meant that normal subcontract-
ing procedures were virtually impossible. Procurement of materials involved 
using sterilized drawings (with certain information redacted) and purchase 
orders; deliveries were routed to various inconspicuous locations.33 Financing 
was handled under a special account separate from normal Lockheed chan-
nels. Dummy company names were established for use when dealing with 
outside vendors. Depending on what was being purchased, vendors might 
sign a contract with C&J Manufacturing Company (using Kelly Johnson’s 
initials), J.E. Ramsey Company (named for Lockheed’s purchasing manager), 
or B.V. Ward (named for Dick Boehme, Art Vierick, and George Welty). Only 
a senior executive from each vendor had been briefed to know the real identity 
of the customer. Specially cleared drivers picked up items from vendors using 
33. Ibid., pp. 2–5.
The first 20 airframes were built at Lockheed’s plant at Burbank Airport. (Lockheed Martin)
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unmarked trucks, delivering them to Burbank or Oildale. Correspondence was 
handled through a post office box outside of Burbank, and all communications 
with the customer took place via secure comlink.34
Approximately 87 percent of each airframe built in Burbank was fabricated 
within a single building. Metal components were fed through the company’s 
main presses at night and on Sundays, then hidden from day-shift workers not 
cleared into the program. At peak production of the first 50 airframes, only 600 
people were involved at both the Burbank and Oildale plants.35 The designers 
and builders employed unorthodox methods with regard to engineering draw-
ings and procedures. Typical company standards were abandoned—sometimes 
resulting in oversize drawings more than 20 feet long—and military specifica-
tions (Mil-Spec) served only as a design guide, but were not strictly followed. 
If a part had to be sent to an outside machine shop, accompanying draw-
ings were sanitized of any information revealing the airplane’s configuration. 
Personnel had access only to the minimum knowledge necessary to do their 
jobs. At the lowest level, vendor employees knew only that they were building 
an airplane, but they knew nothing about its configuration or mission. The 
midlevel included those who assembled partial or complete airframes and saw 
them loaded aboard cargo planes bound for unknown destinations. At the 
highest access level, there were only a few people who knew the identity of the 
customer, the test location, operational capabilities, and the overall mission. 
Workers were briefed to tell no one, not even family members, what they were 
doing. At Johnson’s direction, no paperwork or blueprints were ever marked 
SECRET lest the label call attention to the documents in the event they fell 
into the hands of unauthorized persons. According to one former worker, 
“Kelly said that marking a document Top Secret was telling the enemy exactly 
what was most important to steal. Documents and drawings had no company 
or security markings. Everything was done within physically secured areas. We 
never talked about the program away from work.”36
Every morning, Johnson met with each member of his team to discuss any 
problems from the previous day and take any necessary corrective action.37 In 
order to streamline manufacturing operations, there was no formal configura-
tion control board. Engineering drawings were released directly to assembly or 
functional system supervisors who were responsible for planning any necessary 
34. Ray Passon, “The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,” Star Dusters Newsletter, September 
2003, p. 9.
35. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
36. Passon, “The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,” pp. 9–10.
37. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
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work and making a bill of material (a list of raw materials, subassemblies, 
intermediate assemblies, subcomponents, parts, and quantities of each needed 
to manufacture an end product). Each supervisor followed the design process 
from the beginning and maintained close contact with designers, thus ensur-
ing that each component or assembly could be produced in volume (known 
as a producibility function) and providing greater opportunity to review or 
check engineering drawings before final release. As a result of schedule pressure 
and philosophical differences, engineering and manufacturing personnel often 
engaged in heated discussions, but always with mutual respect. Tooling and 
assembly supervisors coordinated an informal system for tool design. Throughout 
the manufacturing process, mockup and development mechanics were respon-
sible for fabricating parts as well as assembling them. One noted that, “Some may 
say that this can only work for a prototype or small number of aircraft, but this 
was successful for production of more than 50 of the original U-2s.”38
Johnson’s U-2 design, finalized by January 1955, was a model of simplicity 
and innovation. The airframe was constructed primarily of aluminum alloys 
machined to the thinnest gauges allowable within structural strength require-
ments. Skin thickness varied from just 0.020 to 0.063 of an inch. Structural 
stiffening consisted of the fewest possible number of ribs, stringers, and doubler 
38. Passon, “The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,” p. 10.
Lockheed established a second U-2 production line in Oildale to build airframes for the Air 
Force. (Lockheed Martin)
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plates. All skin panels were flush riveted and the control surfaces aerodynamically 
balanced, with virtually no gaps at any of the hinge points. All aerodynamic con-
trol surfaces were cable operated. To further reduce weight, the hydraulic system 
was simplified and none of the primary flight controls were hydromechanically 
boosted. Johnson spent 2 days designing lightweight landing gear consisting of 
a bicycle arrangement with a double-wheel main gear and a small tail wheel, 
The final U-2 design configuration was a study in elegant simplicity and technical innovation. (CIA)
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both mounted along the centerline.39 The landing gear assembly weighed just 
257 pounds. By comparison, conventional tricycle gear on a comparable aircraft 
would typically weigh about 750 pounds and occupy valuable space inside the 
wings that, on the U-2, was used to increase fuel capacity. This careful engineer-
ing of weight and space considerations resulted in an extra 1,500 feet of altitude 
capability and an additional 100 miles of cruising radius.40 To maintain lateral 
balance during takeoff, the wingtips were equipped with mid-span outriggers, or 
pogos—small rubber wheels on the ends of curved steel legs that dropped away 
as soon as the plane became airborne. Skid plates on the wingtips protected the 
airfoils during landing.
The single J57 engine received air through a bifurcated inlet system. With 
the engine located at mid–wing chord for balance, the main gear well had to be 
placed between the air intake ducts, which was further forward than desirable. 
Engineers faced a challenge in designing the ducts because at cruise altitude the 
engine needed near perfect ram-air distribution in order to function. After trying 
a variety of options, the final duct configuration provided airflow comparable 
to that of a ground-based engine test cell.41
39. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 19.
40. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
41. Ibid.
U-2 forward fuselage assemblies under construction. (Lockheed Martin)
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To expedite flight testing, early U-2 flights were made with a 10,500-pound-
thrust J57-P-37 engine designed for use in the B-52. Pratt & Whitney engineers 
spent 12 months developing the 11,500-pound-thrust J57-P-31 specifically 
for the U-2 in an accelerated program that normally would have taken up to 
3 years. The new engine had a 16-stage compressor and operated at full power 
for the duration of flight. Fuel consumption was 9,000 pounds per hour at 
sea level, dropping to 700 pounds per hour at 70,000 feet cruising altitude. 
The J57-P-31 was designed to operate at up to nearly 74,600 feet before suc-
cumbing to oxygen starvation. With the earlier J57-P-37, the U-2 sometimes 
experienced as many as six flameouts at cruise altitude in a single flight. Louis 
Setter, one of the first U-2 instructor pilots, recalled that, “There were literally 
hundreds of high-altitude flameouts with the P-37 engine during early test and 
pilot training flights, but nearly all of these culminated in successful airstarts.” 
Setter also observed that on one memorable day, “I had two students coming 
in with flameouts and one Lockheed test pilot still at altitude with a flameout, 
all at the same time.”42
With the improved fuel system and turbine design of the J57-P-31, the 
flameout problem virtually ceased. An improved ignition system also allowed 
for restart at high altitude, eliminating the need to descend to a lower altitude, 
where the U-2 would be vulnerable to hostile fire. Even with the J57-P-37, 
there were only two forced landings due to engine failure in the first 20 months 
(more than 5,000 flight hours) of U-2 operations.43
The fuselage interior was plain and uncluttered. A pressurized compart-
ment just forward of the main gear, known as the Q-bay, contained recon-
naissance equipment. Ed Martin devised a system for installing and removing 
payloads using pallets mounted on interchangeable hatches that fitted flush to 
the bottom of the Q-bay. A second hatch on top of the Q-bay allowed access 
for maintenance and installation/removal activities. With the Q-bay consisting 
largely of empty space, only the mid-fuselage spar supported the cockpit and 
nose section. The small, cramped crew station looked like a fighter cockpit—a 
holdover from the XF-104/CL-282 design—but featured a control yoke of the 
type used in bombers and transports. Cables and pulleys linked the yoke to the 
ailerons, and a similar arrangement connected the rudder to two pedals. The 
instrument panel contained an assortment of conventional dials and switches, 
but it was dominated in the center by a hooded driftsight—a downward-look-
ing periscope that allowed the pilot to see beneath the aircraft.44 Designed by 
42. Louis C. Setter, correspondence with author, March 22, 2014.
43. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
44. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 19–20.
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James Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, this optical system 
served as a navigational aid, enabling pilots to spot and recognize landmarks on 
the ground.45 By turning a knob on the instrument panel, the pilot could flip a 
mirror and convert the periscope to a sextant, viewing the sky through a small 
glass hemisphere on the airplane’s nose, just ahead of the cockpit. Celestial 
navigation was routinely used by U-2 pilots and was quite accurate at high 
altitudes, as long as the autopilot was operational.46 The lightweight canopy 
(stressed to handle a pressure differential of 5 pounds per square inch [psi]) 
was hinged on the left side and operated manually. There was no ejection seat 
or canopy jettison system. In the event of emergency, the pilot was expected to 
manually unlatch the canopy and bail out. The airplane’s empennage was built 
as a single unit that included the aft fuselage, vertical tail with rudder, and two 
horizontal stabilizers. For ease of assembly, the entire setup was joined to the 
forward fuselage using just three 5/8-inch tension bolts.47
When Johnson calculated new specifications for the wings, including a 
2.5-g load limit and an aspect ratio of 10.67, it resulted in a wingspan of 80 
feet and a total area of 600 square feet, a 20-percent increase over the original 
CL-282 specifications. The new wing featured three-spar construction and 
45. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 56.
46. Setter, correspondence with author.
47. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 20.
Workers assemble U-2 wings in Oildale. (Lockheed Martin)
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retained Johnson’s gust control feature, but Bob Wiele replaced conventional 
rib stiffeners with an unusual latticework of aluminum tubing. The gust control 
system, which allowed the flaps to tilt upward 4 degrees and the ailerons to tilt 
10 degrees, was designed to reduce tail loads and wing bending in turbulent 
conditions by completely changing the airfoil characteristics.48 The long, thin 
wings were among the most efficient in the world, with a lift-to-drag ratio 
of 25.6:1, better than many competition sailplanes. From an altitude of 
70,000 feet, the U-2 could glide approximately 300 miles.49
Four integral fuel tanks—two leak-proof compartments in each wing—
carried a total of 1,335 gallons, which fed into a fuselage sump tank before 
reaching the engine. The outer 6 feet of wing was not used for fuel storage. 
In 1957, the U-2 was equipped with two 100-gallon slipper tanks that 
could be installed on the wings when a mission called for additional range 
capability. Weight and balance during flight were among the most impor-
tant considerations when designing the fuel system. A complex system of 
feed lines and valves enabled the pilot to transfer fuel to maintain aircraft 
trim as fuel was consumed. Unfortunately, this made it impossible to pro-
vide the pilot with a standard full-to-empty type of quantity gauge in the 
cockpit. Instead, the first 49 U-2 aircraft came equipped with a mechanical 
fuel totalizer/counter. Prior to engine start, counters were set to indicate the 
amount of fuel in each wing, and a flow meter then subtracted the actual 
number of gallons of fuel consumed during the flight. A warning light 
came on when the quantity was down to 50 gallons in the sump tank. As 
standard practice, the pilot maintained a plot of fuel and oxygen remaining 
versus elapsed time.50 
Proper fuel was also critical. Ordinary jet fuel, JP-4, had such a low 
vapor pressure that it would boil off during operation at high altitudes. 
Fortunately, help came from retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, a 
vice president of Shell Oil Company and also a member of the Technological 
Capabilities Panel. Thanks to Doolittle’s intervention, Shell set to work to 
develop a low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure, kerosene-based fuel that met 
specifications.51 The result, known variously as LF-1A and as JP-TS, was a 
broad mixture of aliphatic and aromatic hydrocarbon compounds with an 
initial boiling point of 315 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) at sea level and a freezing 
48. Ibid.
49. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
50. Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing Company, 
2001), pp. 61–62.
51. Ibid., p. 62.
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point of 164 °F.52 Production of LF-1A had an unintended consequence to U.S. 
consumers in the spring and summer of 1955. Manufacturing the special fuel 
required the use of petroleum products that Shell normally used to make the 
company’s Flit insect repellent spray. In order to supply the U-2 program with 
several hundred thousand gallons of LF-1A, Shell had to limit production of Flit, 
causing a nationwide shortage.53
The tendency of liquids to boil at high altitudes also had a significant effect 
on the design of life-support systems for the U-2. Fluids in the human body 
will vaporize at altitudes above 63,000 feet unless the body is kept under pres-
sure. Without special life-support garments, reduced atmospheric pressure at 
typical cruise altitudes also threatened to place considerable stress on the pilot’s 
cardiovascular system and prevent adequate oxygenation of the blood. During 
cruise, the U-2 cockpit was pressurized to the equivalent of 28,000 feet above 
sea level. Since symptoms of hypoxia can be experienced when as low as 12,000 
feet, the pilot was required to wear a partial-pressure suit (i.e., a garment that only 
52. E.R. Kinkead, C.L. Gaworski, C.D. Flemming, et al., “Tumorigenic Evaluation of Jet Fuels JP-TS 
and JP-7,” U.S. Air Force, AL-TR-1991-0020, April 1991, pp. 11–12.
53. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 62.
Two workers prepare to attach the vertical tail, foreground, while others inspect the engine and 
tailpipe assembly. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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pressurizes certain critical parts of the body) that provided oxygen to the helmet at 
all times and inflated if cockpit pressure altitude increased to above 28,000 feet.54
By the third week of May 1955, the fuselage assembly was out of the jigs, but 
the wings were way behind schedule. Johnson was worried about instability due 
to bending, and Bob Kelly had not yet completed his design for the ailerons. In 
an effort to make up for lost time, Johnson drove his people harder than ever 
and had shifts working round the clock. By early June, the static test article was 
complete. Stress analysis of the fuselage, landing gear, and wings indicated that 
predicted critical load limits were fairly accurate. The horizontal tail required 
strengthening, but otherwise Johnson’s design had passed the first test. In July, 
after the wings were completed and installed, Johnson spent 3 days inspecting 
the prototype, which was known simply as Article 341.55 Workers then removed 
the wings and tail, carefully packed the various components, and loaded them 
into a C-124 transport.56 The Article was nearly ready to fly.
54. Ibid., pp. 62–63.
55. Lockheed gave each airframe a three-digit production serial number, known as the Article number. 
This was completely separate from Air Force serial numbers or civilian registration numbers.
56. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 24–25.
A C-124 transport ferried the U-2 to the test site for final assembly. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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After being completely reassembled, Article 341 was ready for testing. (Lockheed Martin)
27
 
Aquatone and Oilstone 
While the airplane was being built, key personnel sought to establish a 
secure test site. In April 1955, Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier flew Johnson, 
Richard Bissell, and Ritland to a dry lakebed adjacent to the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s (AEC) proving ground north of Las Vegas, NV. With its remote 
location, excellent year-round flying weather, and the fact that the airspace 
overhead was already governed by AEC security restrictions, it was ideally 
suited to the U-2 project. Upon returning to Washington, Bissell and Ritland 
took immediate steps to have the lakebed and its environs added to the proving 
ground. Johnson drew up a plan for a small, temporary facility with a 5,000-
foot asphalt runway, a control tower, three hangars, an aircraft parking apron, 
miscellaneous support facilities, and rudimentary personnel accommodations. 
Construction of what became known as Watertown Airstrip began the follow-
ing month and, shortly thereafter, Lockheed, CIA, and Air Force personnel 
began moving in. Arrangements were made to acquire a C-47 transport and 
two T-33 jet trainers as support aircraft.1
Early development and operation of the U-2 was a joint effort. Lockheed 
was exclusively responsible for construction and developmental testing. The 
CIA had overall control of the program, which was codenamed Aquatone, 
as well as responsibility for developing security protocols and paying for air-
frames and camera equipment. The Air Force provided support in myriad 
ways, including supplying engines, ground support equipment, maintenance 
and training personnel, air traffic controllers, and transportation for workers 
to the test site. Air Force officials chose to name their part of the program 
Oilstone.2 This was but a foreshadowing of the future. Throughout its service 
life, the U-2 program would have many different nicknames and codenames.
 1. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 56–57.
 2. Ibid., pp. 60–61.
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First Flights
Kelly Johnson assigned Skunk Works foreman Dorsey Kammerer to over-
see preparations at the test site and Frank “Red” Harvey to supervise the 
various personnel. Ernie Joiner served as chief of flight testing, assisted by 
flight-test engineer Glen Fulkerson. Others included instrumentation spe-
cialist Paul Deal, analysis engineers Mich Yoshii and Bob Klinger, and radio 
technician Jack Reedy. Tony LeVier was the first test pilot assigned to the 
project. Maintenance personnel responsible for Article 341 included crew 
chief Fritz Frye, mechanics Leroy Flynn and Bob Murphy, and electrician 
Vernon Buckner. If any special components needed to be manufactured, the 
test site had a metal shop staffed by Carl Herman, Bob Johnson, and Pop 
Christman. Any work on the airplane was thoroughly checked by inspec-
tors Dick Padjet and Pete Wilkerson. Radioman Frank Cruz was in charge 
of communications. Gene Cuthbert oversaw supply stock. Paul Smith did 
double duty as both clerk and photographer. Utility electrician Dick Hough 
and painter Frank Harvey rounded out the shop personnel.3
As Johnson had promised, the disassembled components of the first U-2 
arrived at the test site on July 25, less than 8 months after Lockheed received 
a go-ahead on the contract. After reassembly, the airplane was subjected to 
ground vibration testing to measure structural modes and frequencies for three 
different fuel load configurations. To undergo these tests, Article 341 was 
mounted on a ground transport dolly and shaken at various frequencies, some 
as low as a half-cycle per second. To prevent deformation of engine bearings 
during ground vibration tests, the engine was motored by blowing compressed 
air directly onto the front compressor with a hose and by blowing air into 
the starter to turn the rear compressor. The results were satisfactory and no 
problems were noted with coupling of structural modes.4 Next, technicians 
prepared the prototype for its first engine run. At first, the J57 would not start 
with the special fuel, so the ground crew improvised. Someone found several 
5-gallon drums of conventional JP-4, linked them together, and ran a hose 
to a fuel valve on the J57. Technicians got the engine running with the JP-4, 
then disconnected the hose and ran the remainder of the test using LF-1A. 
Mechanics later traced the problem to the spark plugs, which were too short.5 
 3. “Original U-2 Flight Test Crews - 1955,” Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame historical collection, 
courtesy of author.
 4. Robert T. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp. paper SP-109, November 4, 1958, p. 29.
 5. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 25.
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Final assembly took place in a hangar at the test site. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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Once this discrepancy was corrected, the Lockheed crew was able to complete 
engine testing and prepare for taxi trials.
On August 1, 1955, Article 341 was towed onto the dry lakebed. Tony 
LeVier got the engine running well on his second attempt then began a low-
speed taxi run to the north. At about 45 miles per hour (mph), the wingtips 
began to lift but the pogos were locked into place and remained attached, 
although they were no longer touching the ground. LeVier found that he 
needed to apply a little rudder to keep the nose straight. He noted that the pogo 
wheels trailed satisfactorily and absorbed small lateral loads very smoothly. 
Maximum speed was about 50 knots, just sufficient to make the ailerons 
slightly effective. LeVier found the performance of the wheel brakes to be 
very poor. At the end of the 2-mile run, he made full 90-degree deflections of 
the tail-wheel steering system in both directions before turning 180 degrees 
and coming to a stop.6
Ernie Joiner inspected the brakes prior to the second taxi test. This time, 
LeVier made his run to the south—accelerating to 70 knots in about a quarter 
mile—and then pulled the throttle to idle. “It was at this point that I became 
aware of being airborne,” he wrote in his post-test report, “which left me with 
utter amazement, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying.”7 He immediately 
started back toward the ground but had difficulty judging his altitude because 
there were no markings on the lakebed. LeVier gunned the throttle in an effort 
to accelerate and avoid stalling, but the J57 engine was slow to respond. From 
a height of approximately 35 feet, the U-2 dropped and made contact with 
the ground in a 10-degree left bank. The impact was hard enough that Article 
341 bounced back into the air. The second touchdown was gentler, allowing 
LeVier to regain control, but he found the brakes ineffective in slowing the 
aircraft. After rolling for some distance and finally veering to the left, the U-2 
came to a stop with the main wheel tires on fire directly beneath the fuel sump 
tank. The chase crew promptly extinguished the blaze. LeVier later noted that 
it would have been best to remain airborne, but with the throttle in idle, he 
felt that he probably would not have been able to accelerate to full power in 
time to avert the hard landing.8 The unplanned flight hinted at the plane’s 
airworthiness, foreshadowing its tendency at low speeds to remain in ground 
effect while gliding for great distances above the runway.
To prevent delays, the brakes and tires were replaced that same afternoon. 
An inspection revealed no significant damage from the fire so another taxi test 
 6. Skip Holm, “Article Airborne,” Air Progress Aviation Review, June 1986, p. 25.
 7. Ibid., p. 26.
 8. Ibid.
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was scheduled for the following day. In the meantime, LeVier and Bob Murphy 
painted some black stripes on the lakebed surface north of the asphalt runway 
to provide a visual reference. “Although this runway was far from adequate in 
regards to markings,” LeVier noted, “it was a big improvement.”9
In the morning, Article 341 was towed back onto the lakebed and LeVier 
climbed into the cockpit. “Engine start, OK.” A few minutes later, he radioed, 
“Rolling.” To preclude a repetition of the inadvertent takeoff, he held the con-
trol yoke forward and attempted to raise the tail. At 55 knots, the tail wheel 
lifted off the ground, and he completed a 1-mile run to evaluate directional and 
lateral control. The results were satisfactory, and with the tail up, the airplane 
reached 85 knots without taking off. LeVier eased off a bit on the yoke, and 
felt the airplane become very light, and it might well have lifted off had he not 
pulled the throttle to idle. He then activated the gust controls, allowing the 
tail to settle back to the ground. As the airplane slowed to 70 knots, he applied 
light wheel braking with little or no effect. Approximately 3 miles down the 
runway, rapidly approaching the edge of the lakebed, he chopped the power 
and the U-2 rolled to a stop. The brakes were extremely hot and might have 
caught fire again if not for quick action by the chase crew.10
While allowing the brakes to cool down, LeVier told Ernie Joiner that he 
had been bothered by unsatisfactory reflections on the windscreen from some 
light-colored material forward of the instrument panel. He felt it might have 
contributed to the visibility problems he experienced during previous tests. 
He also noted that the cockpit was extremely hot and recommended installing 
some sort of sunshade inside the canopy. After the ground crew had turned 
the airplane around, he made a low-speed run to the south with the flaps set 
at 35 degrees. This time the U-2 attained a maximum speed of 50 knots, and 
LeVier didn’t bother with the wheel brakes. He simply allowed the airplane 
to coast to a stop. Afterward, he concluded that tail-wheel steering was of 
little use and might even be prone to inducing a ground loop. He and Kelly 
Johnson both agreed that the wheel brakes should not be used at speeds 
above 30 knots until the airplane’s overall gross weight had been considerably 
reduced. LeVier’s final comment in the postflight debriefing was, “I believe 
the aircraft is ready for flight.”11
The test team spent the morning and early afternoon of August 4 prepar-
ing for the maiden flight. Johnson kept a close watch as Ernie Joiner, Glen 
Fulkerson, Bob Murphy, and several others readied the airplane while LeVier 
 9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 27.
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checked his test plan. In earlier conversations with the test pilot, Johnson 
insisted that the U-2 should be landed with the main gear making initial con-
tact with the runway, followed by the tail wheel. “I disagreed,” LeVier later 
recalled, “and told him it should be stalled-in with the tail wheel touching 
first.”12 Otherwise, he believed, the airplane would bounce. Johnson, however, 
felt that the U-2’s high-aspect-ratio wing would have a significant effect on 
its landing characteristics, differentiating it from other bicycle-gear-equipped 
airplanes like the B-47. LeVier had, in fact, interviewed a number of B-47 
pilots in preparation for his U-2 flight, but he agreed to make the first attempt 
using Johnson’s suggested method.
For the final preparations, Article 341 was towed to the north end of the 
lakebed and aligned with the runway. As during taxi tests, the pogos were 
locked in place to provide balance during touchdown. There was a flurry of 
activity as support personnel and equipment were moved into place. LeVier—
using call sign Angel 1—climbed into the cockpit and began preflight checks. 
Bob Matye took off in the C-47 with Johnson and Henry Combs on board as 
observers. Their first task was to check local weather conditions and winds aloft 
because a storm was moving in. Ernie Joiner (call sign Ground Hog) prepared 
to monitor the test from his position on the lakebed. Apparently no one had 
12. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 79.
Chase cars follow the U-2 as it rolls across the dry lakebed. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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thought to secure the airspace in advance of the test flight. A few minutes 
after the C-47 departed, he observed an Air Force F-86 making a fairly close 
gunnery pass overhead. Ray Goudey took off in a T-33 to serve as safety chase, 
and a fire truck was positioned 1 mile to the south, adjacent to the runway. All 
of the months of preparation had led to this moment. LeVier initiated engine 
start. Nothing happened.13
After two failed attempts to start the engine with LF-1A, Joiner decided 
they should refuel the airplane with JP-4 and try again. Nearly an hour was 
lost during this delay, and the observation and chase airplanes had to land to 
conserve fuel. Rain was already falling north of the lakebed and a crosswind 
blew in from the southwest, forcing LeVier to taxi the U-2 to a new starting 
point further to the east than originally planned. Finally, it was time, and he 
began his takeoff roll using approximately 85 percent revolutions per minute 
(rpm). He held the nose down until the airplane reached 100 knots, at which 
point it lifted off the ground. “The initial climb out felt very good,” he reported 
later, “with what appeared to be satisfactory longitudinal stability and control.” 
He noted that the right wing felt heavy, and Johnson told him to hold the 
wing up to balance the fuel. As he circled the lakebed at an altitude of 5,000 
feet and a speed of around 160 knots with the landing gear still down, LeVier 
declared, “This thing flies like a baby buggy.”14
“Try gear up if you want,” Johnson suggested. LeVier raised the gear, 
climbed to 8,000 feet, and continued to explore the airplane’s handling quali-
ties through a variety of gentle maneuvers, including stalls. “Yaws right slightly, 
very sensitive at 100 knots. Right wing still heavy at 90. Aileron input at 85 
knots. Lots of stall warning. Recovering.” LeVier activated the speed brakes at 
approximately 140 knots, resulting in moderate tail buffet. He made six stalls, 
beginning in a clean (flaps up) configuration and gradually increasing the flap 
angle. He concluded that the airplane had normal buffet characteristics prior 
to full stall, with a very mild downward pitch. He noted that the wings were 
bowed slightly upward and that he was picking up a little bit of rain on the 
windscreen. After 15 minutes of flight, he descended, lowered the gear and 
flaps, and started his landing approach from 5,000 feet. “It wasn’t difficult to 
realize that this was no ordinary aircraft,” he later recalled. “With the power 
lever in almost idle, the wing flaps partially down and dive brakes extended, 
the aircraft had a very flat glide angle and a long float on flaring out.”15
13. Holm, “Article Airborne,” p. 28.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 28–29.
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Attempting to touch the main wheels down first while pushing forward 
on the control yoke to lower the nose produced an erratic and uncontrollable 
porpoise maneuver. As the U-2 bounced into the air, Johnson yelled, “Go 
around!” LeVier added power and circled around for another attempt. He 
made a shallower approach this time, but the airplane just floated in ground 
effect approximately 10 feet above the lakebed. “Boy, for more drag,” he 
lamented. After several more approaches and go-arounds with similar results, 
LeVier finally achieved a two-point landing with both the main gear and tail 
wheel touching down simultaneously. He also activated the gust control system 
to further reduce lift.16 Johnson was forced to agree that LeVier had been right. 
It was best to land with the tail wheel touching the ground at the same time or 
just ahead of the main gear. The entire flight lasted less than 40 minutes. The 
storm broke 10 minutes later, flooding the lakebed with 2 inches of water.17
LeVier worked to perfect his landing technique during a second flight 2 
days later, with Bob Matye flying chase in a T-33. Rolling north across the 
lakebed, the U-2 lifted off at 70 knots and immediately began to porpoise. 
LeVier added power and pulled up, resulting in a mild stall buffet, but this 
16. Ibid., p. 29.
17. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
A summer storm flooded the lakebed minutes after Article 341 landed. (Lockheed Martin)
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was less alarming than the porpoising. Matye thought a slight tailwind might 
have been a factor. After climbing to nearly 7,000 feet, LeVier began the first 
of several touch-and-go landings. His first approach was long and shallow, 
but he aborted when it began to seem hazardous. On the second approach, 
he employed the speed brakes and 10 degrees of flap, with the engine at 70 
percent rpm. At 5 feet above the ground, he established the landing attitude 
in mild stall buffet and let the airplane settle in. This resulted in a two-point 
touchdown with a forward lunge and mild porpoising. He later described this 
second attempt as “successful and a reasonably good landing. I used the gust 
control and except for being awful slow, it certainly is a useful aid to [flying] 
this aircraft.” LeVier then raised the flaps, set power to 85 percent rpm, and 
held the control yoke forward. The plane started porpoising again on takeoff, 
and he attributed this motion to low pressure in the main landing gear shock 
strut.18 The third and final landing was about the same.
Following the flight, LeVier had several recommendations. First, he sug-
gested adjusting the shock strut pressure. He also speculated that using the 
gust controls during takeoff might reduce the porpoise motion, as well as 
pitching and stall buffet during the initial climb. He further recommended 
that some method be devised to allow the pilot to establish a proper landing 
attitude that would result in a two-point touchdown every time. Finally, he 
recommended fitting the seat with a back cushion. “I’m still using a regular 
bed pillow,” he fumed. “I believe we should make up a few slightly tapered 
back cushions of two or three-inch thickness.”19
Having proven the basic airworthiness of the U-2, and having solved the 
difficult challenge of developing a successful landing technique, Johnson sched-
uled the official first flight for August 8. This time, representatives of the CIA 
and Air Force had been invited, along with high-ranking Lockheed executives. 
After briefing his guests on the day’s schedule, Johnson donned a parachute 
and climbed into the back of Matye’s T-33.20 The U-2 was readied for flight, 
remaining in the same configuration as during the previous tests, with the 
pogos locked into the wings.
Matye and Johnson took off first, circling the lakebed while LeVier taxied 
into position for departure to the north. They caught up as the U-2 started 
its roll. Takeoff was smooth this time, probably as a result of adjustments 
mechanics had made to shock strut pressure. LeVier made a gentle climb to the 
left, raising the gear when he had attained a speed of 130 knots. He brought 
18. Holm, Article Airborne, pp. 30–31.
19. Ibid., p. 96.
20. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
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the plane around in a wide circle 
and made a pass at moderate alti-
tude—around 8,000 feet—over 
the spectators before starting a 
series of planned test maneu-
vers. Johnson recorded airspeed 
calibration data during a climb to 
30,500 feet, but Matye had dif-
ficulty keeping up with the U-2 
even though LeVier reported that 
his engine was practically idling. 
Soon, the U-2 was nearly 1,000 
feet above the T-33. During the 
climb, LeVier noted that his cabin 
pressure fluctuated as much as 500 
feet in 2-second cycles. After lev-
eling off, he accelerated to 260 
knots and detected some aileron 
buzz and possibly a slight rumble 
in the air intake ducts. The rough-
ness was noticeable even with the 
engine in idle, so LeVier increased rpm, lowered the landing gear, and extended 
the wing flaps. Johnson informed him that the right pogo was shaking a little 
and advised terminating the speed run.21
The tail wheel failed to come down on the first attempt. Descending at a 
rate of 1,500 feet per minute, LeVier took a moment to perform a stall using 
30 degrees of flap. He began to feel slight buffeting at around 80 knots, and 
the airplane stalled at 72 knots, pitching down and to the left. “It sort of crabs 
around,” he noted. “You can feel it.” He recovered quickly and actuated the 
speed brakes, at which time the tail wheel finally extended. The duct rumble 
began to ease at 20,000 feet. He had no difficulty setting up his approach angle, 
but judging the airplane’s height above the lakebed remained a problem. As 
touchdown seemed imminent, he actuated the gust control mechanism and 
set power to idle, but he was still a bit too high. The aileron lost effectiveness, 
causing the left wing to drop suddenly. LeVier realized too late that he should 
have waited until touchdown to activate the gust controls. The left wingtip 
struck the ground fairly hard, but with sparing application of the wheel brakes, 
he managed to bring the airplane to a halt directly in front of the viewing 
21. Holm, Article Airborne, pp. 96–97.
Tony LeVier completed the first phase of  
contractor testing in the U-2. (Lockheed Martin)
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area.22 The VIP guests were then allowed to inspect the airplane, and Johnson 
declared that he had successfully achieved his self-imposed 8-month deadline.23
Developmental Testing
Over the next several weeks LeVier completed 16 additional flights, exploring 
the airplane’s stall characteristics, taking the U-2 to its maximum stress limits 
(+2.5 g’s and –1.5 g’s) and expanding the performance envelope. He flew the 
U-2 to its maximum speed of Mach 0.85, or around 560 miles per hour (487 
knots), and in preparation for cruising at altitudes never previously reached 
in sustained flight, the 42-year-old LeVier became the oldest test pilot to 
complete Air Force partial-pressure-suit training. He expanded the low and 
medium altitude flight envelopes and by August 16, he had reached an alti-
tude of 52,000 feet. He then left Project Aquatone and returned to Burbank 
to serve as the company’s director of flying.24 Before LeVier left, he checked 
out two more pilots, Bob Matye and Ray Goudey, who began making at least 
one flight nearly every day. As the pace of testing increased, Robert Sieker and 
Robert Schumacher joined the team to help expand the airplane’s performance 
capabilities and test the reconnaissance systems. Goudey performed in-flight 
structural tests, and Schumacher was instrumental in clearing the U-2 for 
maximum altitude operation as well as for testing sensor systems. Kelly Johnson 
paid Sieker a $25,000 bonus for performing an intentional deadstick landing 
during one test flight.25 By September 8, the U-2 had been flown to 65,600 
feet (approximately 12 miles above the ground), but engine flameouts at high 
altitude were becoming a significant problem.
The second and third airframes were delivered in September and October, 
and the test program was proceeding fairly smoothly. On December 1, Johnson 
noted, “We have built four flying airplanes, have the ninth airplane in the jig, 
and have flown over our design altitude any number of times.”26 By March 31, 
1956, the U-2 fleet consisted of nine airplanes with a combined total of 1,042 
flight hours. The pilots were routinely flying at altitudes that would have been 
considered incredible in 1955. Three consecutive flights by Matye exceeded, by 
significant margins, the world altitude record of 65,890 feet that had been set 
22. Ibid.
23. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
24. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 71.
25. Miller, Skunk Works, p. 80.
26. Ibid.
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in August 1955 by British pilot Walter Gibb in an English Electric Canberra 
(the original version of the Martin B-57).27 The test pilots devoted a great 
deal of effort to studying the problems of engine performance. The J57-P-31 
powerplant was still not available, and the J57-P-37 had significantly poorer 
combustion characteristics and a tendency to flame out at cruising altitude. 
Combustion problems most often manifested at altitudes between 57,000 and 
65,000 feet, within a portion of the performance envelope that the pilots called 
the “badlands.” In one typical example, the airplane was cruising at 64,000 
feet when flameout occurred. The pilot briefly restarted the engine, but it quit 
again at 60,000 feet. He was ultimately forced to descend to 35,000 feet before 
regaining successful engine operation.28 During a test flight this was merely an 
inconvenience, but if a similar event occurred in the course of an operational 
mission over hostile territory it would place the pilot in deadly peril.
As engineers struggled with the flameout problem, logistical difficul-
ties threatened to slow Lockheed’s production progress. Pratt & Whitney 
announced that the J57-P-31 engines would not be available until the spring 
27. Ibid.
28. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 71.
Lockheed test pilot Ray Goudey receives a weather briefing prior to a U-2 flight. (Laughlin 
Heritage Foundation)
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of 1956, and even the interim J57-P-37 was becoming scarce because the 
company had committed its full production capacity for these engines to the 
Air Force for use in F-100 fighters and KC-135 tankers. In order to keep U-2 
production on schedule, Col. Leo Geary (who had replaced Ritland) arranged 
for the diversion of a number of engines that had been destined for Boeing’s 
KC-135 production line to the U-2 production line.29 This kept the program 
running until the first J57-P-31 engines arrived, at which point the airplane’s 
performance increased significantly. The new engine had greater thrust, lower 
weight, and consumed very little oil. Most important, flameout at altitude was 
almost impossible.30 By June 1, 1956, the J57-P-31 engine had propelled the 
U-2 to 74,500 feet.31
Structural demonstrations, initially conducted with the aircraft restricted 
to 80 percent of design limit loads, included wind-up turns to 3 g’s. A camera 
mounted atop the fuselage was used to measure wingtip deflections. Flight data 
29. Ibid.
30. Benedict J. Koziol, “The U-2 Aircraft Engine,” in Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel, U-2 
History Symposium, National Defense University, Fort McNair, DC, September 1998,  
pp. 7–8.
31. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
A U-2A climbs to altitude during a test flight. (U.S. Air Force)
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were then correlated with static test data prior to extending static testing to 
ultimate loads using the ground-test article. Ray Goudey tested the structural 
limit loads in an orderly fashion despite schedule pressures, and Lockheed 
engineers were pleased to learn that the airframe proved stronger than many 
had thought. Although Lockheed engineers measured ultimate loads of as 
much as 4 g’s, flight limit loads remained at 2.5 g’s, as originally specified, so 
as not to overstress any of the airplanes.32
Since the beginning of the project, the U-2 prototype had served as the 
flagship of the test fleet, and it was the most extensively instrumented airframe. 
Technicians installed strain gages in Article 341, using the same locations 
where measurements had been taken on the structural test article. The devel-
opmental test program lasted 7 months and included basic aircraft and engine 
performance assessments, stability and control evaluations, structural demon-
strations, and operational testing of aircraft systems. By February 29, 1956, 
Article 341 had made 83 flights and logged 150 flight hours. Subsequently, this 
airplane was used primarily for testing modifications to the J57-P-37 engine 
and development of the improved J57-P-31 engine, as well as for other miscel-
laneous tests. Article 342 was also instrumented for testing, although not as 
extensively as Article 341, and was primarily dedicated to testing various recon-
naissance camera systems. This airplane was flown 22 times (logging 33 flight 
hours) during this demonstration then released for use in the pilot training 
program. Instrumentation used in Article 342 was transferred to Article 344, 
and the majority of camera testing was accomplished with the latter. Article 
344 was also used for autopilot development testing and weather research 
flights, eventually accruing 250 flight hours over the span of 85 sorties before 
being released for use in pilot training. A fourth airplane, Article 351, was 
used for testing System I, a radar detection and recording system; System II, 
an advanced high-frequency navigation and communication system; System 
III, a VHF radio transmission recording system; and the AN/APQ-56 radar 
mapping system, as well as the J57-P-31 engine.33
Lockheed engineers in Burbank subjected the ground-test article to static 
loading to destruction in order to establish safe flight limitations for a series of 
structural demonstrations. During five sorties with Article 341, the airplane 
underwent pull-ups, pushovers, stalls, and roll and yaw maneuvers at gross 
weights between 15,900 and 16,800 pounds. Tests were conducted with gust 
controls and flaps faired and extended, landing gear down, and speed brakes 
retracted and extended. The pilot performed the aileron roll test by starting 
32. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 29.
33. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 4.
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from a 45-degree left bank and rolling into a 45-degree right bank at a speed 
of 150 knots. Wingtip deflection was measured during level and maneuvering 
flight, and researchers found that upward deflection could be reduced as much 
as 5 inches by shifting the flaps and ailerons up for gust control. The most dif-
ficult aspect of measuring wing deflection turned out to be the need for very 
precise piloting technique. It was found that g-loading had to be increased as 
gradually as possible while maintaining the planned test airspeed. Otherwise, 
if g-loading increased too rapidly, dynamic overswing resulted in erroneous 
measurements, particularly at high negative-g conditions where pilots had a 
tendency to maneuver rapidly.34
Prior to in-flight structural demonstrations, technicians made reinforce-
ments to portions of the airplane’s structure. These changes were based on 
the results of the ultimate static load tests performed earlier. Subsequent 
flight-testing proved these modifications airworthy and all U-2 airplanes were 
strengthened accordingly. Other reinforcements were implemented in response 
to incidents that occurred during flight-test and training operations. During 
one sortie with Article 342, the pilot slowed the airplane by extending the 
speed brakes in level flight at 260 knots. As the plane decelerated to 250 knots 
(Mach 0.56) at 20,000 feet, an elevator tab support bracket failed and tore 
loose from the web of the rear stabilizer beam. To prevent reoccurrence of this 
type of failure, the bracket was redesigned to be tied into the top and bottom 
beam caps. This modification was incorporated into the entire U-2 fleet and no 
further trouble was experienced. Another modification resulted from discovery 
of fuselage skin wrinkles at the aft end of the tail wheel well. These wrinkles 
were only evident when the airplanes were sitting on the ground with a heavy 
fuel load. Although this was not considered a flight hazard, doubler plates were 
installed to alleviate load concentration while on the ground.35
Lockheed engineer Robert T. Klinger remarked in a November 1958 report 
that “The U-2 project was unique in practically all aspects; the design, test-
ing, production, pilot training and service deployment [were] conducted on 
a ‘crash’ basis, by a relatively few number of people, while maintaining the 
highest order of security.” In fact, the entire developmental flight-test program 
was conducted by just four engineers and five test pilots, assisted by a small 
cadre of about 20 maintenance, supply, and administrative personnel. Unlike 
in conventional aircraft procurement programs, the U-2 was not subjected to 
the formal eight-phase test program then in use by the Air Force. Instead, the 
34. Ibid., pp. 152–156.
35. Ibid., pp. 156–161.
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airplane’s operational suitability, reliability, and other factors were evaluated 
concurrently with the developmental testing and pilot training programs.36
In the spring of 1957, two decades before the advent of what has come to 
be known as low observable—or stealth—technology, the CIA sought to make 
the U-2 less vulnerable to radar detection. For this pioneering effort, known 
as Project Rainbow, Lockheed engineers Luther McDonald, Mel George, and 
Ed Lovick teamed up with Harvard physics professor Ed Purcell and Frank 
Rodgers, associate head of the Radar Division at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, to 
reduce the airplane’s radar signature through two vastly different approaches. 
One method, nicknamed “trapeze,” involved stringing copper-plated steel wires 
with ferrite beads across the aircraft’s outer skin at specific distances from the 
fuselage, wings, and tail. As applied to Article 343, the wires were strung across 
laminated wood stand-offs that bristled from the fuselage, tail, and the leading 
and trailing edges of the wings.37 In the second approach, Article 341 received 
a coating of high-frequency radar-absorbent material (RAM) on the underside 
of the fuselage. The RAM, varying in thickness from a quarter-inch to about 1 
inch, consisted of a fiberglass honeycomb topped by layers of Salisbury Screen, 
a conductive graphite grid on canvas sheets. It was nicknamed “wallpaper” 
because of the circuit grid pattern on its surface. Additionally, the RAM coating 
prevented the dissipation of engine heat through the aircraft’s skin, earning it 
the nickname “thermos.” With the addition of RAM or wires, the U-2 suffered 
from excess weight and drag, making it aerodynamically “unclean.” Hence 
Article 343 and Article 341 were known as “Dirty Birds.” These modifications 
reduced the airplane’s maximum altitude by as much as 5,000 feet and cut its 
range by 20 percent.38
During one of Robert Sieker’s Rainbow test flights in Article 341, the 
insulating properties of the coating surrounding the engine bay caused the 
hydraulic system to overheat and reduce pressure to the fuel boost pump 
motor. The result was a flameout at 72,000 feet and loss of cabin pressure. 
Ordinarily, this would not have been a serious problem because the pilot was 
wearing his partial-pressure suit. Unfortunately, as his suit inflated, the clasp 
on his faceplate failed, causing loss of consciousness when the air rushed out 
of his helmet. The airplane stalled and entered a flat spin. Descending into 
the lower atmosphere, Sieker finally regained his senses and attempted to 
bail out. It took search teams several days to locate the wreckage, which was 
36. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
37. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 50.
38. Peter W. Merlin and Tony Moore, X-Plane Crashes (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 
2008), p. 84.
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Engineers attempted two very different approaches to reducing the airplane’s radar signature. 
One involved stringing ferrite beads on wires along the fuselage and wings while the other 
required coating parts of the aircraft with radar-absorbent material. (CIA)
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largely intact. Sieker’s body was found nearby with his parachute only par-
tially deployed.39 Investigators determined that had his life-support system 
not malfunctioned, he would have most likely been able to bring the plane 
home safely. Kelly Johnson called for a redesign of the faceplate latch, a dual 
oxygen regulator, and an ejection seat that could be used interchangeably 
with the existing bucket seat.40
Testing continued despite the loss of Article 341 and a valued member 
of the team. Several months later, the entire test operation was moved to the 
North Base auxiliary airfield at the edge of Rogers Dry Lake on Edwards Air 
Force Base. “I hesitate to say that this was an easy flight test program,” recalled 
Ernie Joiner during a presentation in 1998, “for there were some challenging 
elements. It must be said, though, that the U-2 program was unique in that 
we overlapped flight test development with training and with deployment. 
This was historic and would have been impossible without a good airplane 
and a reliable engine.”41
39. Ibid.
40. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 51.
41. Ernie L. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” in Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel, p. 21.
Article 341 crashed in a flat spin following a flameout at 72,000 feet. Lockheed test pilot Robert 
Sieker was killed. (CIA)
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Pilot Training
Even as developmental testing continued, the time had come to begin training 
CIA and Air Force U-2 pilots. Members of the Air Force training cadre began 
arriving in early November 1955. Col. William R. Yancey, handpicked by 
Gen. Curtis Lemay, chief of Strategic Air Command (SAC), was tasked with 
representing SAC’s interests in the program. He had been specifically instructed 
to evaluate the Lockheed flight-test effort, verify that the airplane and recon-
naissance equipment performed as expected, and report his findings directly to 
Lemay as soon as possible. Should the results prove satisfactory, Yancey was to 
train a specified number of pilots for operational missions. Shortly after deliv-
ery of the third U-2, the Air Force activated the 4070th Support Wing with 
Yancey as commander. His staff included deputy commander Col. Herbert 
Shingler, navigator and classroom instructor Maj. Robert E. Mullin, navigation 
officer and mission planner Jack Delap, logistics and supply officer Maj. Art 
Lien, development and flight-test officers Maj. Louis A. Garvin and Lt. Col. 
Phillip O. Robertson, flight instructors Capt. Hank Meierdierck and Capt. 
Louis Setter, and three airmen. Ray Goudey and Bob Matye gave the pilots 
ground instruction and checkout before allowing them to make familiarization 
and proficiency flights around the local area.42
Teaching Yancey’s group how to fly the U-2 was particularly challenging 
because there was as yet no two-seat model of the U-2. The unique handling 
characteristics of the single-seat plane could only be experienced firsthand in 
solo flight. The student pilot first underwent extensive ground training, as well 
as practice in the T-33. For his initial U-2 flights, the student took off with 
an instructor pilot flying chase in the T-33 and providing instructions and 
encouragement over the radio. Each U-2 was built by hand, and slight varia-
tions in construction contributed to differences in aircraft behavior. This was 
especially noticeable when stalling the airplane during landing approach. One 
airplane might regularly fall off to the right and another to the left. Lockheed 
flight-test engineers took note of this and added small fixed metal strips to the 
leading inboard edge of the wing to modify the airplane’s stall characteristics 
as necessary.43
All CIA and Air Force U-2 pilots were initially selected from veterans of SAC 
F-84 fighter squadrons scheduled to be disbanded and to have their personnel 
reassigned. Those chosen for the CIA program had to resign their Air Force 
42. William R. Yancey, undated letter (circa 2007) to Hank Meierdierck regarding early U-2 training 
operations, Roadrunners Internationale historical reference collection.
43. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 31.
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commissions, effectively becoming civilians for the duration of their assign-
ment. The selection process was rigorous. Because U-2 pilots were expected to 
endure the stress of flying at extremely high altitudes for extended periods of 
time, every effort was made to exclude those who might be unable to handle 
the claustrophobic conditions of the pressure suit and the airplane’s cramped 
cockpit. In preparation for high-altitude operations, each man underwent 
thorough physical and psychological examinations at the Lovelace Clinic in 
Albuquerque and fitting for partial-pressure suits at the David Clark Company 
in Worcester, MA. Another challenge involved teaching the pilots the proper 
way to handle the delicate U-2. Former fighter pilots accustomed to flying 
fast and making abrupt maneuvers needed to understand the limitations of a 
lightweight airframe not designed to handle the stresses of loops, barrel rolls, 
or even a hard pull-up.44
The first group of pilot trainees arrived at Watertown Airstrip on January 
11, 1956. Two more classes soon followed, resulting in a total of 28 student 
pilots. Yancey’s flight instructors devised a syllabus consisting of ground school 
and flight checkout. Before being allowed to solo in the U-2, each student 
first flew a number of analog sorties in the T-33 to simulate high-altitude 
flameouts and restarts, practice U-2 landing approach techniques, and dem-
onstrate near-stall landings. An instructor pilot shadowed the U-2 when each 
student made his first solo, a flight to 20,000 feet followed by five practice 
landings on the lakebed. Students didn’t wear the pressure garment until the 
third solo flight, which was typically a 3-hour flight to 60,000 feet. The next 
nine sorties introduced trainees to high-altitude navigation and photography, 
long-duration flight (upward of 8 hours), night flying, and landings on the 
paved airstrip. Each pilot was declared mission qualified after logging at least 
58 flight hours in the U-2 and completing a final 8-hour check ride.45 Francis 
G. “Frank” Powers, who was assigned to the second group of trainees, was most 
impressed by the attention paid to the flying portion of the syllabus. “While at 
Watertown we flew the U-2 far more than we would have if we’d been in the Air 
Force and checking out in a new aircraft,” he wrote in his memoir. “As a result, 
on completing our training we had the utmost confidence in its reliability.”46
Once a sufficient number of pilots had completed training, they were 
tasked with an operational checkout of the U-2, including the planes, ground 
and flight crews, navigation systems, life-support systems, cameras, and other 
44. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 74–75.
45. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 32.
46. Francis Gary Powers and Curt Gentry, Operation Overflight (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 
1970), p. 36.
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equipment. During a 5-day training exercise in April 1956, U-2s took off from 
Watertown on eight cross-country sorties for the purpose of testing various 
camera systems. The entire exercise was conducted in the manner of a standard 
Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection, with Col. Yancey and his detach-
ment serving as observers. They carefully examined all aspects of the U-2 unit’s 
performance, including that of maintenance personnel, flight crews, camera 
technicians, and mission planners. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported 
that the detachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level 
Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of 
Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey’s determination that the U-2 
was ready to become operational.47 As the CIA detachments began departing 
for overseas duty, Air Force pilot training began in earnest.
By mid-1956, the U-2 had been flown on several missions lasting more than 
10 hours and covering over 5,000 statute miles. Airplanes equipped with the 
J57-P-31 engine had attained altitudes up to 74,500 feet.48 Not surprisingly, 
the intensive training program resulted in a number of mishaps, some fatal. 
In his March 21, 1956, diary entry, Kelly Johnson noted that Article 342 had 
47. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 77–78.
48. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
Ground crews prepare U-2s for training flights. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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been “wrecked” when Carmine Vito made a rough landing.49 This apparently 
sounded much worse than it actually was, as the airplane was soon repaired 
and flying. But there were more serious mishaps to come.
One incident with deadly results was a consequence of the unusual land-
ing gear arrangement. As originally designed, the pogo outriggers were to be 
dropped during or shortly after takeoff using a manual release system. “We soon 
learned that any delay by the pilot in dropping them would often cause them to 
hang up,” Ernie Joiner recalled. “When that happened, it was wise to stay clear 
of the airplane’s flight path.” On May 15, CIA pilot Wilburn S. “Billy” Rose 
had just taken off for a training flight in Article 345 when he noticed that one 
of the outriggers had failed to separate. He tried to shake it loose while flying 
low over the lakebed but the airplane, heavy with fuel, stalled and crashed. 
Rose became the first CIA fatality of the program. To prevent a reoccurrence of 
the problem, the pilot actuation system was removed so that the pogos would 
fall away automatically as soon as the wings started to lift, while the airplane 
was still on the runway. A spring was installed on the upper end of the pogo 
to push it away from the wing as soon as the weight of the aircraft was lifted.50
The trainees continued to suffer a variety of landing mishaps. On June 1, Bill 
Strickland somehow allowed Article 344 to run out of fuel. He landed 392 yards 
short of the lakebed, miraculously without damaging the airplane. Another pilot 
was not so lucky, damaging Article 355 in a rough landing just shy of 8 weeks 
after the airplane had been delivered. Fortunately, it was repairable.51
Takeoff could be equally hazardous. During a night training flight in Article 
354 on August 31, Frank G. Grace, Jr., tried to climb too steeply during takeoff. 
Apparently failing to maintain a proper climb angle, he stalled with insufficient 
altitude for recovery. Grace died when his airplane plummeted 50 feet to the 
ground, cartwheeled on its left wing, and struck a power pole near the runway.52
On September 17, 1956, Article 346 lost part of its right wing shortly after 
Howard Carey took off from Lindsey Air Force Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. 
The aircraft disintegrated in flight, killing the pilot. The exact cause was never 
determined. Kelly Johnson believed it resulted from overpressure in the wing 
tanks during a steep climb, but it was also noted that the U-2 might have been 
caught in the jet wash from a flight of four Canadian F-86 fighters that had just 
passed by. The U-2 airframe was not stressed to withstand severe turbulence. 
One of Carey’s fellow pilots theorized that the accident could have been caused 
49. Ibid.
50. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” p. 22. 
51. Johnson, “Log for Project X.”
52. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 79–80.
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by an unintentional extension of the flaps. The flap switch was located alongside 
the throttle, where it could be easily bumped to the down position during the 
climb. As long as the gust alleviation system was activated—as it routinely was 
during takeoff—this would have no adverse effect, but once the pilot deactivated 
the gust controls, the flaps would revert to the commanded position.53
The loss of Article 357 on December 19, 1956, resulted from pilot hypoxia 
after Robert Ericson took off from Watertown on a cross-country flight over 
northern Arizona. As the U-2 climbed to altitude, a small leak slowly depleted 
his oxygen supply. Hypoxia gradually set in, impairing the pilot’s judgment. 
As his reaction time slowed and he lost track of the aircraft’s speed, the U-2 
exceeded the placarded 190-knot maximum. The delicate airframe quickly 
approached its load limits and finally disintegrated when it reached 270 knots. 
Ericson somehow managed to jettison the canopy and was sucked out of the 
aircraft at an altitude of 28,000 feet. Fortunately, his chute opened automati-
cally at 15,000 feet, and he touched down without injury.54 The aircraft was 
a total loss, its wreckage strewn across part of the Navajo Indian Reservation 
south of Ganado.
53. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 338. 
54. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 80.
Some of the most challenging aspects of the U-2 resulted from the airplane’s unusual landing 
gear configuration. (Laughlin Historical Foundation)
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Training continued unabated despite these mishaps. The first operational 
mission occurred just 18 months after program go-ahead and was conducted 
over Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe on June 20, 1956. By mid-June 1957, 
three CIA detachments had been deployed around the world, Air Force U-2 
personnel were assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and 
based in Del Rio, TX, and test operations were transferred to Edwards Air Force 
Base. As director of Project Aquatone, Richard Bissell was very pleased with 
the outcome. “The active participation and support of the Air Force continued 
throughout the life of the program,” he wrote in his memoirs, “and without 
its many contributions the project could not have been carried through.”55
55. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Jonathan E. Lewis, and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: 
From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 97.
A U-2A is slowed by a drag chute during landing. (Laughlin Historical Foundation)

52
The U-2C had fluted inlets to accommodate increased airflow to the J75 engine and a dorsal spine 
housing additional equipment. Note the 100-gallon slipper tanks on each wing. (Lockheed Martin)
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Design Evolution 
Over the years, the U-2 family of aircraft spawned two major design variants 
and a host of specialized models. These changes enhanced survivability and 
increased operational effectiveness. The basic design parameters and perfor-
mance characteristics have remained largely unchanged except for those result-
ing from improvements in propulsion and avionics technology. Despite its 
planned short-term obsolescence, the airplane’s versatility ensured that descen-
dants of the original U-2 would remain in service well into the 21st century.
The First Upgrade
Beginning in late 1958, Lockheed embarked on a program to retrofit the CIA 
fleet with more powerful engines to increase operational altitudes. This first 
major upgrade to the airplane was dubbed U-2C. It featured a new powerplant 
and larger inlets for improved performance. Kelly Johnson selected Article 
342 to serve as the prototype, and Lockheed technicians replaced its J57-P-31 
engine with a Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13 axial-flow turbojet weighing 4,900 
pounds and providing 15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. Seven years later, 
the U-2C fleet would be equipped with more powerful J75-P-13B engines 
with a 17,000-pound-thrust rating. In order to improve airflow to the engine’s 
compressor face, the inlets were widened and fluted, allowing a greater mass of 
air to enter.1 Greater thrust meant that the airplane reached operational alti-
tudes more quickly and reduced time spent in the tropopause (the atmospheric 
band between 45,000 and 55,0000 feet), where contrails typically formed. This 
reduced the chances of visual detection. Use of the more powerful J75 also 
enabled the U-2 to carry a larger payload. The J75 engines were in short supply 
in 1959 due to Pratt & Whitney’s commitments to the Air Force for F-105 
production, but the CIA managed to obtain an initial supply of 12 engines. 
The Air Force never equipped its U-2 fleet with the J75.2
 1. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 399.
 2. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 149–152.
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Developmental testing of the U-2C was expedited to meet operational 
requirements for the airplane. Article 342 was thoroughly instrumented for 
airplane and powerplant performance evaluations, autopilot development, 
stability and control, and operational systems testing. Ray Goudey made the 
maiden flight of the U-2C on May 13, 1959, at Edwards. Soon thereafter, 
Article 358 and Article 351 joined the program as the second and third U-2C 
models. These airframes were used primarily for testing aircraft systems and 
reconnaissance equipment. All three were used for accelerated service testing 
to demonstrate operational reliability and collect cruise performance data. All 
testing was complete by July 24, 1959, just 10 weeks after the first flight. The 
three airplanes completed 106 sorties totaling 381 flight hours. Articles 351 
and 358 were deployed with an operational detachment on August 12, but 
Article 342 remained at Edwards for further performance testing and devel-
opment of an electrical power system and the System IX Granger Deceptive 
Repeater installation.3
Designers made a number of significant changes to the basic airplane. The 
U-2C was approximately 1,450 pounds heavier than the U-2A, with the new 
J75 engine accounting for 1,100 pounds of the increase. The landing gear and 
associated structure had to be strengthened, and heavy-duty tires installed, to 
accommodate the heavier gross takeoff weight. The fuselage sump tank was 
slightly larger, holding 95 to 100 gallons of fuel—about a 10-pound increase. 
The total area of the engine air inlets was increased to accommodate the greater 
airflow requirements of the new powerplant. Lockheed engineers redesigned 
the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer, making it more rounded and 
increasing the camber. The operating speed of the gust control system was 
reduced 50 percent to provide a smoother response. Numerous internal systems 
were modified to improve engine and hydraulic oil cooling, autopilot perfor-
mance, fuel flow, electrical power, and environmental controls. Much attention 
was devoted to improving heat shielding around the engine to provide adequate 
aircraft structural cooling.4
Based on lessons learned with the U-2A, Lockheed engineers made several 
changes to improve U-2C controllability. The elevator trim tab operating speed 
was doubled, downward elevator travel was increased from 11.5 to 20 degrees 
to offset a nose-up pitching tendency resulting from a rapid increase in power, 
and gust control system response was slowed by half to decrease the rate of 
change in elevator stick force. The modified airplane demonstrated improved 
 3. Robert T. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2C Airplane,” Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp., SP-179, July 1, 1960, pp. 6–7.
 4. Ibid., pp. 14–18.
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altitude performance, but its center-of-gravity limits were significantly nar-
rower. On one early test flight, Bob Schumacher reported that the center of 
gravity was so far forward that the airplane might become uncontrollable if 
the autopilot disconnected before the fuel supply from auxiliary slipper tanks 
on the wings was exhausted. In order to mitigate this problem, the horizontal 
stabilizers were subsequently modified to balance the aerodynamic load with 
increased camber and more rounded leading edges. For most operational con-
figurations, ballast had to be added to the tail. The U-2C upgrade initially 
raised the airplane’s maximum altitude to more than 74,600 feet (and later to 
75,000 feet with the J75-P-13B) and improved the compressor stall margin. 
Unfortunately, increased altitude capability corresponded with a decrease in 
range from 4,000 to 3,300 nautical miles when the pilot flew a maximum-
power cruise profile. Mission planners favored this profile because the U-2C 
entered cruise climb at 67,000 feet, and nearly two-thirds of the entire mission 
was flown at altitudes above 70,000 feet.5
A combination of higher thrust and greater compressor stall margin gave 
the U-2C more operational flexibility at high altitudes than had the U-2A. The 
engine could be operated anywhere between minimum fuel flow and maxi-
mum power, increasing maximum altitude capability and providing the pilot 
with a wide range of reduced power cruise altitudes as desired. Range could 
be increased with the addition of two 100-gallon slipper tanks on the wings, 
but the additional weight resulted in an altitude penalty of 500 to 1,200 feet. 
At maximum power, use of slipper tanks gave the U-2C a range of 3,350 
nautical miles to zero fuel. The U-2 pilot could achieve a more economical 
relationship between gross weight and altitude by leveling off and cruising at 
constant altitude and airspeed. For a level 70,000-foot-cruise mission with 
slipper tanks, the range was 3,800 nautical miles. Reducing the level cruising 
altitude to 68,000 feet increased the range to 4,050 miles, and the maximum 
slipper tank range was estimated to be 4,600 nautical miles.6
A U-2 Built for Two
In early 1957, Lockheed received a contract to modify a U-2A with an infra-
red sensor mounted in one of two configurations. When installed below the 
fuselage just aft of the cockpit, it could be used to detect the heat signatures 
of jet aircraft flying at lower altitudes. From atop the fuselage, it would be 
 5. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 152.
 6. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2C Airplane,” pp. 24–25.
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used to scan for rocket and missile exhaust plumes. The sensor, designated 
AN/AAS-8, was co-developed by Lockheed and Baird Atomic. In December 
1957, the sensor package was installed on the lower fuselage of Article 389 
in what became known as the AIRSearch configuration. The equipment was 
housed in a rotating barrel that was pressurized by nitrogen gas. Immediately 
aft of this cylindrical assembly, an aerodynamic fairing was installed to smooth 
the airflow around the sensor package. The cylinder contained mirrors that 
could be tilted as necessary to focus the infrared energy onto a lead sulfide 
detector. The optical path for the navigational sextant was modified to include 
an infrared oscilloscope, combining one display into two so that additional 
instruments did not need to be added to the already cramped cockpit. In 
order to allow the U-2 pilot to identify aircraft detected at lower altitudes, 
driftsight magnification was doubled. The modified airplane was delivered 
to Edwards in March 1958. As originally envisioned, this technology would 
have supplemented airborne early warning aircraft and ground-based Ballistic 
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar stations in detecting inbound 
enemy aircraft. But U-2 reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union had 
produced information that diminished fears that Russian long-range bomber 
fleets posed a significant threat. On the other hand, the Soviets were making 
great progress in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Fears of 
a U.S.-Soviet “missile gap” spurred military leaders at the Pentagon to develop 
plans for a Missile Defense and Alarm System (MIDAS) early warning satellite, 
but it was not expected to be operational before 1961 at the earliest.7
The AN/AAS-8 was first tested in the spring of 1958 during Project Low 
Card. Capt. Hugh “Pat” Hunerwadel flew Article 389 to Ramey Air Force 
Base, Puerto Rico, to assess the sensor’s performance during observations of 
test launches of U.S. ballistic missiles from Cape Canaveral, FL. These tests 
ended prematurely in early June when the U-2 ran off the runway, badly 
damaging the downward protruding sensor. Article 389 was airlifted back to 
Edwards for repairs and since the priority had shifted to missile detection, the 
sensor package was moved to the upper fuselage. Project Low Card resumed in 
September with another pilot. By the end of this deployment, the AN/AAS-8 
had been used to track 11 of 12 launches over the Atlantic Missile Range 
between April and November, despite the 4-month interruption caused by 
the runway mishap.8
In light of the spectacular success of the AN/AAS-8, which detected mis-
sile plumes at ranges in excess of 1,000 miles, Lockheed and Baird Atomic 
 7. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 362.
 8. Ibid., pp. 362–363.
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produced two separate reports. Kelly Johnson and Walter Baird presented these 
documents at the Pentagon along with a proposal that a fleet of as many as 
15 sensor-equipped U-2 aircraft should be kept on constant airborne patrol 
around the borders of the Soviet Union to provide early warning of missile 
attacks against the U.S. or its allies. Johnson recommended building 84 addi-
tional U-2 airframes with provisions for the AN/AAS-8 as well as a second 
crew position behind the cockpit. The new model, designated U-2B, would 
have been equipped with an astroinertial navigation system and a UHF data 
link for line-of-sight communication between the aircraft and monitoring 
stations on the ground. The U-2B was expected to be at least 1,500 pounds 
heavier than the standard U-2A, cutting the airplane’s range by 25 percent 
but without significantly reducing altitude capability. To mitigate the risk of 
losing an airplane due to engine failure, Johnson provided an option to install 
a small Pratt & Whitney JT12 turbojet for emergency return-to-base capability 
if the primary engine could not be restarted. The inlet and exhaust ducts for 
the JT12 were to have been covered by jettisonable aerodynamic fairings when 
not in use. A final notification called for replacing the bicycle landing gear with 
a conventional tricycle arrangement. Although this added 884 pounds to the 
The final configuration of what came to be known as the U-2D. Note the cylindrical sensor 
housing between the canopies. (Lockheed Martin)
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airframe, Lockheed’s reported noted, “the expected gain in overall operations 
by lessening landing accidents outweighs this.”9
Although Pentagon officials liked the concept, they had doubts about the 
reliability of the communications links and navigational accuracy, especially 
since the aircraft would be operating within the Arctic Circle. Johnson was sub-
sequently authorized to modify three additional prototypes for further testing. 
Capitalizing on lessons learned from project Low Card, Skunk Works engineers 
designed a compartment behind the cockpit to accommodate a sensor opera-
tor. It had become clear that the pilot could not effectively fly the airplane and 
operate the sensor equipment simultaneously. The first airframe to receive 
this modification was Article 377. Technicians converted the Q-bay into a 
crew station with sensor control panels, an entry hatch on top of the fuselage, 
and a downward ejection seat similar to those used in early model F-104 
Starfighters. The sensor barrel was mounted between the pilot’s canopy and 
the observer’s hatch, which itself was topped with the aerodynamic fairing 
that fit just behind the sensor. Bob Schumacher made the maiden flight on 
January 7, 1958, with flight-test engineer Glen Fulkerson in the observer’s 
 9. Ibid., pp. 363.
A second crew station had to be built to accommodate the sensor operator. (Lockheed Martin)
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seat. Unfortunately, this airplane was lost 8 months later in a crash that took 
the life of Pat Hunerwadel. A second prototype was ready by early 1959. 
Article 394 was the first U-2 purpose-built in the two-seat configuration. 
In an improvement over the first version, the downward ejection seat was 
replaced with a more conventional upward-firing escape system.10
As the early warning panel of the Presidents Science Advisory Committee 
(PSAC) reviewed progress on MIDAS and BMEWS, it was clear that opera-
tional deployment of a satellite system was still a long way off. Johnson had 
promised to have the three squadrons of U-2B aircraft operational within 2 
years, with the first in service just 18 months after start of production. The 
PSAC panel recommended immediate procurement of the U-2B as a comple-
ment to the BMEWS, but critics were skeptical that the Soviets were indeed 
planning to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S. and felt that 
there were already other, more reliable technologies for early detection of 
missile launches. The U-2B proposal did not immediately receive approval 
as Johnson had hoped, but testing of the infrared sensor system continued 
with a second two-place airframe, Article 388, which joined the test fleet 
in late 1959. In time, senior Government officials downgraded the Soviet 
missile threat, and the BMEWS radar sites became operational. Johnson’s 
U-2B proposal was eventually discarded, but the two test bed aircraft, offi-
cially designated U-2D in 1961, continued to be used for sensor technology 
development and a variety of other test projects. In at least one instance, the 
U-2D was flown parallel to the flightpath of NASA’s X-15 in order to track 
the rocket plane’s exhaust plume as it soared to the edge of space.11 Article 
394 was eventually converted into a single-seat U-2C and transferred to SAC. 
Article 388 remained at Edwards until its retirement in 1978.12
Increased Range
Anticipation of long-duration sorties highlighted the need to increase the air-
plane’s operational range beyond that which could be obtained with the addi-
tion of external fuel tanks. The logical solution was to give the U-2 in-flight 
refueling capability. This merely required the addition of a dorsal receptacle 
to accommodate the extendable refueling boom of a KC-135 Stratotanker. 
Although this modification promised a useful capability, many feared it could 
10. Ibid., pp. 363–364.
11. Ibid., p. 366.
12. Ibid., p. 368.
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An aerial refueling receptacle was installed in a dorsal spine on U-2E and U-2F models. 
(U.S. Air Force)
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not significantly extend overall mission length, which was a function of 
human endurance. For operational purposes, pilot fatigue constraints limited 
mission duration to a maximum of approximately 10 hours. Upon approval 
of the project in May 1961, Lockheed began modifying six CIA airframes 
into what became known as the U-2F configuration.13 Air Force interest in 
the U-2F resulted in a decision to convert six SAC airplanes for refueling. 
This order was eventually reduced to three, which were delivered in the fall 
of 1962 under the designation U-2E.14
Article 342 was once again selected to serve as prototype for a new configu-
ration. It was equipped with a pressurized dorsal fairing atop the mid fuselage 
to house the refueling receptacle along with a 400-watt single-side-band radio 
that permitted voice communications at ranges of more than 3,000 miles. Bob 
Schumacher conducted the first simulated refueling trials, easing in behind 
a KC-135 and closing to the requisite distance without actually hooking up. 
Initial tests indicated that refueling rendezvous could be easily accomplished 
at an altitude of 35,000 feet and indicated air speed of 220 knots. For the low-
altitude rendezvous trial, Schumacher had been wearing a standard flight suit 
and helmet. Later pilots discovered that wearing the partial-pressure suit and its 
specialized helmet resulted in significantly reduced visibility while maneuvering 
13. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 198–199.
14. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 153 and 190.
 A U-2F during refueling trials. (U.S. Air Force)
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toward the refueling boom. Another challenge was posed by the fact that the 
in-flight refueling capability meant missions could be extended beyond the 
imposed 10-hour limit. Even without concern for pilot fatigue, practical mission 
endurance was inherently limited by the onboard oxygen supply. Eventually, 
an extra oxygen bottle was added, extending the pilot’s air supply for a 14-hour 
mission if required.15
Refueling trials began with dry hook-ups followed by the first transfer of fuel 
from the KC-135 to the U-2. Testing was completed over the span of several 
weeks, and two more airframes were already undergoing modification. Soon, 
operational pilots began practicing the delicate art of in-flight refueling. The 
KC-135 could transfer as much as 900 gallons to the U-2 in just 5 minutes. 
The main tanks were fed first, followed by sump tanks, and finally the slip-
per tanks (if attached). Center-of-gravity requirements necessitated develop-
ment of a cross-transfer system between the tanks. This consisted of a series of 
motorized and solenoid-operated valves that operated automatically. A manual 
override was provided and the pilot had to keep an eye on transfer rates and 
15. Ibid., pp. 146–147.
The view from the tanker boom operator’s station while refueling a U-2F. (Lockheed Martin)
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valve operations so as to prevent structural failure resulting from overpressure 
of displaced air if the tanks filled too fast. This, however, was only one of the 
potential hazards of in-flight refueling.16
Ordinarily, the aircraft receiving fuel closes on the tanker from behind, but 
because the U-2 had such a narrow speed envelope, the KC-135 had to make 
adjustments during rendezvous. First, the U-2 pilot stabilized his aircraft at 
the proper altitude and airspeed. It was then overtaken by the tanker about a 
quarter-mile off the right side and at the same altitude. After passing the U-2, 
the KC-135 pilot reduced speed as the U-2 moved down and left to take its 
position below the refueling boom. After the boom was lowered, the U-2 pilot 
slowly climbed into final position, careful to avoid the tanker’s wake vortex or 
jet-wash from the tanker’s engines, either of which could flip the U-2 into a 
deadly roll. After refueling, the pilot had to reset the fuel counter and delicately 
disengage from the tanker. The U-2 pilot achieved separation by decreasing 
power and descending approximately 100 feet below the tanker before sliding 
away to the left or right. Only when completely clear of the tanker’s vortices was 
it safe to climb away.17 These hazards were not to be taken lightly. On March 
1, 1962, Capt. John Campbell perished during a nighttime refueling mission 
over Edwards. As he maneuvered his U-2F behind the KC-135 at an altitude 
of 35,000 feet, it flipped and tumbled out of control. Campbell apparently 
attempted to eject, but his seat never left the plane. Aerial refueling opera-
tions were suspended as Lockheed engineers once again evaluated the loads 
imposed on the U-2 airframe while maneuvering behind the KC-135. Some 
suggested that if jetwash were the problem, it might be safer to refuel from the 
prop-driven KC-97, though this would require rendezvous at lower altitudes 
and slower speeds. The KC-135 was ultimately retained as the primary tanker 
for the U-2.18
The U-2 Goes to Sea
Early in the development program, some had suggested operating the U-2 
from an aircraft carrier to provide additional mission flexibility. This idea was 
even briefed to President Eisenhower in May 1957, but critics rejected the 
idea because the carrier capability would add little to the coverage of Soviet 
Bloc countries reachable by the U-2 from land bases. Acting CIA Director 
16. Ibid., p. 347.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., pp. 156–157.
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Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell acknowledged that flexibility and independence of 
foreign jurisdiction would generally enhance U.S. reconnaissance capability 
with respect to areas outside the Soviet Bloc, but he felt the benefits would 
be too limited to justify the expense of modifying the aircraft. Additionally, 
since the CIA and Air Force jointly administered the U-2 program, any such 
modification required the concurrence of both for final approval. The Air 
Force chief of staff decided that there was no need to develop a carrier capa-
bility, and he disapproved of the proposal. Navy officials attempted on several 
occasions over the next 3 years to obtain a joint agreement between the CIA 
and Air Force, but development of a carrier-based U-2 did not gain impetus 
until 1963, when deputy CIA Director Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter became 
interested in the idea.19
Carter discussed the concept with Kelly Johnson, who assured him that the 
aircraft could be modified with relatively minor engineering changes and at 
reasonable cost. Carter then directed Col. Jack Ledford, assistant director of the 
Office of Special Activities, to investigate the feasibility of U-2 carrier opera-
tions and determine how to implement such a program. To begin, Ledford’s 
deputy, James A. Cunningham, Jr., assembled a team of representatives from 
19. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” CIA-
RDP75B00446R000100210015-3, December 1964, approved for release September 30, 
2003, pp. 1–3.
The U-2G fit easily inside the hangar deck of the USS Kitty Hawk. (Lockheed Martin)
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Lockheed and the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to visit several aircraft 
carriers and naval air stations. The purpose of these survey trips was to identify 
and resolve any potential problems that might affect development and opera-
tional deployment of the U-2G. Cunningham then assembled the team’s find-
ings and recommendations into a report for Gen. Carter in which he addressed 
the question of whether the U-2G could be economically adapted to operate 
from carriers within acceptable safety parameters, with sufficient frequency to 
be effective, and without adversely affecting the Navy’s operational commit-
ments. Cunningham concluded that “present engineering analyses confirm 
that the aircraft can be so operated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier 
capability for reconnaissance purposes.”20
As soon as Carter approved Cunningham’s recommendations, on July 23, 
1963, Lockheed began working to modify the first of several airframes to the 
new configuration. Adapting the U-2 to its new environment posed multiple 
challenges. The types of aircraft typically flown from carriers required a cata-
pult to launch from the deck and arresting gear to bring the aircraft to a halt 
upon landing. These operations imposed structural stresses on the airframe and 
landing gear beyond those the U-2 had been designed to withstand. Necessary 
changes to the U-2 would undoubtedly affect the airplane’s range and altitude 
characteristics. The addition of an arresting hook, beefed up landing gear, and 
other equipment promised unavoidable weight penalties, but there were no 
significant aerodynamic changes. Concurrently, the CIA coordinated with the 
Navy to arrange for U-2 carrier suitability tests and to develop a pilot training 
program. There were a great many questions regarding the airplane’s behavior 
during approach and landing. The U-2 normally landed tail-high, which would 
make snagging the arresting cable with the hook nearly impossible without a 
skillful power-on approach just above stall speed. Additionally, wind patterns 
over the stern of a fast-moving carrier typically produced a downdraft immedi-
ately to the rear of the stern, followed by an updraft from 1,000 to 1,500 feet aft 
of the carrier. Specialized landing techniques had to be developed to overcome 
the adverse effects of these phenomena.21
In designing the U-2G, Lockheed engineers made several major changes to 
the basic airframe. The most obvious external difference was the addition of 
an arresting hook installed beneath the aft fuselage and covered with a plastic 
aerodynamic fairing that would be jettisoned in preparation for landing. A 
reinforced main landing gear strut more than doubled the original design 
specification for maximum deceleration speed. The tail wheel strut was also 
20. Ibid., p. 3.
21. Ibid., pp. 3–6.
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reinforced and protected by the addition of a metal plate to deflect the arresting 
cable. Engineers added thicker pressure bulkheads in the landing gear bay and 
augmented longerons in the fuselage at the wing’s trailing edge to enable the 
aircraft to withstand the added stresses of arresting-hook engagement. With a 
full fuel load, the U-2G would necessarily be above its maximum gross land-
ing weight at takeoff. In order to quickly reduce aircraft weight in the event 
of an emergency requiring immediate landing, the U-2G was equipped with 
a mechanically operated fuel jettison system. Because of the critical need to 
reduce lift at touchdown, mechanical spoilers were added to the outboard trail-
ing edge of the wings. Activated by a simple switch on the throttle quadrant 
at touchdown, these caused the wing to stall almost immediately, enabling 
the pilot to make a precision landing. For obvious structural reasons, catapult 
launch of the U-2G was not feasible, but the airplane’s normal takeoff charac-
teristics were deemed more than sufficient.22
There were, of course, logistical challenges involved in loading the U-2 
aboard a carrier and handling the airplane on deck. Using a standard fuselage-
handling cart as a starting point, Lockheed manufactured a special sling for 
lifting the airplane to place it on board or remove it from the ship. The hangar 
deck offered adequate space for maintenance work or fueling, but moving 
the airplane up to the flight deck required Lockheed engineers to design a 
specialized handling cart because the ship’s elevator was not large enough to 
easily accommodate the U-2.23 James Cunningham noted that “the handling, 
launching, and retrieval will always be a special operation, requiring consider-
able technical skill from both ground support personnel and pilots.”24
Carrier suitability trials began in August 1963. These preliminary tests, 
dubbed Project Whale Tale, used an unmodified U-2C flown by Bob 
Schumacher from the USS Kitty Hawk approximately 50 miles off the coast 
of California. Although security was considered paramount, it was impossible 
to conceal the airplane from the multitude of personnel at the Navy port in 
San Diego and onboard the carrier itself. Schumacher had flown Article 352 
into Naval Air Station North Island under cover of darkness, and the U-2 was 
hoisted aboard the Kitty Hawk after midnight. Navy personnel involved in the 
loading operation included firefighters, security guards, crane operators, and 
numerous others.25 Despite the most stringent precautions by both Navy and 
CIA security personnel to prevent unwitting persons gaining knowledge of the 
22. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
23. Ibid., p. 5.
24. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 201.
25. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” p. 9.
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operation, Kelly Johnson was horrified to see unexpected crowds of spectators. 
As he later noted in his diary, “I don’t think more than 2,000 or 3,000 people 
saw the aircraft go aboard, as they kept coming back all night from a carnival 
that was held adjacent to the loading docks!”26
After dawn, the Kitty Hawk steamed westward into the Pacific Ocean to 
a point approximately 20 miles south of San Clemente Island. The ship was 
under way at 20 knots into a 10-knot headwind. The combined 30-knot wind 
across the flight deck posed a challenge for the deck crew as they positioned the 
lightweight airplane for takeoff. When given clearance, Schumacher advanced 
the throttle and began rolling down the deck. He was airborne within a mere 
321 feet, the pogos dropped to the deck, and by the time the U-2 cleared 
the carrier’s bow it had already climbed 1,000 feet. After initially making a 
steep climb, Schumacher circled around and made several low approaches 
to the flight deck at speeds between 75 and 78 knots to evaluate the air-
plane’s handling qualities in the crosswinds and turbulence surrounding the 
carrier. On the third approach, he briefly touched down but bounced, striking 
the right wingtip against the steel deck plating before reapplying power and 
26. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 201.
U-2 pilot attempts to snag the arresting cable during landing aboard the Kitty Hawk.  
(Lockheed Martin)
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going around. After a final pass that allowed observers to check for damage, 
Schumacher flew the U-2 to Lockheed’s facility in Burbank. The test was con-
sidered a complete success that furnished Lockheed engineers with valuable 
data for use in further developing the U-2G design changes.27
Kelly Johnson and his team mulled over many questions still not fully 
answered. They briefly considered using a parachute and speed brakes to arrest 
the airplane on landing instead of the tailhook and cable system, because 
repeated arrested landings might overstress the tail-mounting bolts. There was 
concern that shock effects of carrier landings and associated twisting moments 
might eventually cause wing fatigue or fuel leaks or even damage sensitive 
reconnaissance and navigational equipment. Most carrier-based aircraft were 
designed for landing deceleration speeds of 15 to 20 feet per second, but 
Johnson was only confident that he could beef up the landing gear to with-
stand a 10-foot-per-second deceleration. All the while, Johnson worked to 
keep modification costs as low as possible. One cost-saving innovation was 
his recommendation to transfer two Air Force U-2A airframes to the project 
since they had already been scheduled for overhaul and conversion to U-2C 
standards. Accordingly, articles 348 and 362 were converted to G models 
along with articles 382 and 385. After Article 362 was lost in July 1964, it 
was replaced with Article 349, which had been transferred from the Air Force. 
Originally built as a U-2A, Article 349 now received the J75 engine, the carrier 
landing modifications, and in-flight refueling capability, and it was designated 
the sole U-2H model. It seemed like the perfect combination of characteristics 
for mission flexibility. Unfortunately, the excess weight considerably reduced 
maximum altitude. Consequently, the refueling receptacle was removed less 
than a year later, returning the airplane to the standard U-2G configuration.28
For the arresting gear, Johnson ultimately settled on a modified version of 
the tailhook used on the T-2A. On the U-2, it was mounted ahead of the tail 
wheel and attached to the same structural framework that included the wing 
attach points and engine mounts. Small fairings surrounded the hook to reduce 
aerodynamic drag, and although the jettisonable fairing had been eliminated, 
there was provision for a plastic cover to hide the hook from view when it was 
not in use. A shield assembly ahead of the tail-wheel doors was installed to 
deflect the arresting cable in the event that the hook failed to connect. Johnson 
studied several lift-reduction systems before settling on the spoilers. Fixed slots 
in the flaps offered the simplest solution and the least weight penalty but would 
have required a much steeper angle of attack on final approach. A proposed 
27. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” p. 11.
28. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 201–206.
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leading-edge slat would have required borrowing space from the fuel tanks to 
accommodate actuators, resulting in a 400-nautical-mile loss in range. With 
the addition of the spoilers and fuel-dump system, the total weight penalty 
resulting from the modifications was around 350 pounds.29
CIA project staff and Naval Training Command personnel formulated a 
three-phase training syllabus known as Whale Tale II. Phase One of the short 
but comprehensive carrier qualification course included initial flight checkout 
in the Navy’s T-2A and simulated carrier landings under the supervision of a 
highly qualified landing signals officer (LSO) at Naval Air Station Monterey, 
CA. In Phase Two, trainees completed additional practice landings at Naval 
Air Station Pensacola, FL, followed by actual carrier landings aboard the 
USS Lexington in the Gulf of Mexico. Phase Three consisted of carrier-type 
approaches and landings in the U-2G on a specially prepared lakebed runway 
at Edwards and, finally, actual carrier landings in the U-2.30
The first four pilots began Phase One training in November 1963 under 
the supervision of Lt. Cdr. John Huber. After 2 weeks, the group moved to 
Pensacola for Phase Two and completed initial carrier qualification. A second 
group of four CIA pilots plus Schumacher and Detachment G Comm. Bill 
Gregory began training in January 1964 and completed Phase Two on 
February 15. Phase Three commenced with the delivery of the first U-2G to 
the Edwards detachment. Bob Schumacher tested the spoiler system during 
initial field carrier-landing practice sorties, discovering a variety of minor 
problems that included airframe buffeting, tail vibration, and a rolling ten-
dency at stall. Once these minor problems were resolved, each detachment 
pilot had the opportunity to fly numerous practice sorties. In developing 
landing techniques based on experience with both the T-2A and U-2G, 
they agreed that an ideal carrier landing required approximately 40 knots 
wind speed across the deck. Since the U-2 typically landed at 70 knots this 
resulted in an actual touchdown speed of about 30 knots. The ultimate key 
to success was complete trust in the LSO. Observing from the deck, Huber 
signaled the U-2 pilot with regard to last-minute altitude adjustments and 
the precise moment for chopping the throttle to idle.31
With simulated carrier-landing practice completed, the stage was now set for 
Whale Tale III deployment aboard the USS Ranger. Like the previous training 
project, this effort was divided into three parts. Phase One was devoted exclu-
sively to Lockheed testing of U-2G carrier-landing characteristics and operational 
29. Ibid., p. 202.
30. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” p. 11.
31. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 202–203.
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suitability. As soon as these tests were completed, the airplane was turned over 
to Detachment G personnel for Phase Two, which consisted entirely of carrier 
takeoff and landing practice. In Phase Three, the Edwards detachment evaluated 
the airplane’s operational capabilities. The results provided valuable lessons with 
regard to piloting techniques and operational procedures.32
On February 29, 1964, Bob Schumacher began Phase One with a series of 
touch-and-go landings in Article 362, which had been specially instrumented 
for the tests. This part of the testing went well, but he reported turbulence 
on approach requiring significant throttle adjustments. When Schumacher 
attempted his first arrested landing, he approached too fast and a little high. 
The airplane bounced and the hook engaged the cable while the U-2G was still 
airborne, causing it to slam back to the deck and nose over. Minor damage to 
the nose section was easily repaired aboard ship, but afterward Schumacher flew 
the plane to Burbank so engineers could study the instrument readings and 
add a steel skid beneath the forward fuselage to prevent a similar mishap. Once 
carrier-landing techniques had been perfected, this additional modification 
was no longer required. In order to solve the turbulence problem, the carrier’s 
32. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” pp. 11–12.
Lockheed test pilot Bob Schumacher makes a successful arrested landing on March 2, 1964. 
(Air Force Flight Test Museum)
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speed had to be reduced until the wind over the deck dropped to 25 knots and 
the updraft behind the ship flattened out below the U-2’s approach path.33
Schumacher returned on March 2 in Article 348 and completed Phase One 
with four successful arrested landings. The airplane was then turned over to 
Gregory’s detachment for Phase Two. That same day, Robert Ericson made sev-
eral touch-and-go landings but was unable to successfully perform an arrested 
landing. His plane ran short of fuel while the USS Ranger maneuvered away 
from a foreign vessel that had entered the operational area, and he eventually 
had to land at North Island. Jim Barnes flew Article 348 back to the carrier 
on March 3, but on his first touch-and-go, he allowed the right wing to drop. 
The right wing skid became entangled with the arresting cable and tore off. 
Barnes gunned the throttle, gained some altitude, and flew the airplane to 
Edwards for repairs. These incidents delayed completion of Phase Two by 
another week, which allowed project pilots to refine their approach techniques 
based on experience gained up to that point. Once flight operations resumed, 
all pilots qualified for carrier operations without further incident. The end of 
Phase Three signaled the detachment’s operational readiness.34
The U-2’s carrier capability was put to the test a few months later during 
Operation Fishhawk. This called for a flight over the French nuclear test site 
at Mururoa Atoll in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. So remote was the test 
site that the USS Ranger and her escort had to sail more than 3,000 miles just 
to get within range for the U-2 mission. All necessary support equipment and 
personnel and one of three pilots were aboard the carrier when it departed San 
Diego. On May 12, two additional pilots ferried their U-2G aircraft to the ship 
from Edwards via Hawaii. One week later, when the Ranger was within 800 
nautical miles of Mururoa, one of the airplanes took off on a maximum-range 
sortie covering more than 1,000 miles. Since additional photographic coverage 
was required, a second mission was launched on May 22.35
Detachment G pilots continued to receive carrier qualification in the T-2A 
and perform practice touchdowns in the U-2 at Edwards. Over time, the 
pilots discovered that each of the airplanes had unique flying qualities. Article 
382, for example had a tendency to drop off to the left in a stall. On April 26, 
1965, Buster Edens, a 9-year veteran of the U-2 program, was briefed on this 
phenomenon before taking the airplane up for a series of simulated carrier 
landings. After taking off and climbing to 13,000 feet to check stall character-
istics, which appeared normal, he returned to the landing pattern and made 
33. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 202–203.
34. CIA, “U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale,” pp. 13–15.
35. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 204.
Unlimited Horizons
72
an approach to the runway. At touchdown, the left wing dropped, dragging 
the skid for about 50 feet as Edens added power and struggled to get aloft. He 
managed to level the wings and become airborne, making a left turn to reenter 
the downwind leg. A ground observer advised him to check the wing balance 
again, which he apparently did at an altitude of 3,000 feet. At this point, the 
airplane dipped to the left into a descending spiral. Edens extended the speed 
brakes to arrest the spin but never regained control. He ejected at extremely 
low altitude and was killed because his parachute did not fully open.36
Accident investigators recommended that in the future, stall checks be 
conducted with sufficient altitude available for spin recovery or, at the very 
least, safe egress. They also suggested that efforts be made to ensure symmetri-
cal stall characteristics for all U-2 aircraft and that necessary modifications 
be made to prevent fuel from moving from one wing to the other when the 
pump was not operating.37 In his diary, Kelly Johnson lamented the stall and 
trim problems and the stall strips on the wings that had to be hand tailored 
for each aircraft individually. “If we put the stall strips where they give us 
good landing and takeoff characteristics,” he wrote, “then we run into buf-
feting and pitching at altitude.”38
Although the overall results of the Whale Tale effort were highly success-
ful, there was substantial Navy opposition to conducting additional U-2 car-
rier missions. Operation and deployment of an aircraft carrier was extremely 
expensive and required an entire flotilla of support vessels. Moving an entire 
carrier battle group quickly or in secret was virtually impossible, and senior 
Navy leadership complained that the U-2 operation was interfering with other 
fleet priorities.39 In 1969, all surviving U-2G airframes were placed in flyable 
storage, but this was not the end of U-2 operations at sea.
The First Trainer
Other than the U-2D, there had never been a two-seat U-2. Unlike most 
military airplanes, there was no trainer model with provisions for an instructor 
pilot and trainee. Student pilots received instruction and checkout in the T-33 
before making their first solo flight in the U-2. Although the idea of building 
a U-2 trainer had been raised many times, the idea failed to gain traction until 
36. Ibid., p. 207.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 208.
39. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 251.
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the early 1970s. In the wake of several landing accidents, 15th Air Force com-
mander Gen. Paul K. Carlton sent the SAC U-2 unit operations officer, Col. 
Tony Martinez, to Lockheed to discuss the possibility of modifying one of the 
damaged airframes into a two-place trainer. Kelly Johnson offered to rebuild 
the U-2C for $1 million but estimated it would cost $5 million to $6 mil-
lion to convert it into a trainer. Air Force officials approved the expenditure 
and Johnson assigned Ed Baldwin to lead the conversion team at the Skunk 
Works facility in Palmdale, CA. Maj. George Worley of the 100th Strategic 
Reconnaissance Wing advised Baldwin on what controls and instruments 
would be needed for the instructor’s cockpit.40
Baldwin began with Article 393, which had been badly damaged during 
a landing accident in May 1972. Using parts of other crashed airframes, his 
team installed a second cockpit for the instructor pilot above and directly 
behind the student’s cockpit. The conversion was completed just 5 months 
after receiving the go-ahead. Lockheed chief test pilot Bill Park made the 
maiden flight of the U-2CT on February 13, 1973. He found that the odd-
looking configuration handled well and apparently had no adverse effect on 
the airplane’s aerodynamics. Eleven days later, after the U-2CT had been 
painted gloss white with SAC markings, Worley flew the trainer to Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base near Tucson, AZ. Crew chief TSgt. Jose Ortiz rode 
40. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 349.
The U-2CT had an instructor’s station above and behind the student’s cockpit. (U.S. Air Force)
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in the front cockpit during the ferry flight, becoming the first enlisted crew-
man to fly in a U-2.41
Based on a new training syllabus written by Worley, new U-2 pilots first 
received an hour of taildragger experience in a Bellanca Decathlon. They 
would then need to make five flights with an instructor in the U-2CT before 
being allowed to solo. The new trainer soon proved its worth and was very 
popular with student pilots. A second U-2CT was built from Article 359 in 
the summer of 1975 and delivered in January 1976. Both trainers remained 
in service until 1987.42
Second Generation
The number of U-2s operated by the CIA fluctuated over the course of the 
airplane’s first decade of service. By 1963, nearly half of the 55 airframes built 
had been lost to attrition and others were swapped back and forth between 
the agency and the Air Force. Although Kelly Johnson recognized the need to 
put the U-2 back into production, he was reluctant because the Government 
was already heavily invested in the airplane’s successor, the A-12, and variants 
including the YF-12 and R-12 (later redesignated SR-71). So, rather than 
restart the production line, Johnson assigned several of his engineers to develop 
a simple modification to improve the U-2’s capabilities. Merv Heal and his 
team proposed adding two 30-inch fuselage plugs, one aft of the Q-bay and one 
aft of the wings, adding 60 inches to the airframe. This would give the airplane 
more room for equipment, a refueling receptacle, and carrier arresting gear. 
Johnson was so enthusiastic about the improved capabilities that in September 
1963 he recommended building a new batch of 25 aircraft, designated U-2L, 
at a cost of approximately $1 million apiece.43
Air Force and Navy officials expressed interest in the basic U-2L, but the 
CIA requested a capability for installing an upward-facing optical sensor to 
take images of Soviet satellites. Johnson subsequently sought a 240-inch focal 
length camera that could fit in the nose of the U-2, pointed upward. He then 
proposed a rotating nose assembly that would allow the camera to take pic-
tures of the ground as well. This version of the airplane was dubbed U-2M. 
But getting approval for production was no longer as easy as it once had been. 
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), established in 1960, now had 
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 236.
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procurement approval authority for all overhead reconnaissance programs, and 
despite the fact that the NRO was a joint organization between the CIA and 
military services, there was a significant amount of bureaucratic infighting. In 
September 1964, the NRO rejected Lockheed’s U-2L and U-2M proposals in 
favor of less costly upgrades to the existing fleet.44
In March 1965, NRO Director Brockway McMillan directed the Air Force 
and CIA to study future requirements for the U-2. He also asked for com-
parison of U-2 intelligence collection capabilities versus the A-12/SR-71 and 
reconnaissance satellites, as well as an estimate of the future role of airborne 
reconnaissance platforms in the face of improved hostile air defense systems. 
Three months later, McMillan received a recommendation to procure more 
U-2 airplanes. This gave Kelly Johnson the opportunity to propose yet another 
improvement. Up to this point, he had yet to alter the U-2’s wing configura-
tion, but he began investigating new high-lift NASA airfoils, swept wings, and 
changes in aspect ratio. In July, he pitched a proposal for building 27 U-2N 
airframes with a longer wingspan and increased lifting surface. Unimpressed, 
McMillan rejected the proposal on the basis that “Although a new version 
would have somewhat improved performance, it would still be highly vulner-
able to both ground and air missiles.”45
Johnson’s team continued to work despite this setback. In an effort to 
improve the wing configuration, Lockheed spent $250,000 on designing and 
wind tunnel testing a new wing with a NASA-developed flap, designed by 
Richard Whitcomb of Langley Research Center, that would increase critical 
Mach number, the lowest Mach number at which airflow over some point of 
the aircraft reaches the speed of sound. Initial test results were disappointing. 
Although the new flap arrangement delayed the onset of transonic drag rise, 
the airplane’s overall profile drag increased by 30 percent. As Johnson noted 
in his diary, “When we combined this with the extremely heavy weight of the 
new wing and its controls we obtained a very discouraging outcome.”46
In the meantime, Pratt & Whitney engineers were working on improve-
ments to boost climb performance. The result was the J75-P-13B with 17,000 
pounds of thrust at sea level. The NRO ordered 24 of the new engines to 
upgrade the existing U-2 fleet, but flight testing demonstrated a clear need 
for widening the air inlet to optimize performance. Johnson saw this as an 
opportunity to press his case for a wholly revised U-2 design, and he directed 
Merv Heal to conduct another design study. The U-2R featured an enlarged 
44. Ibid., pp. 236–237.
45. Ibid., p. 237.
46. Ibid.
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fuselage with additional equipment space and provisions for interchangeable 
nose assemblies to carry a variety of cameras and sensors, depending on mis-
sion requirements.47 As Johnson later wrote, “We made a complete circle and 
ended up merely enlarging the present U-2 to take advantage of a 20 percent 
power increase… . Going back to the original concept, where we can fly with 
a lift coefficient of 0.6 to 0.7, gives us an airplane with a 7,000 mile range 
unrefueled and a few thousand feet more altitude.”48 As it turned out, Johnson’s 
range estimate was overly optimistic, but there was significant improvement.
He pitched his proposal in January 1966, offering to build the first two 
aircraft for just $12.5 million. The Air Force expressed little interest at the time, 
giving higher priority to the SR-71 program, but the CIA funded a 3-month 
study contract for basic engineering. Lockheed spent a nearly equivalent sum 
of company money on wind tunnel–model testing. Additional testing was 
undertaken to determine the airplane’s vulnerability to radar tracking and 
surface-to-air missiles.49 By August 1966, the original U-2 fleet had dwindled 
to 15, and several of these were undergoing repairs at Lockheed. To increase 
the number of available aircraft and lengthen the fleet’s service life, Director 
of Central Intelligence Richard Helms initially approved an order for eight 
airframes. Within 6 months, he and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
jointly placed an order for another four.50
Johnson assigned Ed Baldwin and Fred Cavanaugh to spearhead the engi-
neering effort, and he gave their 30-person team 12 months to refine the design, 
build the aircraft, and fly the prototype. Apart from enhanced performance, 
design goals included a better electrical system along with improved main-
tainability and servicing provisions. The enlarged fuselage not only offered 
substantially increased internal volume for additional equipment but also 
achieved better overall weight distribution. Other improvements included 
the elimination of protruding oil cooler intakes (to reduce drag), enlarged 
horizontal and vertical tail surfaces, hydraulically actuated roll and lift spoilers, 
enlarged retractable leading-edge stall strips, strengthened landing gear, a zero-
zero ejection seat, proper stressing for arresting gear, and folding wingtips for 
ease of storage on the ground or inside an aircraft carrier. A mockup review on 
November 29, 1966, resulted in very few recommendations for design changes. 
Johnson’s engineering team had taken thorough advantage of prior experience 
and lessons learned from the earlier U-2 production program. One problem 
47. Ibid., pp. 237–238.
48. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 89.
49. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 238.
50. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 251.
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that had been addressed was that the first-generation U-2 had become so heavy 
that the margin between stall buffet and compressibility at high altitudes was 
only 6 knots. With improved wings and engine, the U-2R had a comparatively 
generous 20-knot window, greatly improving the airplane’s flying qualities.51 
The original U-2 had an 80-foot span with 600 square feet of wing area. 
By contrast, the U-2R had a 103-foot span with 1,000 square feet of lifting 
surface. Bob Wiele, who led the wing design team, retained the original NACA 
64A airfoil and reduced wing loading to the values attained with the U-2A. 
The airplane’s lift-to-drag ratio was 27:1, its lift coefficient was 0.6 to 0.7, and 
the aspect ratio was 10.667. The unconventional wing structure weighed just 3 
pounds per square foot and included planks (eight per wing) milled from large 
aluminum billets, rather than being built up using riveted sheet metal, I-beams, 
and U-channels. The larger wing also gave the U-2R increased internal fuel 
capacity, and the fuel tank arrangement was altered. In the early U-2 models, 
having the main tank forward and the auxiliary tank aft resulted in considerable 
changes in center of gravity as fuel was consumed. This problem was elimi-
nated in the U-2R by placing the 1,169-gallon main tanks inboard and the 
239-gallon auxiliaries outboard. Fuel from the main tanks was exhausted first 
so that the weight of the remaining fuel in the auxiliary tanks helped dampen 
51. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 92.
With its lengthened fuselage and wings, the U-2R, right, was significantly larger than the U-2C. 
(Lockheed Martin)
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wing bending and torsional loads. An additional 99 gallons in the sump tank 
gave the U-2R a total capacity of 2,915 gallons, enough to remain airborne 
for 15 hours, though it was impractical to expect a pilot to endure flying solo 
in a pressure suit for such an extended length of time.52
Herb Nystrom led the team that designed the empennage and tail assembly. 
Following a series of engineering studies, he opted to include an all-moving 
tailplane similar to the one Kelly Johnson developed for the Lockheed JetStar. 
This configuration most effectively distributed pitch forces across the entire 
horizontal stabilizer assembly, widened the airplane’s center-of-gravity limits, 
and eliminated the need for both ballast and trim tabs.53
Ed Baldwin’s team was responsible for designing the fuselage assembly. 
With wide, flaring inlets, it had a Coke bottle shape and was wider and 25 
percent longer than that of earlier models. A surplus of internal volume accom-
modated navigation and communications equipment, defensive avionics, and 
other items. Mission equipment occupied both the enlarged Q-bay and the 
nose compartment. Total payload capacity was 1,050 pounds. The cockpit 
was 45 percent larger than that of the U-2C, allowing the partial-pressure suit 
to be abandoned in favor of bulkier but more comfortable full-pressure suits. 
It also accommodated a new ejection seat that could be safely used at even 
extremely low altitude. Seven experienced U-2 pilots contributed to the design 
of the cockpit arrangement. Fitted with pressure suits, they took turns sitting 
in the mockup and evaluating visibility instrument placement and operability 
of controls and switches.54
Although the remaining U-2C airframes had been equipped with the new 
J75-P-13B engine, the U-2R was powered by an upgraded model that had 
improved dependability and increased thrust, allowing it to achieve speeds up 
to 410 knots (Mach 0.72), or about 12 knots faster than the U-2C. Although 
the U-2R could exceed 74,000 feet, it had a shorter range at maximum altitude 
than the U-2C. One significant improvement was that in the event that the 
P-13B engine quit during flight, it could be restarted at 54,000 feet, roughly 
10,000 feet higher than the earlier P-13A.55
Assembly of the first U-2R began in early 1967. Johnson was very satisfied 
with his team’s workmanship, but by mid-March 1967, he was concerned that 
construction of the prototype was progressing slowly. “This is basically because 
I have insisted on much better tooling than on prior models,” he wrote in his 
52. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 238.
53. Ibid., p. 239.
54. Ibid.
55. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 251–252.
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diary, “and, while it will take us longer to get started, we will get much better 
airplanes.” By April 19, the wings were taking shape and the forward fuselage 
and cockpit structure were nearly complete. Johnson marveled at the size of the 
U-2R and lamented that the airframe was about 800 pounds heavier than origi-
nally specified, about half of which was due to added customer equipment.56
In accordance with Kelly Johnson’s schedule, the completed prototype, 
known as Article 051, was delivered to Edwards in August. Following static 
ground testing and taxi trials, the unpainted U-2R was prepared for its maiden 
flight. On August 28, with Bob Schumacher and Johnson flying chase in a 
Beech Twin Bonanza, Bill Park took off from Rogers Dry Lake and soared 
into the sky. He found the airplane generally similar to its predecessors. As 
testing continued over the ensuing months, Park and other test pilots gained 
an appreciation for the various design improvements. Larger control surfaces 
and an increased critical Mach number significantly improved the overall flying 
qualities. Improved margins between stall and Mach buffet at cruising altitudes 
56. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 92.
Bill Park piloted the maiden flight of the U-2R on August 28, 1967. (Lockheed Martin)
Unlimited Horizons
80
allowed more reliable autopilot control, and the U-2R had better longitudinal 
pitch trim than earlier models.57
A second U-2R was delivered in December. Results of flight testing indi-
cated that range and altitude performance was as desired. Maximum altitude 
was a function of gross takeoff weight and outside air temperature, but a U-2R 
with a gross takeoff weight of 34,750 pounds (including 12,250 pounds of 
fuel and a 3,000-pound payload) could fly a 7.5-hour, 3,000-nautical-mile 
mission, with most of the flight above 70,000 feet. The test team discovered a 
number of small problems with the air conditioning system, engine oil cool-
ing, fuel-feed system, and tail vibration, but these were easily fixed. A more 
serious problem was the airplane’s tendency to veer to the left during takeoff 
roll due to nonaxisymmetric thrust. Testing had to be delayed 2 months while 
Lockheed engineers devised a solution. Their first attempt involved adding a 
5-inch extension to the tailpipe, but this caused serious vibration. Ultimately, 
the original U-2R tailpipe was extended 12 inches and bypass doors were added 
adjacent to the engine compressor face. These doors provided cooling air to 
the engine compartment and secondary airflow to the exhaust ejector. During 
57. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 240–241.
By mid-1968, five U-2R airframes were being flown at Edwards for testing and training. 
(Lockheed Martin)
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ground operations, when nacelle pressure was higher than at the compressor 
face, they remained closed to prevent the compressor from drawing air away 
from the ejector. During flight, the doors opened when pressure at the engine 
face was higher.58
Production airframes rolled off the assembly line at the rate of approximately 
one per month. By the end of May 1968, five airplanes were flying and two of 
those were being used for operational pilot training. The U-2R proved to be a very 
stable platform for reconnaissance sensors and featured better camera-window 
glass than had been previously used. Kelly Johnson presented test results and 
touted the airplane’s enhanced capabilities in the hope of attracting customers 
and keeping the U-2R production line open beyond the 12-unit initial run. He 
emphasized the reliability and flexibility that built upon prior experience with 
a family of aircraft that had logged more than 135,000 flight hours since its 
introduction in 1955. The J75 engine, already in use throughout the fleet, was 
well proven and capable of enduring 1,200 hours of operation before requir-
ing overhaul. With a multitude of built-in access panels, the U-2R had been 
designed for ease of maintenance and servicing. It also had a comprehensive 
suite of communication and navigation equipment, as well as multiple backups 
for the electrical power system.59
Johnson succeeded in impressing senior Air Force leadership, though not as 
he had intended. Instead of placing a new order that would keep the production 
line running, they instead tried to acquire all 12 of the existing airframes for 
use by SAC. For a while, this pitted Director of Central Intelligence Richard 
Helms against Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Eventually, they came 
to an agreement to split the disposition of the U-2R production between the 
CIA and Air Force. In November 1968, 1 month prior to the delivery of the last 
U-2R, the NRO Executive Committee ordered most of the remaining U-2C 
and U-2G airframes placed in flyable storage to be used later for replacement 
of any U-2R models lost to attrition. 
After the new model was declared operational in January 1969, pilots who 
had previously flown the U-2C underwent a 20-hour conversion course while 
transitioning to the U-2R. For reconnaissance sorties, the airplane could be 
equipped with a variety of different cameras, but with a 24-inch-focal-length 
stereo design and 12-inch resolution, the Itek IRIS II became the sensor 
of choice. This panoramic camera had a 140-degree scan angle and carried 
10,500 feet of film to cover a 60-mile swath from 70,000 feet. An optical 
bar system in which the entire mirror-lens assembly rotated continuously 
58. Ibid., p. 241.
59. Ibid.
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eliminated vibration problems that reduced resolution in cameras with recip-
rocating shutters and lenses.60
Developmental and experimental testing at Edwards continued as the U-2R 
was placed into service elsewhere. Some of these experiments were quite inno-
vative if not terribly successful. One of these, dubbed Chameleon, involved the 
application of paint that changed color as temperature varied with altitude. It 
was hoped that paint that appeared light blue at low altitudes would change to 
dark blue in the cold upper atmosphere, and then back again during descent, 
to better camouflage the airplane throughout the course of a mission. Wailing 
Wall was an experiment to determine whether specially designed intake duct 
linings and various exhaust nozzle shapes would reduce the airplane’s acoustic 
signature, preventing detection during missions at low altitudes. Lockheed 
engineers hoped to make the U-2 inaudible as low as 500 feet above the ground, 
but the effort failed. For additional mission flexibility, one proposal involved 
development of a probe-and-drogue buddy refueling capability that would 
allow one U-2 to refuel another in flight. There was also a study to develop a 
night-vision driftsight to allow the pilot to navigate from high altitudes using 
terrain features after dark. By far the most practical effort involved an attempt 
to provide the U-2R with a high-altitude engine restart capability. This worked 
consistently at 50,000 feet, 10,000 feet above the normal J75-P-13B relight 
altitude, but worked only occasionally at 56,000 to 58,000 feet. Some test 
projects were almost surreal. One involved a method for dropping propaganda 
leaflets from 70,000 feet. Another, called Fortune Cookie, called for launch-
ing modified AQM-37 supersonic drones from wing pylons. Under the initial 
concept, the rocket-powered drone would be equipped with a camera and 
recovered at the end of its flight. Later, it was proposed that an expendable 
drone would collect electronic intelligence data, which could then be relayed 
to the U-2 or another airborne platform within range. Although test results 
were promising, no operational missions were undertaken.61 Kelly Johnson also 
pursued the concept of arming the U-2 with bombs and missiles. This would 
have required the addition of hard-points on the wings for attaching weapon 
pylons and replacing the original landing gear with a tricycle arrangement 
consisting of two main gear in mid-wing pods and a nose wheel. This concept 
never went beyond testing of a wind tunnel model.62
In the summer of 1969, despite continuing Navy opposition, the U-2R 
was scheduled for carrier trials under project Blue Gull. Things went a little 
60. Ibid., p. 245.
61. Ibid., pp. 255–257.
62. Jenkins, Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady, p. 19.
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smoother this time because the U-2R had been designed to accommodate 
removable arresting gear and the outermost 6 feet of each wing folded upward, 
allowing the airplane to fit more easily onto the carrier’s elevator and inside 
the hangar deck. The first phase of testing involved 2 days of practice using 
a mock carrier runway at Naval Air Station Lakehurst, NJ. Thanks to the 
improved flap configuration and a more responsive throttle, pilots found the 
carrier landing characteristics of the U-2R much more benign than those of 
the U-2G. Next, Lockheed test pilot Bill Park, along with two American and 
two British pilots assigned to the U-2 project, underwent carrier qualification 
in the T-2B at Pensacola. This time, Lt. Cdr. Lonnie McClung served as the 
project’s resident LSO.63
In November 1969, following additional landing practice in the U-2R at 
Edwards, the team headed east for Blue Gull V carrier trials aboard the USS 
America. Two U-2R aircraft were ferried to NASA’s Wallops Island facility on 
63. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 257.
For carrier operations, the U-2R was equipped with arresting gear and wingtip skid extensions. 
(U.S. Air Force)
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Virginia’s Eastern Shore, and on November 21, Park flew out to the carrier. He 
made his first approach at a speed of 72 knots with a 20-knot wind over the 
deck but had to abort when the tailhook failed to deploy. He returned to shore 
where it was found that someone had forgotten to remove the locking pin prior 
to takeoff. His second and third attempts resulted in successful full-stop land-
ings on the carrier deck. Park also demonstrated lightweight and heavyweight 
takeoffs. Overall, he was very satisfied with the airplane’s handling characteris-
tics, and he remarked that he scarcely needed to use the arresting gear at all.64
Each of the four remaining pilots earned their carrier qualifications in the 
U-2R, but debate still raged as to whether the Navy would permit operational 
missions to be carried out. The Blue Gull V exercise had demonstrated that 
the airplane fit onto the elevator and could be easily moved from hangar deck 
to flight deck and that flight operations could be easily accomplished with 
repeated success. Besides the obvious reconnaissance applications, there had 
been some interest in using the U-2R as a high-altitude communications relay 
for the carrier air group. Some high-ranking Navy officials, however, still felt 
that these were not sufficient reasons to take up valuable deck and hangar space 
and that it was simply too expensive to commit a carrier deployment to what 
would likely be a single U-2 sortie.65
64. Ibid., p. 258.
65. Ibid.
Deck crewmen prepare the U-2 for takeoff from the USS America. (Lockheed Martin)
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This didn’t stop Kelly Johnson from pursuing other potential naval appli-
cations for the U-2R, particularly in the field of maritime surveillance. Up 
to this point, any airborne platform that relied on photographic means for 
obtaining imagery was constrained by inclement weather and limited daylight. 
By the early 1970s, significant advancements in high-speed integrated solid-
state circuits made it possible to digitally process radar imaging signals in real 
time. The resulting increase in coverage and resolution this afforded spurred 
a revolution in the development of such sensors as synthetic-aperture radar 
(SAR), in which the airplane’s flightpath was used to make a relatively small 
antenna perform like an extremely large antenna electronically. Collected data 
could then be processed to generate high-resolution imagery. In 1971, the 
NRO sponsored Project Senior Lance—flight tests of a prototype imaging 
radar built by Goodyear Aerospace in Phoenix. When installed in the nose of 
the U-2R, the sensor provided a commanding view from high altitude. Targets 
as far as 100 miles away could be identified in all weather conditions, day or 
night, even when concealed beneath foliage or camouflage netting. Flights 
made over the ocean provided imagery in which the wakes of individual ships 
were distinguishable even at great distances.66
In the initial phase of testing, Article 061 was equipped with a radar sensor 
that simply collected and stored all data for later processing. In March 1972, a 
66. Ibid., p. 281.
There was little clearance between the airplane’s wingtip and the carrier’s superstructure. 
(Lockheed Martin)
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data link was installed in the airplane so that radar returns could be transmitted 
to the ground for immediate processing and then sent as quickly as possible to 
military commanders to provide vital, current intelligence. A 3-month test of this 
capability, dubbed Senior Dagger, took place at McCoy Air Force Base, FL, that 
summer, with U-2 radar imagery being downlinked to a ground station at Rome 
Air Force Base, NY. Following completion of these tests, Article 061 was bailed to 
the Navy for a 6-month, $5.5 million program to evaluate a configuration called 
Electronics Patrol Experimental (EP-X). Under Project Highboy, the U-2R was 
equipped with forward-looking radar in the nose compartment and wing pods 
to contain additional sensors. The nose-mounted system was a variant of the AN/
APS-116 X-band weather radar, modified to detect surface vessels or submarine 
periscopes protruding above the waves.67 The left pod contained a return-beam 
vidicon camera, a high-performance electronic imaging sensor capable of making 
continuous or discrete exposures with performance matching or exceeding that 
of film, particularly with low-contrast imagery. An AN/ALQ-110 radar signal 
67. Ibid., p. 282.
A U-2R was fitted with radar systems to detect oceangoing vessels for the Navy EP-X test 
program. (Lockheed Martin)
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receiver was installed in the right pod along with a tracker camera that would 
normally have been mounted in the nose.68
During EP-X tests in early 1973, the U-2R was flown off the coast of California 
to provide near-real-time information on shipping. The sensors were controlled 
from the ground and all data were downlinked to analysts at Lockheed’s facility 
in Sunnyvale, CA. In another test, dubbed Outlaw Hawk, sensors aboard the 
U-2R were downlinked to surface ships including the USS Kitty Hawk. In this 
exercise, the U-2R was flown from Palmdale while the carrier group sailed from 
San Diego to Pearl Harbor, HI. Despite promising results, the EP-X concept 
was ultimately abandoned in favor of a combination of more conventional 
aircraft, such as the EP-3E, and ocean surveillance satellites.69
Kelly Johnson’s hopes for restarting the U-2R production line under 
Navy contract were dashed when NRO leadership recommended terminat-
ing the CIA portion of the U-2 program. Under this plan, the U-2R fleet 
would be consolidated within SAC and two airframes could be loaned to 
the Navy for further EP-X testing. Johnson continued to propose new ideas 
for his beloved U-2, including a capability to carry two laser-guided bombs 
68. Michael J. Cantella, “Application of the High Resolution Return Beam Vidicon,” Optical 
Engineering 16, no. 3 (June 1, 1977): 163257, http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.7972141, 
accessed July 7, 2013.
69. Norman Polmar, “When the U-2 Went to Sea,” Air Force Magazine 84, no. 2 (February 2001): 62.
Under Project Highboy, the EP-X test bed carried a variety of sensors. (Lockheed Martin)
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or anti-ship missiles and a U-2RL with a lengthened Q-bay and a refueling 
probe mounted at the tip of the vertical tail fin. Unfortunately, by this time 
a series of bribery scandals, as well as developmental and financial problems 
involving the L-1011 Tristar, threatened to bankrupt the company. The Navy 
showed no further interest in EP-X, and in 1974, the CIA put an end to the 
agency’s U-2 operation. Johnson retired the following year to be replaced by 
his deputy, Ben Rich.70
Over the next several years, the Air Force sought expanded capabilities for 
the U-2R, including improved cameras and the Advanced Synthetic Aperture 
Radar System (ASARS), which had resolution comparable to that of film cam-
eras. Use of interchangeable nose assemblies, the Q-bay, and wing pods made 
it possible to conduct multisensor missions for simultaneous collection of both 
imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Lockheed eventually contracted 
with Texas-based E-Systems to combine multiple SIGINT sensors within two 
24-foot-long superpods mounted at midspan on each wing. Each superpod 
was capable of containing 800 pounds of equipment and was three times larger 
than the instrument pods used during the EP-X trials. As in the early days of 
the U-2, the airplane could also be fitted with particulate samplers for collecting 
debris from foreign nuclear tests; although such tests took place underground, 
radionuclides were sometimes vented into the atmosphere.71 This capability 
was also put to use after a nuclear-powered Soviet ocean surveillance satellite 
reentered Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrated over Canada’s Northwestern 
Territories in January 1978. Five U-2 high-altitude aerial sampling sorties 
were flown during a joint U.S.-Canadian search-and-recovery effort known 
as Operation Morning Light.72 The SAC U-2 fleet was also occasionally called 
upon to assist with flood control and tornado-damage assessment, hurricane 
surveillance, and geothermal-energy monitoring. Many such missions were 
accommodated during routine training sorties.73
By the mid-1970s, the Air Force had recognized the value of remotely 
piloted vehicles (RPVs) for airborne reconnaissance and was seriously con-
sidering investing in an extremely long-duration, high-altitude RPV. Drones 
used during the war in Vietnam produced imagery and other intelligence 
comparable in quality to that collected by crewed platforms but at consider-
ably lower risk. In a fighter-sized RPV, space normally used for crews and 
70. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 283.
71. Ibid., pp. 283–290.
72. Mahlon E. Gates et al., “Operation Morning Light: Northwest Territories, Canada, 1978: A Non-
technical Summary of United States Participation,” U.S. Dept. of Energy NV-198 (1978), p. 30.
73. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, p. 95.
  Design Evolution
89
life-support systems could be allocated to additional fuel and sensor equip-
ment. Alternatively, such an airframe might be built with a strong, lightweight 
structure for improved altitude and range. Funding of engineering studies and 
testing of prototypes bled funding from other programs, including the U-2R. 
In one such effort, called Compass Cope, both Boeing and Teledyne-Ryan 
submitted competing designs for a high-altitude, long-range RPV designed 
for long-endurance photographic reconnaissance and electronic surveillance 
missions. Sensing an opportunity, Ben Rich proposed that Lockheed develop 
a remotely piloted version of the U-2R. He argued that since it was based 
on proven technology, the RPV would be less expensive to produce and be 
available sooner that either the Boeing or Teledyne-Ryan entries. Moreover, 
it would have equal or better performance and payload capabilities. It became 
a moot point when the Compass Cope program was canceled in July 1977 
because of difficulties in developing sensor payloads for the aircraft and 
because Air Force officials apparently had no interest in a U-2 RPV.74
74. Ibid.
Advanced synthetic aperture imaging radar and wing-mounted SIGINT equipment expanded the 
U-2’s capabilities. (U.S. Air Force)
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New Production
To the surprise of many, Kelly Johnson’s dream of restarting the U-2 production 
line eventually came true with congressional approval of the fiscal year 1979 
defense budget. In 1977, Lockheed proposed upgrading the U-2R to carry 
side-looking radar and the latest ASARS, sensor packages considered ideal for 
the type of standoff tactical reconnaissance mission that military planners con-
sidered vital for future conflicts. Upon accepting this proposal, the Air Force 
signed an initial $10.2 million contract with Lockheed to refurbish the original 
U-2R tooling that had been in storage since 1969 and to create whatever new 
tooling might be required for constructing the new airframe. This was followed 
with a $42.4 million production contract to build the first three airframes, two 
trainers for the Air Force and a single-seat model for NASA to be used as an 
Earth resources science platform. By the time full-scale production ended, a 
total of 37 new airframes had been built, including another for NASA and an 
additional trainer. In keeping with the airplane’s new tactical reconnaissance 
role, the Air Force changed the designation from U-2R to TR-1A for the single-
seat model and TR-1B for the trainer.75 The NASA plane was initially called 
the ER-1 but was later redesignated ER-2, perhaps to further distinguish the 
research plane from its military counterpart.
After 12 years of dormancy, restarting the assembly line proved more diffi-
cult than anticipated. Lack of experienced labor necessitated enticing some ear-
lier U-2 production veterans out of retirement to augment the less-experienced 
workforce. The learning curve was steeper than it should have been but shot up 
dramatically over the first 2 years. Delays resulted from the need for Lockheed 
to reestablish relationships with vendors and subcontractors. Documentation 
became a nightmare. Whereas before the Skunk Works team had been able to 
streamline and minimize paperwork, the Air Force now demanded strict adher-
ence to military specifications (better known as Mil-Spec) that governed proce-
dures and processes. Throughout earlier production runs, Lockheed frequently 
disregarded Mil-Spec in order to meet the unique design requirements of the 
U-2, such as the need to minimize structural weight. With the new produc-
tion, Air Force officials insisted on conformation to regulations. Eventually, the 
company and the Government reached a compromise that allowed Lockheed 
to work to the intention, rather than to the letter, of Mil-Spec regulations. 
There were also a few turf battles. A bureaucratic tug-of-war erupted between 
the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) and Air Force Logistics 
Command (AFLC) over which organization should have overall responsibility 
75. Ibid., p. 96.
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for program management; it was settled only after AFLC successfully pressed 
the argument that the TR-1 was essentially a continuation of the earlier U-2R 
program. Then, the general in charge of Tactical Air Command sought to 
wrest ownership of the TR-1 from SAC, since it was at least nominally to be 
used for tactical reconnaissance rather than strategic reconnaissance. SAC 
commander Gen. Richard H. Ellis prevailed, contending, “There is absolutely 
Lockheed workers build a new version of the U-2, now redesignated TR-1. (Lockheed Martin)
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no reason why SAC cannot continue to support the tasking requested by 
theater commanders.”76
It took 3 long years before TR-1 production began coming in under budget 
and ahead of schedule. This eventual success was largely due to the program’s 
greatest asset: strong teamwork among Lockheed, ASD, AFLC, and the TR-1 
System Program Office. According to ASD commander Lt. Gen. J. Michael 
Loh during an acceptance ceremony for the final airframe, “Each successive 
year we got smarter about writing incentives for the TR-1 contracts, Lockheed 
got better at building it, and AFLC got better at integrating subsystems.” This 
teamwork ultimately resulted in a $26 million savings on budget over the final 
6 years of production.77
First to roll off the assembly line was the NASA ER-2. Lockheed test pilot 
Art Peterson made the first flight on May 11, 1981, and NASA pilot Marty 
Knutson delivered it to Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA, on June 
10.78 This occurred with surprisingly little fanfare compared to the subsequent 
debut of the TR-1. Unlike its predecessors, which had been born in secrecy, the 
first TR-1A was unveiled publicly during a media event at Lockheed’s Palmdale 
76. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 294–295.
77. Ibid., p. 295.
78. Ibid., p. 374.
The TR-1 was publicly unveiled in July 1981. (Lockheed Martin)
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facility in July 1981. Company test pilot Ken Weir made the first flight on 
August 1, and by April 1982, six aircraft were flying. Low-rate production 
continued until the final delivery in early October 1989.79
Several airframes were delivered under the designation U-2R and the second 
trainer as a U-2RT. In October 1991, the TR-1 designation was dropped 
altogether and the airplanes were once again all referred to as U-2s. By the 
time the final airframe rolled off the assembly line, the U-2R had evolved 
into a flexible, multipurpose platform for electro-optical, SIGINT, and radar 
reconnaissance. It was also considerably less expensive to maintain and operate 
than its putative successor, the SR-71. Sensor payloads included the ASARS-2 
improved imaging radar and the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance 
System (SYERS). Both payloads could be installed in the interchangeable nose 
sections. In addition, the U-2R was capable of serving as a data relay and, when 
called for, could still carry high-resolution film cameras that were considerably 
more flexible and reliable than those used in the early days of the program. To fur-
ther enhance its capabilities, the airplane was equipped with a data link to provide 
reconnaissance products in near real time. Early versions required the transmitter 
to be within 200 to 250 miles of a ground station for the line-of-sight downlink 
to work, otherwise data had to be recorded onboard until the U-2 was within 
range of the receiver. To escape this limitation, a satellite communications system 
was developed for the U-2R. Known as Senior Span, it consisted of a steerable 
79.  Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, pp. 96–97.
 A trainer variant designated TR-1B was similar in configuration to the U-2CT. (U.S. Air Force)
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30-inch parabolic antenna housed in an unpressurized dorsal radome. Skunk 
Works engineers faced the challenge of designing the 17-foot-long antenna dome 
so that it would not add excessive weight to the airframe or affect the center of 
gravity. The result was one of the most unusual looking U-2 configurations yet.80
Into the 21st Century
In the 1990s, the U-2 fleet received the first of several significant upgrades that 
modernized the airplane for a new era. Preproduction testing began in 1991 in 
preparation for retrofitting the fleet with General Electric F118-GE-101 non-
afterburning turbofan engines; the antiquated J75-P-13B turbojet engines were 
becoming increasingly costly to maintain. Evaluation of the new powerplant 
included engine-airframe integration, basic operation, and demonstration of 
the airstart system. The new engine was rated at 18,300 pounds of thrust, and 
flight-test results indicated it would provide the U-2 with a weight savings 
of 1,300 pounds and use an average of 16 percent less fuel than the J75. The 
engine’s size (39 inches shorter than the J75) and weight improved the airplane’s 
center of gravity. Digital engine controls ensured linear thrust throughout 
the flight envelope and virtually eliminated the chance of compressor stalls 
and flameouts.81 In addition to being 30 percent lighter than the old engine, 
the F118 was more fuel efficient, more reliable, and easier to maintain, only 
requiring overhaul every 2,500 hours instead of every 800. The new engine 
increased the airplane’s range by 1,220 nautical miles and increased altitude 
80. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 303–305.
81. Ibid., pp. 314–315.
A NASA ER-2 equipped with the Senior Span pod. (NASA)
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performance by about 3,000 feet.82 Production modifications began in 1994, 
and the entire fleet was retrofitted over the course of scheduled major overhauls 
that were due every 3,400 hours of operation. As each U-2R was modified, it 
was redesignated a U-2S, and the final engine installation took place in 1998.83 
The F118 was not immune to problems. One U-2 was lost after a bearing 
failed, causing the engine to seize and rendering the restart system useless; 
subsequent dual battery failure and loss of altitude through inclement weather 
doomed the airplane. Another U-2 suffered repeated malfunctions, causing 
momentary power loss and severe engine vibrations, forcing the pilot to make 
an emergency landing.84
In 2000, Lockheed embarked on a 6-year, $140-million effort called the 
Power-EMI upgrade that called for equipping the U-2S with an updated elec-
trical system that produced less electromagnetic interference. At the same time, 
the airplane was equipped with improved GPS navigational capability, a single-
piece windscreen for better visibility and de-icing capability, and provisions for 
integrating an improved SIGINT package. As with engine installation, these 
improvements were added during scheduled depot maintenance.85
There was some consideration given to redesigning the SYERS package to fit 
inside the Q-bay, thus allowing the U-2S to carry both it and the ASARS-2 sen-
sors simultaneously. This proved impractical, so instead, efforts were focused on 
upgrading the SYERS multispectral capabilities. The SYERS-2 had seven col-
lection wavebands compared to two with SYERS-1. The sensor now detected 
three visible, two shortwave infrared, and four medium-wave infrared wave-
bands, making it easier to detect and identify targets in daylight or at night, 
even through layers of haze. Improved data links enabled transmission of the 
increased data streaming from the sensor.86
Up to this point, the U-2S was still equipped with a control panel character-
ized by round dials and a multitude of switches and knobs, just as it had been 
since 1967. A new so-called “glass cockpit” was introduced in December 2000, 
replacing conventional analog instruments with electronic displays. Difficulty 
maintaining and replacing older components and the need to establish a better 
interface with modern equipment and sensors drove the $93 million U-2 
Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability Program (RAMP). Antiquated cock-
pit panels crowded with approximately two-dozen gauges were replaced by 
82. William E. Burrows, “The U-Deuce,” Air&Space/Smithsonian (March 2005): 24.
83. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 315.
84. Ibid., p. 329.
85. Ibid., p. 324.
86. Ibid., p. 325.
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three 8- by 6-inch flat-panel, multifunction color screens. An avionics pro-
cessor converted analog signals to digital. Vital switches were conveniently 
grouped together on an upfront display panel within easy reach of the pilot. 
Many of the old-style switches were replaced with touch controls that were 
In 2000, the U-2 fleet was equipped with modern cockpit instruments, right, to replace anti-
quated control panels that had been in use since 1967. (Lockheed Martin)
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spaced so that they could be easily operated while wearing bulky pressure suit 
gloves. Such attention to the human-machine interface was a major break-
through over the old cockpit configuration in which some radio and navigation 
controls were located in awkward, out-of-the-way places, and critical informa-
tion such as fuel quantity was not accurately portrayed. The new cockpit layout, 
along with such features as an angle-of-attack indicator that provided aural as 
well as visual warnings, provided the U-2 pilot with substantially improved 
situational awareness.87
As the U-2 entered the 21st century, defense planners began preparations 
to retire the fleet and replace it with the RQ-4 Global Hawk in an effort to 
expand the use of remotely piloted and autonomous platforms. The Global 
Hawk had no need for onboard crew accommodations or life-support systems 
and could remain aloft for more than 30 hours. Unfortunately, it also had a 
smaller payload than that of the U-2, less electrical power to operate the sensors, 
and a lower operational ceiling. Nevertheless, by August 2011, the Air Force 
was ready to announce that the U-2 would cease flying within 4 years. In a 
statement at the National Press Club, Global Hawk program manager Lt. Col. 
Rick Thomas expressed confidence that the RQ-4 would soon be able to match 
the capabilities of the U-2. In order to do this, engineers had to find a way to 
successfully integrate the U-2’s massive Optical Bar Camera (OBC) with the 
Global Hawk’s composite airframe. This was easier said than done, as it became 
clear that it would require substantial modifications to both the airplane and 
sensor package. Another stumbling block to the fleet replacement schedule 
was proposed congressional legislation that would require the Department 
of Defense to certify that sustainment costs for the Global Hawk were less 
than those of maintaining the U-2. At the time, it cost just $31,000 per U-2 
flight hour compared to $35,000 for the RQ-4, though Thomas promised that 
operating costs for the Global Hawk were dropping. Critics acknowledged the 
Global Hawk’s endurance capabilities but lamented that sensors carried by the 
autonomous aircraft provided less range, less resolution, and less collection 
capability than those of the U-2.88
Once it became clear that the Global Hawk would not be a viable replace-
ment for the U-2 in the near term, the Air Force embarked on another 
series of upgrades for the venerable platform. Most of the proposed improve-
ments involved sensors carried by the U-2, starting with the OBC, which 
87. Ibid., p. 326.
88. Dave Majumdar, “Global Hawk to Replace U-2 in 2015,” Defense News, Digital Edition, August 
10, 2011, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110810/DEFSECT01/108100302/Global-
Hawk-Replace-U-2-2015, accessed July 23, 2013.
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was upgraded to provide better resolution at lower altitudes. Additionally, 
the U-2 was to be equipped with a hyperspectral sensor package called the 
Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition Testbed (SPIRITT), which 
had been previously tested on NASA’s WB-57F. The SPIRITT package was 
designed to fit into the U-2’s Q-bay in place of the OBC, and it could be car-
ried simultaneously with the nose-mounted SYERS-2 high-resolution digital 
camera. As with other sensor packages, the SPIRITT would be controlled 
remotely via a data link from a Distributed Common Ground System intel-
ligence analysis station. Other U-2 upgrades included the Cabin Altitude 
Reduction Effort (CARE), designed to increase air pressure inside the U-2 
cockpit to mimic pressures at lower altitudes. Aerospace medical specialists 
hoped that CARE would reduce instances of decompression sickness and 
shorten a pilot’s recuperation time between sorties. Increased operational 
tempo due to operations in southwest Asia had resulted in greater numbers 
of reports of altitude sickness. Even under the best of circumstances, a U-2 
pilot was required to spend 3 to 4 days recuperating between flights. With 
the increased cabin pressure provided by CARE, the same pilots could fly 
every other day, increasing squadron capabilities. Finally, defense planners 
began looking into the possibility of replacing the U-2’s special fuel with 
less expensive JP-8, which had become standard for all other Air Force 
aircraft. To do so would require modifying the kerosene-based JP-8 with 
an additive to prevent the fuel from freezing at temperatures below –80 °F; 
Although the RQ-4 Global Hawk can remain aloft for 30 hours at a time, it has not yet 
demonstrated sensor capabilities comparable to those of the U-2. (U.S. Air Force)
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standard JP-8 freezes at around –50 °F. Fortunately, such an additive had 
already been developed.89
According to Maj. Bill Evans, U-2 program element monitor at Air 
Combat Command Headquarters, Hampton Roads, VA, the only foreseeable 
problem is parts obsolescence that eventually plagues all aircraft. Although 
the current fleet was built in the 1980s, from a structural standpoint, the U-2 
is in excellent shape. “Right now, the airframe itself is viable though 2040,” 
Evans said. “Structurally, the aircraft is sound for the next 30 years, at least.”90
89. Dave Majumdar, “Notebook: Plans for Reinvigorated U-2 Include Hyperspectral Sensor,” Defense 
News, Digital Edition, March 22, 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120322/
C4ISR02/303220012/Notebook-Plans-Reinvigorated-U-2-Include-Hyperspectral-Sensor, 
accessed July 23, 2013.
90. Ibid.
100
The U-2 is divided into several major assemblies. (U.S. Air Force) 
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The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of 
Although the overall design configuration of the U-2 was extremely inno-
vative, the materials and construction methods used to build it were fairly 
conventional. In its outward appearance, the airplane looked like a typical jet, 
with the exception of its long, thin wings and bicycle landing gear. Most of 
the airframe was made from ordinary aluminum alloys, with titanium used 
sparingly in areas that required additional strength or which were subject to 
higher temperatures. What set it apart from other craft was Kelly Johnson’s 
elegantly simple design that maximized fuel and payload capacity while mini-
mizing gross weight. The airplane’s major assemblies included the forward 
fuselage, wings and mid-fuselage, tail group, landing gear, and powerplant.
Most of the airframe was constructed from aluminum alloys. With the 
exception of welded assemblies, extrusions, and machined fittings, all alumi-
num sheet metal parts were manufactured from clad material. These included 
2024 or 7075 sheet varying in thickness from 0.005 to 0.190 inches. Machine 
parts were typically made from 2024 or 7075 aluminum plate or bar stock. 
Extruded parts were made using both 2024 and 7075 aluminum. Other 
components were constructed from 6061-T4 or T6 using a fusion welding 
process. Wherever necessary, components requiring additional strength were 
fashioned from stainless steel or carbon steel of varying hardness. For protec-
tion against corrosion, aluminum parts were coated with zinc chromate primer 
or a similar equivalent. Carbon steel components were cadmium plated, but 
stainless steel parts needed no additional paints or coatings.1 The airplane 
included small amounts of titanium alloys in selected areas. Forward flap 
edges, exhaust ejector skin panels, and miscellaneous fittings and details were 
made from A110 AT. Parts of the empennage support ring, longeron, other 
fittings, the main gear piston, and the cylinder consisted of B120 VCA, and 
the wing-to-fuselage attach bolts were machined from C120 AV.2
 1. NASA, “U-2 Investigators Handbook,” NASA Ames Research Center, pp. VI-6–VI-10.
 2. Michael A. Alexander, “TR-1A/TR-1B/U-2R/ER-2 Handbook,” U.S. Air Force, 1986, p. 13–15.
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Forward Fuselage
The forward fuselage included the nose, cockpit, and a space for camera and 
sensor payloads known as the Q-bay. Many features were common to all U-2 
variants while some were specific to certain models. To reduce weight while 
retaining structural strength, components were machined to the thinnest 
Titanium was used in select areas that required additional strength or protection from heating. 
(U.S. Air Force)
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gauges allowable. Builders used the minimum possible number of ribs and 
stringers, and flush-riveted skin panels were a mere 0.020- to 0.063-inches 
thick.3 Engine air inlet scoops were located on the sides of the fuselage just 
aft of the cockpit. These scoops featured built-in boundary-layer bleed ducts. 
Air from the left-hand duct cooled the D.C. generator, and air from the 
right-hand duct was routed through the air conditioning refrigerator to cool 
cabin air bled from the engine compressor.4 Article 341 was originally built 
using 75-ST aluminum sheet for inlet duct interiors. This material was hand 
formed, a process that included hammering the thin sheets into the proper 
shape. Maintenance crews found that the aluminum skin started to crack 
after about 90 hours of operation. As a result, later airplanes used 24-ST 
stretch-formed aluminum skin that was less susceptible to cracking. Even so, 
it was recommended that high-power static ground runs be limited to about 
2 minutes to avoid putting too much stress on the inlet skin.5
The nose assembly on the early U-2 models had a slender ogival cross 
section. Internal space was extremely limited and typically served to accom-
modate various antennas and electronic gear. A special nose assembly was 
installed during the High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP). It featured a 
circular aperture at the tip, with filters to collect airborne particulates. Later 
U-2R/S and ER-2 models were equipped with a variety of interchangeable 
nose assemblies capable of carrying a variety of cameras and sensors. Attached 
to the fuselage with four quick-release latches, the standard nose cone pro-
vided a payload volume of 47.8 cubic feet. The 101-inch-long nose compart-
ment was built to accept payloads of up to 650 pounds on custom-built racks. 
Other nose cones of varying size were available for specialized payloads. Due 
to forebody weight limits, payloads in the nose section reduced payload weight 
in the Q-bay on a pound-for-pound basis. At cruise altitudes, the environment 
inside the nose area was maintained at 27,000 to 30,000 feet pressure altitude. 
A pilot-operated valve controlled pressurized air in the nose compartment, 
but the rate of air exchange was solely regulated by the leakage rate of the nose 
structure, as there were no overboard dump valves. Temperatures inside the 
nose compartment during flight varied between 68 and –40 °F.6
The cockpit compartment was separated from the nose section by a bulk-
head and was pressurized to approximately 25,000 feet pressure altitude. 
The pilot’s control panel had a conventional layout with many standard 
 3. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 19.
 4. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 8.
 5. Ibid., p. 161.
 6. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” August 2002, p. III-4.
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instruments to provide funda-
mental information of aircraft 
systems, speed, altitude, and nav-
igation. Engine power was con-
trolled by a single throttle lever 
of the same type used in contem-
porary single-engine jet fighters 
such as the F-100.7 Unlike in a 
fighter, the U-2 pilot used a yoke 
rather than a stick to make flight 
control inputs. Otherwise, the 
controls were conventional. All 
surfaces (ailerons, rudder, etc.) 
were directly connected to the 
yoke and pedals by cables with no 
hydraulic boost power. An electri-
cally driven system provided trim 
in pitch and roll. Although there 
was no provision for directional 
trim from the cockpit, the autopi-
lot effectively provided yaw trim 
when operating.8 Conventional 
pedals controlled the rudder, 
permitting 30 degrees of travel in 
either direction. These pedals were 
adjustable fore and aft to accom-
modate pilots with differing leg 
lengths; but more importantly, 
the upper portion of each pedal 
could be rotated to a horizontal 
position. This feature allowed the 
pilot to extend and stretch his 
legs, thus reducing fatigue during 
long flights.9 The most unique 
flight control system feature was 
the gust alleviation system. This 
 7. CIA, “U-2 Utility Flight Handbook,” March 1, 1959, p. I-10.
 8. Ibid., p. I-21.
 9. U.S. Air Force, “Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft,” p. I-27.
The nose was designed to be lightweight yet capable 
of supporting mission payloads. (U.S. Air Force)
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device made it possible to raise both ailerons up 10 degrees while simultane-
ously raising both wing flaps by 4 degrees, thus reducing structural loads on 
the wings and tail assembly. Use of the gust controls was necessary when flying 
in turbulent air or when flying at higher speeds in smooth air.10 Because cloud 
cover below the airplane’s flightpath often prevented the pilot from locating 
navigational points on the ground through the driftsight periscope, the U-2 
was also equipped with a small sextant for making celestial navigation. When 
clouds were not a factor, however, the driftsight proved highly accurate, and 
pilots found that they could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less 
than 1 nautical mile over a 1,000-nautical-mile course.11 Much later U-2 
models were equipped with an angle-of-attack indicator, which provided the 
pilot with a visual and aural warning of approach-to-stall. Because the U-2 
was designed to operate very close to stall during most phases of flight, this 
instrument greatly increased pilot safety. Lack of stall warning on earlier vari-
ants was indicated as a possible contributing factor in several mishaps.12
10. Ibid., p. I-26.
11. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 76.
12. Tim Williams, NASA ER-2 pilot, interview with author, April 30, 2014.
 U-2 pilots found the driftsight, a downward-looking periscope, extremely useful for navigation. (NASA)
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The cockpit was enclosed beneath a lightweight canopy, hinged on the 
left side. The uppermost portion of the canopy was coated with either white 
or black paint to provide a sun shield. Although this feature enhanced crew 
comfort, it also somewhat reduced visibility. In an emergency, the pilot pulled 
a handle to jettison the canopy and fire a rocket-propelled ejection seat that 
was qualified for use in zero-speed/zero-altitude ejections. A spur-and-cable 
arrangement restrained the pilot’s legs during ejection to prevent flailing. 
Life-support equipment included dual normal oxygen systems, an emergency 
oxygen system, and a pressure garment. Primary breathing air came from a pair 
of 2.6-gallon liquid-oxygen converters, each providing gaseous oxygen to the 
pilot’s helmet through independent supply lines and pressure regulators. The 
emergency oxygen system consisted of two gaseous oxygen cylinders located 
in the survival kit and was used only in the event of ejection or malfunction 
of the two primary oxygen sources. Activated automatically, the emergency 
system provided suit pressurization and 15 minutes of breathing oxygen.13
The environmental control system (ECS) delivered pressurized and envi-
ronmentally controlled air to the cockpit, nose, Q-bay, and (on NASA air-
craft only) the forward two-thirds of the wing pods. Air in the payload areas 
and cockpit remained unprocessed below 7,900 feet pressure altitude. As the 
13. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” pp. II-5 
and IV-7.
A painted sunshade limited visibility through the lightweight canopy. (NASA)
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aircraft climbed higher, the ECS switched to an isobaric control mode, main-
taining a pressure altitude of 7,500 feet. Once the U-2 climbed above 18,300 
feet, the ECS established a pressure differential of 3.88 pounds per square 
inch between the ambient atmospheric pressure and that of the cockpit and 
payload areas. This resulted in a cockpit pressure altitude of approximately 
28,500 feet at an aircraft altitude of 70,000 feet. Engine bleed air for pres-
surization was passed through a heat exchanger, mixing muff, and a turbine, 
though at altitudes above 25,000 feet, the turbine was bypassed. Fans with or 
without additional heat were used in the cockpit and payload areas to circulate 
air for the dual purpose of reducing condensation from windows or optics, 
and to distribute heat. Although relative humidity was low at stratospheric 
cruise altitudes, relative humidity could reach 100 percent during descent 
and landing, allowing condensation to form on surfaces that had been cold-
soaked at altitude.14
The pressurized equipment bay, or Q-bay, just behind the cockpit, was 
designed to be the principal location for special equipment packages. Top 
and bottom access hatches, removable by means of external latches, made 
it possible to install and remove delicate cameras and sensors quickly and 
easily. Typically, instrumentation and other equipment was installed on rack 
assemblies, hoisted upward, and secured to several mounting points. In early 
model U-2 aircraft, the Q-bay was 67 inches long and 55 inches high, vary-
ing in width from top to bottom. This space accommodated payloads weigh-
ing between 500 and 750 pounds. Additional equipment could be carried 
in wing-mounted pods (up to 300 pounds each) and inside a dorsal fairing 
with a 100-pound capacity.15 Later model airframes were capable of carrying 
up to 2,550 pounds of equipment distributed between the Q-bay, nose, and 
wing pods. Weight distribution between payload areas affected the center of 
gravity of the aircraft, resulting in reduced allowable payload in some areas. 
Aside from these primary areas, provisions for instruments were available in 
several smaller areas, including the aft fuselage, tailcone, wingtips, and spaces 
on the left and right sides of the forward fuselage. Instrument integration 
required evaluation of all payloads for weight and balance concerns, aero-
dynamic effects that might alter the airplane’s stability characteristics, and 
total electrical power consumption.16 In the U-2R/S and ER-2, the Q-bay 
provided 64.6 cubic feet of volume and, like earlier models, featured remov-
able upper and lower hatches. Hatches for all models could be configured 
14. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. I-4.
15. NASA, “U-2 Investigators’ Handbook,” vol. 1, NASA Ames Research Center, pp. I-1-I-7.
16. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. I-2.
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to accommodate a wide variety of specialized sensors. The combined weight 
carried in the forward fuselage area (Q-bay and nose assembly) was nor-
mally limited to 1,300 pounds including payload mounting racks, electrical 
Technicians install a camera package in the Q-bay of a U-2A. (Lockheed Martin)
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interface panels, and the 
payload itself.17
Payloads carried by 
the U-2 were subjected to 
a range of environmental 
conditions resulting from 
the airplane’s extremely 
high cruising altitudes. 
Two regulator valves, 
located at the bottom of 
the cockpit aft pressure 
bulkhead, allowed pres-
surized air to enter the 
Q-bay. Available airflow 
was dependent upon the 
amount of air bled from 
the engine’s compressor 
stages, but it typically 
varied from 0.5 pounds 
per minute at idle to 
3.0 pounds per minute 
at cruise power settings. 
Though the compart-
ment’s pressure altitude 
was normally maintained 
at around 30,000 feet, 
safety considerations 
required that payloads 
be designed to withstand 
pressure altitudes of up to 70,000 feet in the event of a pressurization system 
failure. Bleed air from the engine was cooled by a heat exchanger to a nominal 
temperature of 60 °F. Actual temperatures within the Q-bay depended upon 
the incoming air temperature, ambient temperature, amount of insulation 
used on the equipment package, air circulation inside the Q-bay, cockpit 
controlled heaters and blowers, and the instrument’s heat output. At cruise 
altitude, air temperatures inside the compartment could vary from 10 °F to 
17. Ibid., p. III-1.
Simple, lightweight construction was the hallmark of 
the forward fuselage assembly. (U.S. Air Force)
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50 °F, though in the summer temperatures could rise above 120 °F during 
ground operation prior to takeoff.18
Wings and Wing Pods
Due to requirements for high aspect ratio and low drag ratio, the wings proved 
to be among the most challenging design features of the entire airplane. For 
optimum lift, they needed to be long and narrow with a thin airfoil. They 
had to be extremely lightweight to reduce overall aircraft gross weight, but 
for mission endurance, they needed to be capable of carrying most of the 
airplane’s fuel supply. The wings were attached to the rearmost portion of the 
forward fuselage, at the airplane’s center of gravity. In order to meet weight 
restrictions, the U-2 designers chose an unusual arrangement for attaching 
the wings to the fuselage. Unlike on conventional airplanes, the U-2’s main 
wing spar did not pass through the fuselage to give the wings continuity and 
strength. Instead, each wing assembly was entirely separate, attached to the 
sides of the fuselage with tension bolts as on a sailplane. Absence of a carry-
through wing spar left room inside the fuselage for the Q-bay between the 
cockpit and the engine compartment, improving the aircraft’s center of gravity 
and contributing to overall weight reduction.19
As originally designed, the wings were configured with integral fuel tanks 
extending from the leading edge to the beam at the 48-percent chord line. 
Spanwise, each main tank extended from the wing root to wing station 440. 
Auxiliary wing tanks were located from 48 to 65 percent of the chord and 
extended from the root to wing station 300. The trailing edges consisted of 
flaps and ailerons that were only unconventional in that they also served to 
alleviate structural loads on the wings and tail in turbulent air and at high 
speeds. The gust alleviation system worked by raising the flaps upward 4 
degrees while simultaneously shifting the neutral point of the ailerons 10 
degrees up. This moved the spanwise center of pressure inboard, reducing 
the wing’s bending moment. This also effectively reduced the wing camber, 
which reduced the required balancing tail load.20
The wing had a mean aerodynamic chord of 100.8 inches. Designers selected 
an NACA 63A409 airfoil with 9 percent thickness-to-chord ratio for the wing 
root and an NACA 63A406 airfoil with a 6 percent thickness-to-chord ratio 
18. Ibid., p. III-3
19. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 47.
20. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 8.
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for the tip. Incidence varied from 4 degrees at the root to 2 degrees at the tip. 
The dihedral was 0 degrees, and sweepback at 25 percent chord was 6 degrees. 
The ailerons had a total area of 35.2 square feet, and the flaps had a combined 
area of 97.5 square feet.21
The wings on the original U-2 spanned 80 feet with 600 square feet of wing 
area. By contrast, the larger U-2R had a 103-foot span with 1,000 square feet 
of lifting surface. Bob Wiele, leader of the U-2R wing design team, ensured 
that the wing structure did not exceed 3 pounds per square foot. For maxi-
mum performance, he retained the original NACA airfoils while reducing 
wing loading for the heavier airframe to the same values attained with the 
U-2A. The resulting lift-to-drag ratio was 27:1, with a lift coefficient of 0.6 
to 0.7 and aspect ratio of 10.667. Larger wings allowed for a greater internal 
fuel capacity, and the fuel tank arrangement had to be altered. Pilots of the 
early U-2 models discovered that having the main tank forward and the aux-
iliary tank aft resulted in considerable center-of-gravity changes as fuel was 
consumed during flight. Wiele and his team eliminated this problem in the 
U-2R by placing the 1,169-gallon main tanks inboard and the 239-gallon 
auxiliaries outboard. This allowed fuel from the main tanks to be exhausted 
first so that the weight of the remaining fuel in the auxiliary tanks helped 
dampen wing bending and torsional loads.22
Wing pods for the TR-1/U-2R and ER-2 provided approximately 86 cubic 
feet of payload capacity. Each pod accommodated payloads up to a maximum 
weight of 600 pounds. The pod structure consisted of five individual segments: 
21. Ibid., p. 16.
22. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 238.
For maximum lift and high-altitude performance, Lockheed engineers designed the U-2 wing 
using the NACA 64A airfoil. The internal structure was built to be as light as possible while 
providing sufficient strength. (U.S. Air Force)
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Most of the wing interior spaces were occupied by integral fuel tanks. External wing-mounted 
tanks, or pods, provided additional space for mission equipment. (Lockheed Martin)
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nose cone, forward pod, mid-body, aft pod, and tail cone. Latches at the for-
ward and aft ends of the pod mid-body provided easy access for equipment 
servicing and installation. For the ER-2, the forward two-thirds of each pod 
was pressurized, but as in the aircraft nose area, there were no overboard dump 
valves in the pods; the rate of air exchange was a function of the leak rate of 
the structure and associated pressure sealing. Interior temperatures inside the 
empty wing pods varied from –40 °F to 20 °F at cruise altitudes. Internal heat 
sources were normally installed in the pods to produce warmer local tempera-
tures for sensitive equipment. Aeroelastic effects caused the wings to deflect 
upward during flight. Deflection of the pods was measured to as much as 0.86 
degrees from horizontal, though deflection angles tended to vary slightly with 
altitude, payload weight, fuel load, and atmospheric conditions.23
Smaller pods, or tanks, could be pylon-mounted on the wings or along the 
fuselage centerline, aft of the main landing gear. Unpressurized and lacking 
temperature control, each tank offered a payload volume of 14 cubic feet and 
a maximum weight of 350 pounds. Instruments in these tanks were subjected 
to greater vibrations and more extreme temperatures than elsewhere on the 
airframe. Centerline installation provided an unobstructed nadir view, but 
viewports required protection from debris, water, or ice thrown up by the 
main gear during takeoff and landing. When attached to wing pylons in 
symmetrical pairs, the tanks were not susceptible to debris from the land-
ing gear. Additional instruments could be accommodated in a fairing called 
the System 20 pod on the right wing, as well as within the left wingtip, but 
instrument weight had to be carefully evaluated for its effect on the aircraft’s 
trim condition.24
Tail Group
Herb Nystrom and Rod Kreimendahl designed the original U-2A tail assem-
bly. This included the aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer and rudder, and horizontal 
stabilizer airfoils. These components were constructed almost entirely of alu-
minum alloys and assembled using the minimum number of parts required 
for structural strength. The most unusual feature of the tail group was the 
fact that the aft fuselage was joined to the forward fuselage using just three 
tension bolts, thus reducing weight and easing assembly.25
23. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” pp. III-6–III-7.
24. Ibid., p. III-7.
25. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 47.
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The tail-fuselage interface was designed for ease of assembly and maintenance. (Laughlin 
Heritage Foundation)
As with the fuselage and wings, the U-2 empennage was constructed from lightweight alumi-
num alloys. (U.S. Air Force)
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The fixed horizontal tail had a total area of 90 square feet, the elevators 
totaled 20 square feet, and the vertical tail had an area of 49 square feet plus a 
9.5-square-foot rudder. As originally configured, the horizontal stabilizer had 
zero incidence, but this was later increased to 1.5 degrees.26
On later models such as the U-2R, the tail group retained the basic con-
figuration, but it was enlarged as necessary to match the new airframe. The tail 
assembly, or empennage, primarily accommodated the stabilizer airfoils and 
housed the engine exhaust duct. There was also room for ballast to trim the 
airplane’s center of gravity, and additional space within the fuselage aft cavity 
and the tail cone to carry small instrument packages.27 Two speed brakes, 
each about 7 square feet in area, were installed just aft of the fuselage break. 
These hydraulically actuated drag devices were used to slow the aircraft. They 
were hinged at the forward end and capable of opening to approximately 50 
degrees. For additional landing deceleration, a 16-foot-diameter ribbon chute 
was housed in a compartment at the top aft end of the fuselage, at the base of 
the vertical tail fin.28
Landing Gear
The airplane’s hydraulically actuated, bicycle-type landing gear consisted of a 
single oleo strut with two lightweight wheels toward the front of the airplane 
and two small solid-mount wheels under the tail. Both sets of wheels retracted 
forward and upward into the gear wells. The entire assembly weighed just 208 
pounds yet was capable of withstanding touchdown forces imparted by the 
7-ton airframe during landing. The gear was hydraulically operated, but an 
alternate cable-operated free-fall system was provided in case the normal gear-
extension mechanism malfunctioned. For braking, the pilot applied hydraulic 
pressure equally to both main wheels through toe pressure to the rudder 
pedals. There was no differential braking. In the event of normal hydraulic 
system malfunction, an emergency-brake accumulator supplied sufficient 
pressure for up to five applications of the brakes.29
Several landing gear deficiencies were corrected during early testing. 
Originally, Article 341 was equipped with two brake pads, one on the 
inboard side of each main wheel; but pilots found this configuration provided 
26. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 16–17.
27. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. III-7.
28. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 13.
29. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. III-10.
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unsatisfactory braking and caused the brake mechanism to overheat. To resolve 
the problem, an additional brake pad was installed on the outboard side of 
each wheel. Another problem was the tendency of the airplane to porpoise 
when the pilot touched down on the main gear first. To prevent the U-2 from 
bouncing, technicians installed a valve in the main gear strut with two orifices 
of different sizes for metering the hydraulic fluid. The larger orifice helped 
absorb shock loads while the smaller one prevented rapid springback. This 
solution proved very effective. Finally, the tail-wheel steering was found to be 
deficient in early tests. In the original configuration, the steering cables were 
attached to the rudder horn and then routed to the tail wheel. The design 
called for 6 degrees of travel in either direction, but due to cable stretch, the 
most steering that could be obtained was between 3 and 4 degrees. To correct 
this, the system was revised so that the steering cables were attached directly 
to the rudder cables and then routed to a bell crank at the tail wheel.30
The two wingtip pogo outriggers used for lateral balance during takeoff 
were made from flat steel bars, curved like the leaf spring on an automobile to 
absorb shocks during takeoff roll. The lower end of each pogo was equipped 
with two small wheels with solid rubber tires.31 These auxiliary gears were 
30. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 259.
31. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 47.
The bicycle landing gear included a set of main wheels and a smaller set of tail wheels. 
(U.S. Air Force)
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originally designed to be released electrically during the takeoff roll. If released 
early enough, this method proved fairly reliable, but if the pilot waited until 
airspeed had increased to 60 or 70 knots, the pogos hung on due to air loads. 
This created a hazardous situation; in fact, one airplane was lost in a fatal 
accident while the pilot tried to shake loose a hung pogo. Lockheed designers 
tried several methods to allow the auxiliary gear to drop at higher airspeeds, 
including springs, external kickers, and olive-shaped rollers instead of round 
rollers in the release mechanism. None proved satisfactory. Eventually, they 
adopted a free-fall system that allowed the pogos to drop out as the wings 
lifted during the takeoff roll. For training flights where it was desired to retain 
the pogos to be used for lateral balance during landing, safety pins could be 
installed to lock the gear in place. The modified system proved highly suc-
cessful. Occasional subsequent instances of hung pogos were traced to rough 
or battered pogo heads that hung up in the sockets.32
Powerplant
The U-2A was powered by a single J57-type non-afterburning engine fea-
turing an axial flow, twin-spool compressor, and a three-stage turbine. The 
32. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 260.
Senior Airman Jordan Mihm installs an outrigger pogo on a U-2R. (U.S. Air Force) 
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forward compressor was a nine-stage, low-pressure unit connected to the 
second and third stage turbine wheels by a through-shaft. The seven-stage 
aft (high-pressure) compressor was mechanically independent of the forward 
compressor and was connected by a hollow shaft to the first-stage turbine 
wheel. This arrangement permitted the low-pressure rotor to turn at its most 
efficient speed and allowed high compression ratios. Engine performance 
varied depending on which model of the engine was installed. The J57-P-
31 developed 11,200 pounds of static thrust at sea level and weighed 3,820 
pounds, providing a power-to-weight ratio of 2.9:1. Until the J57-P-31 
engines were available, the first U-2 aircraft used J57-P-37 engines, which 
were 415 pounds heavier and delivered only 10,500 pounds of thrust at sea 
level, resulting in a power-to-weight ratio of 2.5:1, almost 15 percent less 
efficient than the P-31. Because the P-31 engine had been designed specifically 
for high-altitude operation, it offered better thrust and fuel consumption than 
the P-37, as well as wider operating margins.33
The engine received air through a bifurcated inlet system; two external 
ducts opened on either side of the fuselage just behind the cockpit and merged 
into a single internal duct at the compressor face. For weight and balance pur-
poses, the engine was installed at mid–wing chord. Fuel consumption varied 
from 9,000 pounds per hour at sea level to 700 pounds per hour at cruising 
33. “U-2 Utility Flight Handbook,” p. I-3.
Cutaway of J57 engine. (CIA)
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altitudes.34 As Lockheed engineers refined airframe-powerplant integration 
during the first year of flight testing, it was only necessary to make a few small 
changes to the aircraft design. As Ernie Joiner recalled, “The engine tailpipe 
operated inside an ejector in order to induce cooling air low through the aft 
fuselage. We were robbing the engine thrust because the jet stream was striking 
34. Downie and Jarboe, The Inquisitive Angel.
Cutaway of a J75 engine. (U.S. Air Force)
Unlimited Horizons
120
the ejector lip. Cutting one inch off the ejector lip solved this.” Another change 
involved engine oil coolers. “We started with one fuel-oil cooler and two air-
oil coolers,” Joiner noted, “but we found it possible to eliminate one of the 
air-oil coolers and its outside scoop.”35
Removing the oil-cooler scoop decreased cooling airflow on the left side of 
the airplane. This necessitated installation of heat shields inside the fuselage 
to prevent electrical wiring and hydraulic system components from overheat-
ing. Additionally, with the J57-P-31 engine installed, there was overheat-
ing of bulkheads at fuselage stations 495 and 504 on the left side and high 
temperatures at the rear engine mount. The highest temperatures were in the 
vicinity of the engine turbine nozzle where the exhaust gas temperature was 
hottest. On the J57-P-31 engine, this area was covered with a single layer of 
skin that permitted greater thermal radiation than on the J57-P-37, which 
had a double skin layer in the same area. Lockheed technicians installed an 
engine-mounted heat shield that lowered temperatures within the aft fuselage 
to acceptable levels.36
To improve performance, the U-2C was equipped with the J75-P-13 
powerplant, a 15-stage axial-flow, non-afterburning turbojet that provided 
15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. Larger, fluted air inlets improved airflow 
to the compressor face.37 Eventually, the U-2C fleet was equipped with more 
powerful J75-P-13B engines rated to 17,000 pound of thrust. The U-2R was 
powered by an upgraded model of the P-13B that improved dependability 
and increased thrust under climb and cruise conditions. Engine performance 
was enhanced through changes to turbine vanes, improved turbine disks and 
compressor blades, and enlargement of the compressor inlet case to increase 
airflow.38 An engine-driven fuel pump supplied pressure for both normal and 
emergency fuel systems. This pump supplied sufficient fuel to maintain flight 
even if the normal and auxiliary boost pumps failed.39
In 1984, the U-2R/TR-1 fleet was grounded following a series of accidents 
involving the engine exhaust system. In the first mishap, on May 22, Capt. 
David Bonsi had just taken off in a U-2R when he heard and felt an explosion 
behind him, and the entire tail section separated from the airframe. Bonsi 
ejected safely, and although accident investigators were uncertain of the exact 
cause, they suggested that the explosion might have resulted from a small 
35. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” pp. 23–24.
36. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 161–162.
37. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 399.
38. Koziol, “The U-2 Aircraft Engine,” pp. 9–10.
39. U.S. Air Force, “Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft,” p. I-4.
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fuel leak inside the engine compartment. Less than 2 months later, a similar 
accident occurred in which the tail section of a TR-1 crumpled immediately 
after takeoff. Capt. Todd Hubbard escaped unharmed after being forced to 
eject at low altitude. This time, investigators suspected a hydraulic leak, but 
on October 8 another U-2R was lost. Capt. Tom Dettmer ejected as his 
airplane broke apart just 1,500 feet above the ground. By now, an inescap-
able pattern was emerging, and investigators turned their attention to the 
long cylindrical duct connecting the engine to the exhaust ejector. The duct 
comprised a forward adaptor section (approximately 4 feet long) that con-
nected the J75 engine to the 12-foot-long tailpipe. The adaptor/tailpipe link, 
consisting of a U-shaped clamp and two ¼-inch bolts, had apparently come 
loose and allowed the tailpipe to slip out of alignment. When subjected to 
increased pressure from takeoff thrust, the tailpipe crumpled, and trapped 
exhaust gases blew the tail assembly off at its mounts. To fix the problem, 
Lockheed engineers devised a new clamp and added more bolts to secure it in 
place. Speculation remained as to why this problem had only manifested after 
many years of trouble-free operation. Some thought that engine modifica-
tions to improve fuel consumption had resulted in more compressor surges, 
putting added strain on the tailpipe connection. Others suspected inadequate 
maintenance or assembly procedures.40
By the late 1980s, Lockheed was considering potential replacements for the 
antiquated J75 engines. The leading candidate was General Electric’s F101-
GE-F29 bypass ratio (0.8:1) mixed-flow turbofan featuring aerodynamically 
coupled low- and high-pressure rotors. The low-pressure compressor section 
consisted of a three-stage fan, driven by a two-stage low-pressure turbine. The 
high-pressure section was composed of a nine-stage compressor; annular com-
bustion chamber; and a single-stage, air-cooled high-pressure turbine. The 
engine control system combined electronic and hydromechanical elements 
to achieve stall-free operation throughout the flight envelope regardless of 
the pilot’s throttle input. It was designed for completely automatic operation 
from start to shutdown.41
This engine was redesignated F118-GE-101 prior to the start of prepro-
duction testing in late 1991. The F118 was rated at 18,300 pounds static sea 
level thrust, which represented a significant improvement over the J75. It was 
easier to install and remove than older powerplants, hydraulic components 
were easier to access, and the new gearbox was mounted on the airframe. 
Known as an airframe-mounted accessory drive (AMAD), this gearbox drove 
40. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 299–300.
41. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. III-1.
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the airplane’s secondary power accessories such as alternating current (ac) and 
direct current (dc) generators, hydraulic pump, and air turbine starter. The 
engine powered the AMAD mechanically through a flexible power trans-
mission shaft. A dedicated oil system independent of the engine oil system 
provided lubrication and cooling for the AMAD and associated accessories, 
gears, and bearings.42
To ease engine maintenance, General Electric developed improved trouble-
shooting capabilities and provided sophisticated new test equipment. One 
of the greatest advantages was that the airplane’s hydraulic and electrical sys-
tems could still be operated with the engine removed. The F118 suffered one 
notable disadvantage, however. Up to this time, U-2 pilots had responded to 
a flameout by using a procedure called a windmill restart, a maneuver that 
takes advantage of the airplane’s kinetic energy to force enough air into the 
engine inlets to spin the rotors and create sufficient pneumatic pressure for 
ignition. Unlike the J75 turbojet, the new turbofan could not be restarted in 
flight by windmilling. To remedy this deficiency, Lockheed engineers devised 
42. Ibid.
Technicians install a GE F118 engine in a U-2. (Lockheed Martin)
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an emergency airstart system that ignited a mixture of compressed air and 
jet fuel in a two-stage compressor. Because this system imposed a significant 
weight penalty, it was replaced with a lighter, hydrazine-fueled system capable 
of spooling the engine up to 45 percent core rpm. Use of hydrazine, which 
is colorless, odorless, and highly toxic, necessitated introduction of special 
handling procedures.43
Life-Support and Environmental Control Systems
The pilot’s life-support systems included dual normal oxygen systems, an 
emergency oxygen system, and a pressure suit. Two independent systems, each 
supplied by a 10-liter liquid-oxygen converter, provided breathing air to the 
pilot in the form of 100-percent oxygen. Gaseous oxygen was delivered to 
the pilot’s helmet through independent supply lines and pressure regulators. 
An emergency oxygen system provided oxygen to the pilot in case of ejection 
or malfunction of the dual normal system. The emergency system (supplied 
by dual-redundant, gaseous-oxygen cylinders located in the survival kit) was 
designed to maintain pressure in the pilot’s suit after ejection and provide 
breathing oxygen for approximately 15 minutes during descent to the ground. 
Each U-2 pilot wore a pressure suit capable of providing a safe environment 
regardless of cockpit pressure conditions. A dual pressure/breathing regulator 
provided breathing oxygen upon demand in the helmet and automatically 
pressurized the suit in the event of cabin-pressure loss. A fire-retardant outer 
coverall and harness was worn over the pressure suit and contained a life 
preserver and fasteners for the parachute release latches.44
The environmental control system provided pressurization to the cockpit, 
equipment bays, and nose section. Engine bleed air passed through a heat 
exchanger, a mixing muff, and—below 25,000 feet—a turbine. Above 25,000 
feet, the turbine was bypassed. At altitude, cabin pressure was maintained at 
3.88 psi above atmospheric pressure. This produced a cabin-pressure altitude 
of approximately 28,500 feet at an aircraft altitude of 70,000 feet. The pilot 
used a refrigerator bypass valve to regulate cockpit air temperature. An adjust-
ment lever could be used to mix cold outside air and cockpit pressurization 
air to regulate suit temperature. The cockpit was also equipped with a duct to 
43. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 314 and 389.
44. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. IV-7
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provide warm air for defogging the canopy and windshield. On later models, 
windshield defrosting was augmented with an electrically heated element.45
The heated-air defroster originally consisted of a single manifold built into 
the forward end of the canopy. The manifold was perforated with forward-
facing holes to defrost the windshield and aft-facing holes to defrost the 
canopy. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, particularly for windshield 
defrosting. In an effort to improve system performance, a second manifold 
was added along the base of the windshield, and another was later installed 
at the top of the windshield where it joined the canopy. This system pro-
vided much more efficient distribution of heated air for defrosting both the 
windshield and canopy. An auxiliary defrosting system consisted of a small, 
rubber-bladed fan on the left-hand cockpit sill to circulate warm air. This 
was especially useful during engine-out descents, when the normal source of 
hot air for defrosting was unavailable.46
Cockpit temperature distribution in early model U-2 airplanes was quite 
inefficient. The pilot’s feet became very cold while the head and upper parts 
of the body were too warm. Eventually, floor-level heat outlets were added—
directing warm air at the rudder pedals—as foot warmers. The pilot could 
reduce heating at head level only by restricting use of the defroster or using 
the auxiliary fan to improve air circulation in the cockpit.47
Temperature control within the equipment bay was also critical. During 
early high-altitude testing, the Q-bay became too cold, with interior air 
temperature dropping to –4 °F. The glass in the camera windows some-
times dropped to as low as –29 °F and quickly frosted over if there was 
any moisture in the air. Lockheed engineers experimented with blowers, 
various types of insulation, and baffle curtains to control airflow within 
the Q-bay. A combination of curtains and insulation eventually yielded 
aft lower equipment bay temperatures of around 32 °F, which was deemed 
satisfactory. Window defrosting presented a more difficult problem. Liquid 
solutions caused blurring and deterioration of the optical qualities of the 
glass. Electrofilm heaters installed along the edges of the windows warmed 
the glass inefficiently and had a tendency to short out, resulting in a poten-
tial fire hazard. Eventually, a hot-air defrosting system was installed, but 
it was only used during the climb phase and turned off before operating 
45. Ibid., p. IV-6.
46. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 233.
47. Ibid., p. 235.
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the cameras. The camera window heater provided a secondary benefit by 
improving equipment-bay temperature distribution.48
Fuel System
Fuel flowed from the four integrally sealed tanks, one inboard and one out-
board in each wing, and through a sump tank within the fuselage before 
reaching the engine. Bleed air from the engine provided pressurization for 
the wing tanks and, along with gravity, assured fuel flow from the wings into 
the sump. The engine consumed fuel from the inboard tanks first, leaving 
the weight of remaining fuel in the outboard tanks to alleviate wing bending. 
Two boost pumps fed fuel from the sump tank into the engine. To minimize 
structural weight, the U-2 designers did not include a single-point refueling 
system for ground servicing. Instead, each individual tank was equipped with 
its own filler cap. During flight, a cross-transfer system provided the pilot with 
a means to correct a lateral imbalance of wing-tank fuel. The transfer pumps 
allowed fuel to be moved between inboard and outboard tanks or to increase 
the rate of flow to the sump tank. In an emergency, the pilot could dump fuel 
from the inboard tanks at a rate of 90 gallons per minute or from the outboard 
tanks at a rate of 60 gallons per minute. Standpipes in the outboard tanks 
retained 150 gallons each. Later-model U-2 and ER-2 aircraft were designed 
to carry up to 19,175 pounds of fuel in the wing and sump tanks.49
One interesting characteristic of long-range endurance flights was the 
apparent ability of the U-2 to manufacture fuel. Robert Schumacher dis-
covered this illusion in Article 344 during a February 1956 flight that lasted 
more than 9½ hours. In preparation for the test, the airplane was fueled to 
full capacity (1,362 gallons) and the totalizer instrument was set to 1,335 
gallons in order to provide a safety margin. Schumacher’s U-2 departed the 
runway with a gross weight of 19,900 pounds, but this dropped to 11,155 
pounds by the end of the 9.58-hour sortie. Based on calculations from the 
totalizer, the airplane had consumed 1,386 gallons of fuel, 24 more gallons 
than had been loaded aboard prior to takeoff. More surprising, the mechan-
ics drained an additional 15 gallons from the fuel tanks after landing. The 
mystery was solved when Lockheed engineers determined that the fuel, which 
had been cold-soaked for hours, expanded due to heating as it passed through 
48. Ibid., pp. 249–257.
49. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” 
pp. III-4–III-6.
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the fuel-oil heat exchanger, causing the gauge to indicate a larger volume. A 
subsequent series of tests consistently revealed an average increase in volume 
of approximately 3 percent during similar long-range flights.50
Although the special low-vapor-pressure LF-1A was selected as the stan-
dard fuel for the U-2, two alternate fuels were also evaluated. At the time, most 
U.S. military aircraft were fueled with JP-4, a 50-50 kerosene-gasoline blend. 
U-2 operations with JP-4 were restricted to 50,000 feet maximum altitude 
and 2,000 feet per minute maximum climb rate. Exceeding these limits risked 
damaging the airplane with excessive wing-tank pressures or possibly losing 
fuel through the vent system. Consequently, use of JP-4 was restricted to ferry 
missions or emergency operation when LF-1A was not available. Tests were 
also conducted using JP-1, a pure kerosene fuel with a high flash point and 
a low freezing point. Tank pressures were comparable between LF-1A and 
JP-1, range and fuel consumption were about the same, and both fuels were 
considered satisfactory for operational use.51
Miscellaneous Systems
For electrical power, the U-2 was equipped with a three-phase, 115/200-volt, 
400-Hertz ac system and a 28-volt dc system. These provided automatic, 
in-depth redundancy for flight and mission-critical power requirements. 
Two 50-ampere-hour silver-zinc batteries were installed to provide backup 
power to flight instruments and communications equipment and for engine 
restart capability, in case the main dc generator and transformer rectifier were 
offline. These batteries could supply power to the essential and emergency 
dc buses for approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes, along with power to the 
emergency ac invertor.52
A single engine-driven pump supplied pressure to the hydraulic system. A 
normal pressure of 3,000 psi was used to actuate the wing flaps, speed brakes, 
roll and lift spoilers, wheel brakes, stabilizer trim system, and standby ac gen-
erator, as well as for extension and retraction of the landing gear.53
The U-2 was equipped with a variety of communication and navigation 
systems. Two-way voice communication during flight was accomplished via 
several installed UHF and VHF radio systems. An interphone system was 
50. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 61–62.
51. Ibid., pp. 108–111.
52. Lockheed, “U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System Description,” p. III-6.
53. Ibid., p. III-7.
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available for communicating with ground-crew personnel during preflight or 
postflight activities. For navigation, the aircraft was equipped with a standard 
military Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) ultrahigh-frequency system to 
provide continuous indication of bearing and distance from a transmitting sta-
tion, as well as an automatic direction finder (ADF) radio navigation system. 
Depending on mission requirements, greater accuracy could be achieved using 
inertial navigation systems (INS), astroinertial navigation systems (ANS), 
or global positioning systems (GPS). The INS steered the aircraft toward 
each destination point through the autopilot. The ANS employed a highly 
accurate star tracker to limit position error, and it could be used in daylight 
and at night. GPS navigation was designed for near-pinpoint accuracy using 
transmissions from small groups of orbiting satellites. On approach to airfields 
equipped with ground-based instrument landing systems (ILS), the U-2 pilot 
simply homed in on a localizer near the runway; ILS receivers in the aircraft 
guided the U-2 along the proper glideslope to touchdown.54
54. Ibid., pp. IV-3–IV-6.
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Lockheed test pilot Frank Powers models the MC-3 partial-pressure suit. (Lockheed Martin)
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Life Above 50,000 Feet 
Among the greatest challenges of flying the U-2 was simply surviving the hos-
tile environment of the stratosphere, the highest layer of Earth’s atmosphere in 
which aircraft can still fly using conventional aerodynamic surfaces. The unpro-
tected human body cannot withstand the combination of extremely low ambi-
ent air pressures, diminishing with increasing altitude, and temperatures that 
drop as low as –112 °F. The human respiratory system is optimized for operation 
at elevations ranging from sea level to 10,000 feet. Supplemental oxygen or 
cabin pressurization systems are necessary for flight at higher altitudes, where 
humans are subject to hypoxia. Above 15,000 feet without such measures, one 
may experience such physiological symptoms as fatigue, headache, euphoria, 
decreased visual acuity, impaired memory, and faulty judgment. More extensive 
protection is required in the space-equivalent zone that extends from 50,000 
feet to the outer fringes of the atmosphere. Here, unprotected exposure quickly 
results in death. Crossing the Armstrong Limit at around 63,000 feet exposes 
humans to barometric pressure so low that water boils at normal body tempera-
ture. As dramatic as this sounds, only superficial bodily fluids are immediately 
affected, resulting in swelling of exposed tissues as water within the body changes 
into a gaseous vapor. Therefore, hypoxia and decompression sickness are greater 
concerns.1 In order to survive this hostile realm, U-2 pilots were equipped with 
pressurized garments that protected them during normal operations, as well as 
in such instances when it became necessary to eject at high altitudes.
Partial-Pressure Suits
When CIA officials needed advice on equipment for high-altitude survival, they 
turned to Air Force medical experts Col. Donald D. Flickenger, ARDC director 
of human factors, and Col. W. Randolph Lovelace II. A graduate of Harvard 
Medical School, Lovelace had been studying high-altitude flight since 1938 and 
 1. András Sóbester, Stratospheric Flight: Aeronautics at the Limit (New York: Springer-Praxis, 
2011), pp. 7–12.
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he helped develop an oxygen mask that had become standard throughout the Air 
Force. He and Flickenger also conducted a number of high-altitude parachute 
jumps from B-47 bombers to test pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. 
When it came to developing environmental protection equipment for Project 
Aquatone, Lovelace and Flickenger suggested the David Clark Company of 
Worcester, MA, which had previously produced the MC-1 partial-pressure suit 
for use in the RB-36. Having developed the U-2 cockpit pressurization system, 
the Firewel Company of Buffalo, NY, provided oxygen regulators, valves, and 
other equipment, and made the company’s altitude chamber facilities available 
for testing the suit.2
David Clark’s Joe Ruseckas drew the first patterns for the new partial-pressure 
suit that came to be known as the MC-3. Assisted by John Flagg and about a 
half-dozen designers, pattern makers, and technicians, he strove to create a suit 
that would not only protect the U-2 pilot from the stratospheric environment 
but be sufficiently comfortable to be worn for prolonged periods and allow the 
pilot enough freedom of movement to control his airplane. When completed, 
the MC-3 represented a substantial improvement over earlier suits. As in the 
MC-1 and other early models, capstans provided mechanical counter-pressure 
on the limbs in the MC-3, but it was also fitted with a full-torso inflatable blad-
der extending from the shoulders to mid-thigh, completely surrounding the 
chest, abdomen, hips, and upper thighs. Instead of using separate hoses, as in 
all earlier suits, pressure leads to the torso bladder and capstans were simply 
an extension of the bladder system. Lacing, extending up the inner thigh and 
across the chest and small of the back, provided control of the torso bladder 
and allowed for more variation in circumferential fit than on previous suits. 
There were numerous zippers at the ankles, wrists, back, and across the chest 
from waist to neck. A zipper at the shoulder made the MC-3 easier to don 
and doff. Cords were sewn into heavy seams to break the continuity of waist 
and groin bladders, when inflated, to make it easier for the pilot to bend and 
sit. The suit included nylon pressure gloves with leather palms that had the 
pressure lead on the thumb side, using positive-lock bayonet connections. 
Laces on the back of the hand could be used to adjust the fit. The pilot wore 
standard flight boots because the feet were not included in the pressurization 
scheme. Breathing oxygen was fed into a Type MA-2 helmet, manufactured 
by ILC Dover, of Frederica, DE.3
 2. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 63.
 3. Dennis, R. Jenkins, Dressing for Altitude: U.S. Aviation Pressure Suits—Wiley Post to Space 
Shuttle (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2011-595, 2012), pp. 153–155.
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Since the suits were individually customized, each pilot made two trips 
to Worcester for fitting. During the first visit, each pilot was carefully mea-
sured so that Ruseckas could tailor the initial pattern for a comfortable fit. 
After the suit was completed, the pilot returned to try it on and determine 
whether alterations were necessary. Once it was confirmed that the suit was 
properly tailored, the pilot then journeyed to Buffalo to try it on in Firewel’s 
altitude chamber. After pilots complained that the restraint fabric connect-
ing the helmet to the suit made it difficult to turn their heads, the David 
Clark Company developed a new Link-Net fabric for the neck section that 
allowed greater range of motion. Ultimately, the MC-3 became available in 
12 standard sizes, as well as in custom-fitted models. The suit was often worn 
with a protective outer layer to shield the capstans and laces against becom-
ing entangled with switches or other objects in the cramped U-2 cockpit.4 
The MC-3 served as the predecessor to a family of partial-pressure suits that 
included the MC-3A, MC-4, and S-100.
Lockheed officials contacted David Clark in early 1970 to ask for an 
improved partial-pressure suit for use with first-generation U-2 airplanes 
that were still in service. By this time, U-2R crews were wearing full-pressure 
suits, and although flight testing had proven that a pilot wearing such a 
garment would fit in the cockpit of a U-2C after certain modifications had 
been made, the Air Force was hesitant to make those changes. Joe Ruseckas 
agreed to develop a better partial-pressure suit based on the MC-3A suit and 
hardware but with a helmet from the A/P22S-6 full-pressure suit. The neck 
ring required for attaching the new helmet made the shoulder-zipper entry 
used on most partial-pressure suits impractical, so a rear-entry system was 
developed for the new suit, by now designated S-100. Integration of the A/
P22S-6 helmet with the S-100 suit considerably improved pilot comfort and 
mobility, which also helped reduce stress and fatigue during long missions.5
David Clark eventually fabricated 142 of the new suits for the Air Force 
and NASA. The S-100 consisted of a coverall much like that of the MC-3, 
with a restraint assembly, breathing bladder, and capstans extending down 
the back and along the arms and legs to provide counter pressure. Slide 
fasteners on the wrists and ankles and at the center of the back facilitated 
donning, and laces along the arms, legs, chest, and back permitted individual 
size adjustments. Pressure bladders at the waist and groin were designed to 
crease in order to facilitate sitting and standing. Wrapped completely around 
the torso, the breathing bladder was integrated with the neck seal and neck 
 4. Ibid., pp. 155–158.
 5. Ibid., pp. 316–318.
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ring and included a perforated inner liner that vented airflow around the 
wearer. For added protection and utility, a fire-resistant Nomex exterior cover 
could be worn over the suit, providing pockets and Velcro pads for checklists 
and other items. The partial-pressure gloves had suede leather palms, elastic 
cuffs, and lacings on the back of the hand to allow for personal adjustments. 
The helmet consisted of a Fiberglas shell with a movable visor and separate 
sunshade, oxygen regulator system, anti-suffocation valve, cushion assem-
bly, and communication equipment. Channels distributed vent air around 
Each suit was custom fitted for maximum comfort. Donning the suit required assistance. 
(Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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the pilot’s head, and a spray bar around the inner edge of the visor opening 
delivered breathing oxygen and prevented visor fogging. A rubber face seal 
divided the breathing space from the rest of the helmet, and a spring-loaded 
valve allowed exhaled air to be exhausted from the breathing space to the 
pressure-suit breathing-bladder assembly. The system was designed to main-
tain pressure in the face area slightly higher than the suit pressure in order to 
provide the pilot with 100-percent oxygen at all times. The helmet was also 
equipped with a self-sealing drinking and feeding port through which a tube 
The S-100, worn here by NASA pilot Jim Barnes, was a hybrid of a partial-pressure suit and a 
full-pressure-type helmet. (NASA)
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could be inserted to enable the pilot to consume liquids and semi-solid foods. 
Air Force and NASA pilots began using the S-100 in 1972 and continued to 
do so until the last U-2C was retired in 1989.6
 6. Ibid., pp. 319–322.
Lt. Col. Dee Porter demonstrates a prototype S1034 full-pressure suit at Palmdale in 1991. 
(Lockheed Martin)
  Life Above 50,000 Feet
135
Full-Pressure Suits
With significantly more available cockpit space in the U-2R and subsequent 
models, it was finally possible to equip pilots with full-pressure suits. Officials 
from the Air Force, CIA, David Clark, Firewel, and Lockheed met in Burbank 
in May 1967 to discuss the final configuration of the U-2R cockpit, pressuriza-
tion system, escape system, and pressure suit. The David Clark Company was 
contracted to produce the S1010 full-pressure suit, but the first unit would not 
be ready until September. In the interim, several S901J suits of the type used in 
the A-12 were modified for use in the U-2R. When the S1010 finally became 
available, it was very similar to the S901J but with oxygen and electrical connec-
tions tailored for the U-2 cockpit. In the event of emergency egress, it included 
a fully integrated parachute harness, automatic water-activated flotation system, 
and an optional inflatable thermal-protective garment. For crew comfort during 
long-duration missions, it had a urine-collection system. In order to minimize 
pilot stress and fatigue during long sorties, the company designed an entirely 
new helmet, making every attempt to reduce the amount of weight supported by 
the pilot’s head. The designers achieved this by removing the breathing regula-
tor and oxygen-supply system from the helmet and relocating them within the 
coverall garment, and by integrating the helmet-disconnect bearing assembly 
with the helmet via a soft neck section at the base of the Fiberglas shell. They 
also enlarged and reshaped the S1010 helmet shell to increase headroom over 
that of the S901J helmet assembly.7
At just 31 pounds, the S1010 was surprisingly lightweight; the suit and 
gloves weighed just 14 pounds, the exterior cover and harness 10 pounds, and 
the helmet 7 pounds. Without the helmet, the entire suit could be folded into a 
2.7-cubic-foot package. Although the coverall and gloves were custom tailored 
for each pilot, the helmet came in only one size. Interior cushions were used 
to accommodate individual head sizes. As with earlier David Clark suits, U-2 
pilots traveled to Worcester to be measured and fitted. The company produced 
the suit in two variants. On the S1010A, the oxygen regulator, communication 
gear, parachute harness, and flotation device were integrally mounted. For the 
S1010B, designers moved the regulator and communication equipment into 
the helmet and put the parachute and flotation gear into a separate harness 
worn over the suit.8
In 1978, the David Clark Company began development of a new helmet to 
replace the S1010 units when they reached the anticipated end of their service 
 7. Ibid., pp. 334–337.
 8. Ibid., pp. 337–338.
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lives 3 years later. In a continuing effort to minimize helmet-induced stress and 
fatigue, designers introduced a nonconformal dome helmet that completely 
eliminated head-borne weight and provided greater freedom of head movement 
within the helmet. The S1010D helmet provided excellent visibility and greatly 
reduced the rotational torque associated with neck stress. Instead of the usual 
conformal padding, the pilot now wore a skullcap that contained a microphone 
and earphones for the communication system. Testing yielded mixed results; 
although the helmet was more comfortable, pilots complained that foam cush-
ions—inside the coverall, underneath the helmet neck ring—interfered with the 
parachute risers and shoulder harness and provided inadequate front-to-back 
stability for the helmet.9
This problem was solved within 3 years. The S1031 was nearly identical to 
the S1030 developed for the SR-71 except for the placement of oxygen and 
electrical interfaces, as dictated by each aircraft. In addition, special care was 
taken to limit bulk on the front of the chest to minimize interference with the 
U-2 pilot’s control yoke; this had not been a problem in the SR-71, which fea-
tures a standard control stick. The S1031 came in 12 standard sizes and weighed 
about 35 pounds. It began replacing the S1010 in late 1982 and remained in 
use until 1996. Starting in 1991, some S1030 and S1031 suits were replaced 
with the S1031C, a common pressure suit that could be used interchangeably 
in either the U-2 or SR-71, thus reducing ground support and maintenance 
requirements. Such improvements and a desire to further improve wearer com-
fort eventually led to development of the S1034, an entirely new design based 
on lessons learned from years of crewmember and maintainer experience with 
earlier suits. For the S1034, designers studied myriad factors that affected crew 
performance, including comfort, mobility, visibility, tactility and dexterity, 
oxygen systems, altitude and thermal protection, drinking and feeding neces-
sities, durability, maintainability, and survival characteristics in the event of 
emergency. The result was a suit with a bladder manufactured from Gore-Tex, a 
lightweight fabric that allowed perspiration to pass through in the form of water 
vapor while retaining air pressure. The S1034 was more comfortable and less 
bulky than earlier full-pressure suits and more durable and easier to maintain. It 
was easier to don and doff and had better mobility than the S1031. New gloves 
offered improved comfort, mobility, and dexterity, as well as improved gripping 
power and wear protection. The helmet was functionally identical to that of 
the S1031 but made of lighter materials. In 2002, the David Clark Company 
began development of an improved helmet called the S1034E that was slightly 
 9. Ibid., pp. 338–339.
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larger and more comfortable to wear. This model was put into production in 
2006 to replace earlier helmets as they reached the end of their service lives.10
Physiological Support
Flying the U-2 would have been impossible without the assistance of a team of 
specialized physiological support technicians to help the pilot don and doff his 
pressure suit and ensure the proper attachment and operation of life-support 
equipment. With the exception of the specific types of personal equipment worn 
by flightcrews, the process of preparing for a U-2 flight has remained essentially 
unchanged since 1955.
To avoid decompression sickness during flight, U-2 pilots had to don their 
pressure suits and begin breathing pure oxygen at least an hour prior to takeoff 
so that their bodies would have sufficient time to dissipate nitrogen in the 
bloodstream. This procedure was known as pre-breathing. During high-altitude 
cruise, the cabin-pressure altitude was maintained between 28,000 and 30,000 
feet. The pilot’s suit automatically pressurized to 3 psi because breathing pure 
oxygen at 3 psi at 29,000 feet is equivalent to breathing ambient air at sea level. 
Without pressurized oxygen, the time of useful consciousness at 70,000 feet 
is only a few seconds. Typically, the pilot arrived at the ready room about an 
hour and a half before the flight for a quick examination by a flight surgeon. 
The preflight physical consisted of checking blood pressure, respiration, pulse, 
and recent diet. Only low-residue foods were consumed prior to a mission 
because gas expansion during ascent could cause gastrointestinal distress. Once 
the examination was complete, two suit technicians and a supervisor provided 
technical assistance as the pilot donned his suit coverall over long underwear and 
pulled on boots and gloves. The pilot then lay down for an hour prior to takeoff 
to pre-breathe pure oxygen for denitrogenation of his blood. This downtime 
also provided an opportunity for the technicians to integrate and inflate the 
suit, check out all systems and hardware, and check for leaks. Before leaving the 
ready room for the crew transport van, the pilot was connected to a portable 
oxygen system so as not to break the breathing cycle. At the aircraft, the pilot’s 
pressure suit was hooked up to the onboard oxygen system.11
Once cocooned within the pressure suit, simple tasks such as eating, drink-
ing, and urination became major problems. To prevent pilots from becoming 
10. Ibid., pp. 348–361.
11. Ryan Ragsdale, interview with author, NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (now, Armstrong 
Flight Research Center), August 27, 2013.
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The pre-breathing ritual was the same regardless of whether the partial-pressure or full-
pressure garment was worn. In upper photo, a life-support technician checks oxygen levels for 
Lockheed test pilot Robert Schumacher in 1957. In lower photo, TSgt. Shawn Hansen performs 
a similar task for Lt. Col. Brian Dickinson in 2008. (U.S. Air Force)
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desiccated during long missions—a condition aggravated by having to breathe 
pure oxygen—provisions were made to allow the pilot to drink sweetened water 
by way of a tube inserted through a small self-sealing hole in the facemask. 
Ready-to-eat foods in squeezable containers were also provided. Despite all 
precautions, U-2 pilots often lost as much as 3 to 6 pounds of body weight 
through dehydration during an 8-hour mission. To reduce waste elimination, 
pilots ate a low-bulk, high-protein diet on the day before and the morning of 
each mission. Early pressure suits made no provision for urination, but a sub-
sequent model required the pilot to be catheterized before donning his flying 
suit. This method to permit urination during flight proved very uncomfortable 
and was eventually replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made 
the catheter unnecessary.12
Ryan Ragsdale, a physiological support technician with more than 35 years 
of experience, started working with both partial- and full-pressure suits at Beale 
Air Force Base in 1979. He immediately noticed that there was a big differ-
ence between the cockpits of the U-2C and U-2R (the C cockpit was about 25 
percent smaller than that of the R) and the types of pressure suits worn in each 
model. At that time, the Air Force was employing a variety of suit configura-
tions for use with the U-2C, U-2R, and SR-71, all aircraft that were stationed 
at Beale. “The U-2C at that time was not flying operational missions; it was 
only being used for initial training,” he recalled. “We had so few U-2R models 
that when a pilot came into the program we would first configure him with 
a partial-pressure suit to fly in the U-2CT trainer for initial certification and 
acceptance flights, and then for his solo flights in the single-seat U-2C. Once he 
got through that phase, we would transition him into the S1010 full-pressure 
suit assembly so he could start flying the U-2R.”13
Ragsdale first worked with the hybrid S-100 before being trained on the 
S1010 full-pressure suits. The oxygen regulator for the S1010 was mounted 
underneath the neck ring inside the suit, and oxygen entered through openings 
in the neck ring and passed into the helmet’s face cavity. “This was problem-
atic,” said Ragsdale, “because the neck ring is a movable fixture, so now you 
had a movable fixture with seals that your oxygen system is going through. 
We spent a lot of time overhauling, continuously working to keep those suits 
functioning.” The later S1010B, with the regulator located inside the helmet 
instead of the suit, was a big improvement. But there were always new chal-
lenges, including the vexing problem of faceplate fogging. “There was a wire 
grid within the visor glass, a heating element for defogging. We tried battery 
12. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 63–65.
13. Ragsdale, interview with author.
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power packs, rechargeable power packs; it wasn’t very effective.” Alternatively, 
the pilot could insert a food probe into the helmet’s feeding port; the pressure 
change activated the regulator, causing oxygen to flow across the faceplate and 
evaporate any moisture on the glass. Ragsdale eventually mastered the art of 
assisting the U-2 pilot through the lengthy process of donning the pressure 
garment, pre-breathing, and integrating the suit with the airplane’s life-support 
systems. Doffing the suit after a mission was a quicker process as long as all of 
the systems functioned properly, but the pilot had to be observed for any signs 
of decompression sickness.14
Over the past three decades, suit designers and technicians have learned 
many lessons. As a result, pressure garments have been made lighter, with 
increased mobility, and have become easier and more comfortable to wear. 
Neoprene rubber suit bladders have been replaced with Gore-Tex assemblies 
that wick moisture away from the pilot’s body. “The pilots are coming back 
much drier than they used to, and the suits are more sustainable because acidic 
sweat had previously caused the suits to deteriorate faster.” There have been 
surprisingly few improvements in manual dexterity of the gloves, however. “The 
14. Ibid.
Physiological Support technicians perform a vital role in preparing U-2 flightcrews for their 
missions. (U.S. Air Force)
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early partial-pressure suit gloves were better,” according to Ragsdale, “because 
they were thin and fit more tightly. Once you have to encase the entire hand 
in air, you can’t have the glove be a snug fit like that. They have tried Velcro on 
the palms and fingertips, and metal bars across the palms, but there hasn’t been 
a perfect solution.” When he first arrived at Beale, Ragsdale was told that he 
might not be trained to work with the U-2 because it was expected to be phased 
out of service. “Now here we are more than 30 years later, the SR-71 was retired 
not once but twice, and the U-2 is still going strong.”15
High Cuisine
Requirements for long-duration reconnaissance and research flights resulted in 
the development of special foods and equipment to deliver nourishment and 
liquid refreshment to the U-2 flightcrews. Pilots wearing bulky, fully pressurized 
suits have a limited range of motion for feeding themselves and cannot break 
the integrity of their pressurized environment by opening their helmet visors. 
In order to overcome this dilemma, the Air Force turned to the expert chefs 
and nutritionists at the Department of Defense Combat Feeding Directorate 
(CFD) at the Army’s Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering 
Center, Natick, MA. The result 
was “tube food”—meals in the 
form of a paste with the consis-
tency of baby food. U-2 pilots 
are supplied with metallic-
foil containers, similar in size 
to a large tube of toothpaste, 
each fitted with a plastic straw 
designed to slip through a 
sealed port on the pilot’s helmet. 
Breaching this port, which is 
also used for hydration, does 
not affect the suit’s internal pres-
sure. The CFD has been supply-
ing tube foods to U-2 pilots for 
more than half a century and has 
produced approximately 28,000 
tubes annually for a community 
15. Ibid.
Tube food comes in many flavors, including 
cinnamon applesauce. (U.S. Air Force)
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of only about 100 pilots. Each has a shelf life of approximately 3 years if stored 
at a maximum temperature of 80 °F. “We’ve been making these for years and 
years,” said Dan Nattress, a CFD food technologist, “and constantly adding 
new flavors.”16
Pilots usually consume one tube per hour. Although eating peach cobbler, 
Key lime pie, Chicken à la King, or truffle macaroni and cheese from a tube 
doesn’t compare to a home-cooked meal, U-2 pilots say they enjoy the tube 
meals while flying long missions. They typically request their favorites while 
being assisted into their pressure suits. “Depending on the duration of the 
flight, each pilot is different,” said suit technician SSgt. Suzzett Stalesky of the 
9th Physiological Support Squadron. “It just depends on the pilot preference. 
Some pilots take the same thing every flight, and some newer ones are still trying 
to find what agrees with their body during a flight.” While classic flavors such 
as beef stew or applesauce are popular, there are also more exciting options like 
chocolate pudding with enough caffeine to satisfy any coffee addict.17 Since 
some missions can last as long as 12 hours, caffeine is a popular ingredient 
among U-2 pilots. “The aircraft itself is very difficult to fly, and it’s actually very 
difficult to land,” Nattress said. “[The pilots] want to be very alert when they 
land. Fairly soon before they’re landing, they’ll open up a caffeinated product.”18
In 2010, Air Force officials decided the tube food menu needed a boost and 
asked the CFD to bring its products into the 21st century. “Things change,” 
said Nattress. “In the 1970s, expectations were different. We had no direct 
communication with the user prior to 2010.” To rectify that, Nattress and 
Deborah Haley, chef and physical science technician with CFD, visited Beale 
Air Force Base to gain a firsthand understanding of what the U-2 crews experi-
ence. “Things are a lot more difficult,” Haley said. “Once you’re fully suited 
and under pressure and connected to oxygen, there’s no movement inside the 
helmet, except when you breathe in and breathe out, so swallowing is a con-
scious effort. You have to actually think about that, because there’s no air move-
ment. It’s a lot different sort of feeling to it.”19
16. Shawn Nickel, “Fueling the high flyers—U-2 tube food calms cravings in the cock-
pit,” Air Combat Command News, February 8, 2013, http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.
asp?id=123335478, accessed August 30, 2013.
17. Ibid.
18. Bob Reinert, “Natick tube foods keep U-2 pilots flying high,” Army News Archives, January 18, 
2013, http://www.army.mil/article/94301/Natick_tube_foods_keep_U_2_pilots_flying_high/, 
accessed August 30, 2013.
19. Ibid.
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After surveying a number of U-2 pilots, Air Force officials asked the CFD 
to produce four popularly requested flavors including Peach Melba, Beef 
Stroganoff, Key Lime Pie, and a breakfast item, which became bacon with hash 
browns. These were added to a revamped 15-item menu, all made with fresh 
ingredients. “They didn’t want us to completely revise all of the products,” said 
Haley, “but we knew that there were things we could do to improve them that 
wouldn’t be major.” CFD technicians suggested developing layers of flavors to 
improve the meal experience. “Now the pilots are getting really excited about 
the food. It’s so much better.”20
Developing high cuisine for high-altitude flyers is not as easy as it sounds. 
There have been occasional failures and missteps along the way. In the early 
stages of developing the Peach Melba, for example, Nattress recalled that it 
had a “dirty sock kind of taste.” Eventually, after some additional tweaking, it 
became one of the more successful flavors. “It takes a while to find just the right 
balance,” said Haley, “so that when it comes out of the tube, you’ve hit just the 
right flavor profile.”21
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
SSgt. Suzzett Stalesky, 9th Physiological Support Squadron, demonstrates the proper method for 
inserting the feeding tube into the helmet. (U.S. Air Force)
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Hazards of High Flight
U-2 pilots have been subjected to a variety of hazards related to high-altitude 
flying, especially hypoxia (oxygen deficiency) and dysbarism (medical con-
ditions resulting from changes in ambient air pressure). These phenomena 
were not merely confined to the early days of the program and the use of 
partial-pressure suits but continued into the 21st century despite advances 
in aerospace physiology and the development of improved technology for 
personal survival equipment.
Two fatal U-2 accidents on successive days in July 1958 resulted from 
hypoxia. The first, on July 8, occurred 6 hours into a high-altitude navigation 
training flight when Squadron Leader Chris Walker, a British exchange pilot, 
reported that his aircraft was descending out of control. Although he ejected at 
a safe altitude, Walker never separated from his seat and perished. The following 
day, Capt. Al Chapin, Jr., was killed during a similar training sortie. Both were 
highly qualified pilots. Walker was fully qualified in the U-2 and had hundreds 
of hours of flight experience in the Canberra (British forerunner to the B-57). 
Chapin had been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for safely landing a 
disabled U-2 1 year earlier, after a power failure and loss of pressurization at high 
altitude. The U-2 fleet was grounded following Walker’s and Chapin’s accidents, 
while investigators initially focused on suspicions that autopilot failures led to 
loss of control. This line of thought was abandoned after excessive moisture 
was discovered in the oxygen systems of other U-2s, leading to the conclusion 
that ice may have formed in the oxygen systems of the two mishap aircraft. The 
commander of SAC restricted U-2 operations to a maximum altitude of 20,000 
feet until corrective actions were implemented.22
That same year, Col. Jack Nole suffered hypoxia while attempting a high-
altitude bailout after his U-2 broke apart following inadvertent extension of the 
wing flaps. As his airplane dove toward the ground, Nole extended the landing 
gear and speed brakes and reduced engine power to idle, but it was no use. 
Airframe stresses eventually snapped the bolts holding the tail assembly in place 
and Nole was battered about inside the cockpit as the plane tumbled end over 
end. Struggling mightily, he released his harness and was immediately slammed 
into the canopy, which came loose and sailed away. Nole’s survival pack snagged 
on something, and he found himself pinned halfway out of the cockpit, bent 
backward against the tumbling fuselage by the powerful slipstream. He eventu-
ally wrenched free but soon came to the realization that he had failed to initiate 
his emergency oxygen feed. As he depleted his remaining air, Nole felt the onset 
22. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 339–341.
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of hypoxia and determined that he had two choices. “The first,” he later recalled, 
“was to let myself fall until my parachute opened automatically at the preset 
14,000 feet. But it would take more than two minutes to free-fall those seven 
and a half miles; by that time, there was a good chance I’d have suffocated.”23
His second choice was to immediately open his parachute and hope he could 
find and activate his emergency oxygen bottle. Tempting though this was, it 
carried a number of risks. The first stemmed from the fact that a human body 
could accelerate to as much as 375 miles per hour in the thin atmosphere. Even 
if his shroud lines did not become tangled, the force of the parachute snapping 
open at such speed could shred the fabric or cause great bodily harm due to 
sudden deceleration. Successful chute deployment did not guarantee survival 
either since it might take up to a half-hour to descend to the ground from 
53,000 feet. Nole decided to chance it and pulled his ripcord. He was pleas-
antly surprised when the parachute opened gently, without the slightest shock, 
possibly as a result of his being propelled upward during egress and, by chance, 
opening the chute while at the apex of his arc. Nole managed to activate his 
emergency oxygen but then had to contend with wild oscillations beneath the 
parachute canopy, exacerbated by the thin air, which provided little resistance. 
“Each time I swung, I was afraid that air would spill from the chute’s high side, 
and that it would collapse, dropping me like a stone.” At 20,000 feet and still 
swinging wildly, he opened his faceplate and was violently airsick. Finally, 22 
minutes after exiting the cockpit, he touched down safely on a gently rolling 
Texas prairie. He later learned that his descent should have lasted at least another 
10 minutes, but air spillage during his oscillations sped his fall, allowing him to 
more quickly reach warmer, thicker air before his emergency supply ran out.24
In another incident, Capt. Pat Halloran suffered oxygen deprivation due to 
faulty connection of his life-support equipment by technicians prior to takeoff. 
After his oxygen hose came loose during cruise at around 64,000 feet, Halloran 
began to feel warning signs of hypoxia, including flushing and hyperventilation. 
His helmet bladder collapsed around his head and he had difficulty breathing 
as the pressurized oxygen feed suddenly ceased. He was now breathing only 
the ambient cockpit air, which was pressurized to around 30,000 feet pressure 
altitude. His vision dimming, he checked the airplane’s oxygen controls and 
found nothing amiss, but when he looked in a rearview mirror, he noticed the 
hose dangling loose from its connector. Working quickly, he re-established the 
proper connection and felt immediate relief as oxygen began to flow into his 
23. Ibid., p. 340.
24. Ibid.
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helmet. The ensuing investigation resulted in modifications to prevent acciden-
tal disconnection during flight.25
Later U-2 pilots equipped with full-pressure suits were likewise vulnerable to 
the vicissitudes of high-altitude flight. In 2006, a 47-year-old pilot began feel-
ing various aches and pains 2½ hours into a long-endurance sortie. He tried to 
alleviate discomfort in his knees and ankles by adjusting his rudder pedals and 
then by increasing the pressure in his suit. The situation became increasingly 
worse over the next 2 hours as he experienced confusion, headache, fatigue, 
and degraded ability to concentrate. Eating, drinking, and adjusting his oxygen 
supply gave no relief, and only after another 4 hours had passed did he report 
his problems to ground control. He was immediately instructed to return to 
base, but he almost did not make it. He was sick in his helmet several times, and 
his mental and physical capacities (including hearing and vision) deteriorated 
until he could no longer communicate via the radio. Upon arrival at his home 
base, he attempted to land on the wrong runway three times before finally 
touching down safely. Following a thorough physical examination, the pilot 
was diagnosed with severe decompression sickness with neurological symptoms 
25. Ibid., p. 341.
Ground crewmen assist Col. Jack Nole with last-minute preparations for a U-2 flight. 
(Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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and incipient cardiovascular collapse. Although investigators found no technical 
problems with the airplane’s environmental systems, the pilot’s symptoms had 
apparently been brought on by the pressure changing from that experienced 
on the airfield before takeoff to that of the minimum ambient pressure in the 
cabin of the U-2 in cruise. Decompression sickness, known to divers as the 
bends, results from the formation of tiny bubbles from gases (mainly nitrogen) 
dissolved in body tissues due to a reduction in the environmental pressure. It 
can strike aviators exposed to altitudes above 18,000 feet or so, and the symp-
toms can range from a mild case of the bends to serious neurological problems. 
In this case, the U-2 pilot seemed to recover within a few months, but he was 
eventually found to have suffered permanent brain damage severe enough to 
end his flying career.26
In the first decade of the 21st century, according to Lt Col. Edward 
“Tadd” Sholtis, the Air Force’s deputy director of public affairs at Air Combat 
Command Headquarters, a higher operations tempo for the U-2 coincided 
with an increased number of pilots suffering from neurologic decompression 
sickness (NDCS). In fact, between 2006 and 2010, the number of reported 
NDCS incidents increased from 0.076 percent to 0.23 percent of missions 
flown. “By late 2010, officials believed there was enough cause for concern to 
initiate a study,” said Sholtis in an interview with Air Force Times. “What we 
knew or suspected about the problem was briefed to decision makers in early 
2011, and the study was authorized in March 2011.” By October 2012, the 
Air Force had conducted magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) tests on more 
than 100 U-2 pilots, ranging in age from 26 to 50, said Dr. Stephen McGuire, 
a neurologist and retired Air Force colonel who led the study. Of those pilots 
examined, 75 percent had more brain lesions than they should have for their 
age and health status. McGuire noted that these were the same type of lesions 
normally associated with repeated head trauma.27
The study, published in Neurology in August 2013, compared MRI images 
from 102 Air Force pilots assigned to U-2 squadrons with 91 brain scans from 
a control group matched by age, health, and education. Citing previous research 
from other scientists, McGuire and his colleagues showed that high-altitude 
pilots’ exposure to low-air-pressure environments can lead to NDCS, affect-
ing the central nervous system. Symptoms include slowed thought processes, 
26. Sóbester, Stratospheric Flight: Aeronautics at the Limit, pp. 13–14.
27. Jeff Schogol, “Air Force re-pressurizes U-2 cabin to prevent brain lesions in pilots,” 
Air Force Times, August 28, 2013, http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20130828/
NEWS04/308280019/Air-Force-re-pressurizes-U-2-cabin-prevent-brain-lesions-pilots, 
accessed August 30, 2013.
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anomia (impaired ability to name things), confusion, unresponsiveness, and 
permanent cognitive decline. The researchers who performed the study found 
a link between clinical NDCS and white-matter hyperintensity brain lesions, 
possibly related to microbubbles of predominantly nitrogen gas formed during 
high-altitude flying. In testing whether the entire U-2 pilot population might 
exhibit significantly more lesions than members of the control group, they dis-
covered a 375 percent increase in the volume of lesions among the pilots and a 
295 percent rise in the number of white-matter hyperintensities. Lesion volume 
and count are important markers of cerebral integrity and have been previously 
used to measure age-related cognitive decline as indicated by declines in execu-
tive functioning, processing speed, and general cognitive ability. Brain scans of 
the U-2 pilots indicated white-matter damage different from that occurring in 
normal aging, further bolstering the hypothesis that the pilots’ lesions resulted 
from microemboli (tiny gas bubbles) in the brain tissue.28
Interestingly, pilots with the most U-2 flight time did not always have the 
highest number of brain lesions. Instead, the main contributing factors to lesion 
formation included the amount of nitrogen the pilots were able to get out of 
their system while breathing 100 percent oxygen before flying, mission dura-
tion, and the amount of recovery time pilots were given before making another 
high-altitude sortie. In order to alleviate the risks of NDCS, the Air Force took 
steps to improve cockpit pressurization in the U-2 and minimize hypobaric 
exposure. The Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort reduced the pressure altitude 
U-2 pilots were exposed to during operational missions from 29,000 to 15,000 
feet. This was a significant improvement as research has shown that the risk of 
developing decompression sickness becomes virtually nonexistent below 18,000 
feet. “What we’ve done is bring the pilots down below what is commonly 
thought to be the threshold for DCS and we think that will prevent any further 
occurrence of lesions,” McGuire subsequently reported. Technicians completed 
CARE upgrades to the fleet in June 2013 along with other cockpit modifica-
tions, including reinforcement of frames, bulkheads, and the canopy. McGuire 
acknowledged that it is unknown whether U-2 pilots would be at greater risk 
of having health problems later in life as a result of hypobaric expose. “In all 
other neurological disease, these types of lesions are associated with cognitive 
impairment,” he said. “We have not seen any clinical impairment in any of 
our U-2 pilots, and they are all still flying. But, being conservative, the com-
manders rightly made the decision [to implement CARE], ‘Let’s not push the 
28. Markus MacGill, “Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots,” Medical News 
Today, August 21, 2013, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/265036.php, accessed  
August 30, 2013.
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envelope; let’s protect our pilots.’”29 As an additional precaution, according to 
Sholtis, “The Air Force is in the process of reviewing flight operations guidance 
to potentially increase downtime between high flights longer than nine hours, 
as well as limiting the length of deployments.”30
Even flight at lower altitudes can carry the risk of hypoxia. In December 
2011, veteran U-2 and ER-2 pilot Denis Steele was flying a NASA sortie from 
Palmdale when his oxygen regulator failed. Since the maximum planned cruise 
altitude for the mission was only 45,000 feet, Steele was not wearing a pressure 
suit. His oxygen supply was delivered through a standard mask and regulator of 
the type used in fighter-type aircraft such as the F-15 and F-18. Typically, regula-
tor failure results from a rupture of one of two diaphragms within the assembly. 
The regulator is designed to fail in the full open position, providing a continuous 
flow of oxygen. According to Ryan Ragsdale, “It’s going to be uncomfortable 
breathing because now it’s going to be equivalent to pressure breathing, but 
at least you still have oxygen, which gives you time so you can safely descend 
to a lower altitude.” Steele’s incident was unusual in that his regulator ceased 
to function, leaving him with no oxygen flow whatsoever. He could not even 
activate his emergency oxygen,” Ragsdale said, “because it all went through the 
29. Schogol, “Air Force re-pressurizes U-2 cabin to prevent brain lesions in pilots.”
30. MacGill, “Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots.”
To reduce the chance of decompression sickness, cockpit upgrades have improved cabin-
pressure altitude. (U.S. Air Force)
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same regulator.”31 At that point in the flight, the ER-2’s cockpit had a pressure 
altitude of 23,000 feet, which gave the pilot approximately 3 minutes of useful 
consciousness before he was unable to fly the airplane. Steele needed to reduce 
his altitude quickly before he succumbed to hypoxia, but he had to be careful 
not to descend too quickly and risk overstressing the airframe. He declared 
an emergency, engaged the autopilot, and attempted to balance his need to 
get down quickly enough to remain conscious with a requirement to descend 
slowly enough to keep his airplane intact. During his long descent, he felt the 
onset of hypoxia and worried that he might become so cognitively impaired 
that he would lose control of the airplane. As his symptoms worsened, he even 
considered the possibility that he might have to eject. Frustration mounted as 
air-traffic controllers tried to convince Steele to descend more slowly in order 
to avoid commercial air traffic in the flight corridor above Palmdale. They did 
not seem to grasp the severity of his predicament. Somehow, he managed to 
retain control of the airplane and remain conscious long enough to reach a lower 
altitude, where his hypoxic symptoms subsided and he was able to safely land 
the airplane. For these actions, Steel was later awarded the NASA Exceptional 
Bravery Medal. Investigators determined that the faulty regulator had been used 
well past its service life.32
Another hazard of high-altitude flight comes from ionizing radiation. Earth’s 
atmosphere shields humans and other life forms living at ground level from 
galactic cosmic rays (GCR); the denser the atmosphere, the greater the pro-
tection. The intensity of atmospheric background radiation levels varies with 
altitude, latitude, and phase of the solar cycle, which ranges from minimum to 
maximum about every 11 years. When solar activity is at a minimum GCR, 
levels are at their highest, and vice versa. GCR consist of energetic nuclei of all 
naturally occurring elements, interacting with atmospheric constituents, pri-
marily through atomic and nuclear collisions. At flight altitudes above 10,000 
feet, the dominant contributor to the effective dose comes from secondary neu-
trons. GCR exposure approximately doubles with every 6,000 feet of increased 
altitude. At sea level, the exposure rate is a miniscule 0.03 microsieverts per 
hour (μSv/h). At altitudes of 30,000 to 40,000 feet, typical of those used for 
commercial airline traffic, the exposure rates increase to approximately 5 to 10 
μSv/h. At typical operating altitudes for the U-2, and those of proposed future 
high-speed commercial passenger aircraft (59,000–65,000 feet), the estimated 
dose equivalent rates range from 10 to 20 μSv/h. As an example, measurements 
31. Ragsdale, interview with author.
32. Jim Smolka, Director of Flight Operations, remarks during the NASA Honor Awards ceremony, 
Dryden Flight Research Center, August 6, 2013.
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taken aboard the Concorde supersonic transport in October 1996 averaged 
14.1 μSv/h. In the future, commercial aircraft may be developed that fly higher, 
faster, and farther than currently possible. This will result in increased effective 
doses of atmospheric radiation for aircrews and passengers.33
In order to more accurately characterize radiation levels at high altitudes, 
scientists from the NASA High Speed Research Project Office at Langley 
Research Center conducted a study in 1997 with assistance from Johnson Space 
Center, Ames Research Center, the Department of Energy’s Environmental 
Measurements Laboratory, Canadian Defense Research Establishment, U.K. 
National Radiological Protection Board, Boeing Company, and several research-
ers from domestic and foreign universities. For the Atmospheric Ionizing 
Radiation (AIR) project, a NASA ER-2 aircraft conducted five high-altitude 
sorties from Moffett Field to measure galactic cosmic radiation during a solar 
minimum. On flights ranging over the Pacific Ocean, southwestern U.S., and 
western Canada, the ER-2 carried 14 different instruments in the nose, Q-bay, 
and wing pods. These included a multisphere neutron spectrometer, ionization 
chamber, scintillation counters, two spherical tissue-equivalent proportional 
counters, and two particle telescopes. Data from the AIR program are poten-
tially useful in developing not only more accurate radiation models for high-
altitude flight but also for planning human exploration of the planet Mars, 
which has a radiation environment very similar to that of Earth’s atmosphere 
at 70,000 feet.34
Flight operations in the stratosphere have proven challenging and hazardous 
to U-2 flightcrews but have immeasurably increased knowledge of aerospace 
physiology and aided in the development of improved life-support systems. 
Many lessons came at a high cost, but despite heavy losses in the early days of 
the U-2 program, Air Force officials are quick to point out that the airplane 
has a pretty good overall safety record. According to Sholtis in an August 2013 
interview, “[During] U-2 operations since 1963, for every 100,000 hours flown 
there were eight mishaps that resulted in the death of the pilot.” Analysis of 
these mishaps resulted in a variety of procedural, educational, and technological 
changes made to improve safety. “We have reduced the fatality rate to 0.1 per 
100,000 hours over the past 10 years.”35
33. Lawrence W. Townsend, “Radiation exposures of aircrew in high altitude flight,” Journal of 
Radiological Protection 21, no. 1 (March 2001): pp. 5–8.
34. Susan Bailey, “Air crew radiation exposure—An overview,” Nuclear News, January 2000, 
pp. 32–40.
35. MacGill, “Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots.”
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Pilots learn to fly the U-2ST trainer before going solo. (U.S. Air Force)
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Flight Operations and 
Performance 
The U-2 has always been a difficult airplane to fly, challenging even the best 
pilots. Lightweight construction and long, thin wings give it terrific soaring 
ability but also make it hard to land. As the airplane approaches the ground, 
it floats on a cushion of air—known as ground effect—that causes the U-2 to 
remain airborne even at idle. The pilot almost has to force it down using spoilers 
to extinguish any remaining lift. A safe touchdown is further complicated by 
the unusual landing gear configuration. Near or on the ground, the U-2 appears 
to be a clumsy beast. The mysterious Dragon Lady seems at ease only when 
soaring to altitude or cruising through the stratosphere. Even there, danger 
lurks within the thin margin between Mach buffet and stall speed, the dreaded 
“coffin corner” of the flight envelope. Technological improvements have eased 
such problems as high-altitude engine flameouts and balky autopilots, but only 
a select few can hope to admire Earth’s curvature from more than 12 miles 
above the surface in what has been dubbed the Near-Space Plane.
Crew Selection and Training
U-2 pilots come from every type of military flying background—fighters, 
bombers, tankers, transports, and trainers—and have included inter-service 
transfer officers from the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Candidates for crew 
selection must submit an extensive application package. Finalists undergo a 
formal interview with several commanders at Beale Air Force Base, home of 
the 9th Reconnaissance Wing. 
Those selected for interview generally possess a strong flight-evaluation 
history and solid officer-performance evaluations and exceed minimum flight 
experience requirements. Because the U-2 does not meet military specifications 
for handling qualities, selectees must also pass a demanding three-sortie profile 
in the two-seat U-2ST to determine their suitability for further training. If all 
goes well, they are soon inducted into a very select community. Trainee pilots 
are initially assigned to the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, a unit that traces its 
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origins to the earliest days of military aviation. Training lasts approximately 
10 months, including about 3 months for inprocessing and qualification in 
the supersonic T-38. This is followed by a 22-sortie U-2 training syllabus that 
includes Basic Qualification and Mission Qualification prior to operational 
assignment. Line pilots typically alternate between 2-month deployments flying 
operational missions and 2 to 3 months at Beale for continuation training.1
Pilots fly the T-38 to maintain basic qualifications and proficiency in aer-
obatic maneuvering and instrument flying. The trainer is less expensive to 
operate than the U-2 and does not require use of a pressure suit. Operational 
pilots typically fly the T-38 twice a week and the U-2 two to three times 
per month. Flying the U-2, even during training flights, is largely a solitary 
affair. According to Capt. Neal Hinson, a U-2 pilot assigned to the 99th 
Reconnaissance Squadron, “You train mostly on your own after the initial 
solo flight and instructors monitor the pilot’s objectives using GPS.”2
Flying the Mission
Flying the U-2 requires a great deal of teamwork and coordination. While pilots 
are honing their flying skills, life-support technicians prepare pressure suits 
and survival gear, and maintainers keep the airplanes flyable, and the mission 
planners develop all the necessary material required to complete each mis-
sion. This group consists of about a dozen inactive pilots who use their flying 
experience to create flight route plans and other information for the current 
U-2 pilots prior to each sortie. Among the products they create are items such 
as navigation plans, fuel-consumption tables, and radio frequency commu-
nication cards mounted on cardboard so they can be handled more easily by 
a pressure-suited pilot. After a flight is completed, charts and flight plans are 
collected and stored for possible use in future missions. “Mission planners,” 
said 99th RS Mission Planning Flight Commander Lt. Col. Eddie Efsic, “are 
hired to transform distributed ground systems products into something pilots 
can use to efficiently and safely collect [imaging] targets.”3
 1. U-2 Pilot Application, June 14, 2012, http://www.beale.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?id=5077, accessed July 27, 2013.
 2. Chuck Broadway, “A U-2 Dragon Lady Pilot: From interview to altitude,” Air Combat Command 
News, April 3, 2009, http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123142867, accessed August  
26, 2013.
 3. Ibid.
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Following a mission briefing and preflight physical examination, the pilot 
is helped into the pressure suit and spends the next hour pre-breathing pure 
oxygen. Shortly prior to takeoff, the physiological support crew switches the 
pilot to a portable oxygen system and boards a van for transport to the flight-
line. Entering the cockpit is a difficult task while wearing a bulky pressure 
suit. Additional time is consumed with connecting the oxygen hoses, com-
munications cables, seat harnesses, and boot stirrups. The pilot then taxies to 
Senior airmen David Sivixay, left, and Allen Smith assist Lt. Col. Brian Dickinson with donning his 
pressure suit. (U.S. Air Force)
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the runway and pauses while the ground crew removes locking pins from the 
outrigger pogos.4
A normal mission profile begins with a short takeoff roll followed by a 
steep initial climb angle in the first 25,000 feet and a high rate of climb to 
altitude. Depending upon total gross takeoff weight, the U-2 will usually attain 
an intermediate cruise altitude of 60,000 feet within 30 to 45 minutes. At 
this time, the pilot initiates cruise climb and engages the autopilot to hold a 
constant Mach number. Altitude increases as fuel is burned off and the weight 
of the aircraft decreases. Depending on payload weight, the U-2 may climb 
to cruising altitudes above 70,000 feet. Local air conditions can affect cruise 
climb performance; colder air allows a more rapid climb whereas warmer air 
reduces climb performance. In standard cruise climb, the U-2 normally flies 
at a zero pitch (level) angle, though this varies approximately ±1 degree as the 
autopilot seeks a constant Mach number. Pitch attitudes during takeoff and 
climb can reach 20 degrees nose up, 10 degrees nose down during descent. 
Bank angles are a function of desired turn radius but are normally held to less 
than 30 degrees. At cruise altitude, the pilot holds the airplane at a constant 
Mach number of about 0.70, equivalent to a true airspeed of approximately 
410 knots. A normal 6.5-hour mission will cover a range of approximately 
2,400 nautical miles, spending about 5.5 hours at altitudes above 60,000 
feet. An 8-hour mission can cover a distance of 3,000 nautical miles with 
about 7 hours time at altitude.5 The automatic flight control system provides 
 4. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 395.
 5. NASA, “ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook,” p. I-2.
U-2 pilot glances out the left side of the cockpit while making a turn. (U.S. Air Force)
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stability augmentation in yaw, pitch, and roll and also incorporates autopilot 
functions including Mach hold and automatic navigation via the inertial 
navigation system (INS).6
According to the flight plan, the pilot navigates between waypoints using 
any of several navigation systems. The INS operates by sensing accelerations 
from a gyro-stabilized, all-attitude platform and using a digital computer to 
integrate this information to provide an indication of present position (latitude 
and longitude), attitude data (pitch and roll), and course-line computation 
referenced to great circle routes. A control display in the cockpit allows the 
pilot to store navigation waypoints and to change the flight track en route. An 
update function allows for GPS updating of the INS with accuracy typically 
better than ±20 meters. A backup or secondary navigation system allows for a 
safe return to base or to an alternate landing site should the primary INS fail. 
Additionally, the U-2 is equipped with several systems that enable navigation 
with respect to ground-based radio beacons, and the optical viewsight offers the 
pilot visual coverage of the terrain beneath the aircraft for navigation purposes.7
Approximately 30 minutes prior to landing, the pilot initiates descent 
from high altitude by bringing the throttle to idle, opens the speed brakes, 
and extends the landing gear. This results in a descent rate of approximately 
2,000 feet per minute. Sometimes, several 360-degree turns may be required 
to bleed off altitude. At 1,500 feet, the pilot sets trim for landing. The 
 6. Ibid., pp. I-1–I-6.
 7. Ibid., pp. II-1–II-2.
A mobile chase car follows a U-2 down the runway during landing. (U.S. Air Force)
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U-2 crosses the runway threshold with a speed of approximately 75 knots.8 
Now comes the most challenging and difficult phase of flight: the landing. 
Typically, pilots are fatigued after long hours of flying in a pressure suit, so 
to make landing easier, a chase car follows the U-2 down the runway. Using 
a radio, a qualified U-2 pilot riding in the car communicates the plane’s alti-
tude during the last few feet before touchdown. As airspeed drops, the pilot 
works to keep the wings straight and level until the U-2 tilts to one side on 
its bicycle landing gear with one wingtip dragging on the ground. Ground 
crew then reinsert the pogo wheels so that the U-2 can taxi to a hangar. Chase 
cars, known as mobiles, have been used since the earliest days of U-2 opera-
tions. The Air Force initially used Chevy El Caminos then later switched to 
Ford Mustangs. More recently, these were replaced with the Chevy Camaro 
Z28. According to Capt. Spencer Thomas, a pilot who previously served as 
a U-2 crew chief, “The driver is always a U-2 pilot. That ensures identical 
mindsets. When I’m not flying a mission, I’m ‘mobiling.’ ”9 
Performance Characteristics
Flying the U-2 has always been a challenge because its unusual handling quali-
ties require precision and skill. In adapting to the airplane’s peculiar flight 
characteristics at altitude, early U-2 test pilots developed several standard flight 
profiles. One of these, for reaching maximum altitude, required a stair-step 
approach. Following takeoff, the pilot began a rapid climb to 55,000 feet at a 
specified speed schedule. After slowly gaining another 10,000 feet, the pilot set 
power for a cruise climb for the remainder of the flight, with the airplane rising 
slowly higher as fuel was depleted. Maximum altitude depended on a number 
of variables, such as aircraft gross takeoff weight and outside air temperature.10
Early U-2 pilots routinely exceeded world altitude records but were unable 
to take credit for these feats due to secrecy concerns. A number of tests were 
conducted to obtain true altitude in order to calibrate the altimeter used in 
the U-2 and to collect data required for camera development. These checks 
were made by placing targets of known dimensions on a dry lakebed and 
photographing them from an indicated pressure altitude of 70,000 feet. The 
surveyed elevation of the lakebed was 4,440 feet above sea level. The airplane’s 
true altitude above the ground was determined by two methods, first by scaling 
 8. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 396.
 9. John B. Dendy IV, “Crouching Airmen, Hidden Dragon,” Airman 46, no. 7 (July 2002): p. 20.
10. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 27.
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the target size from the pictures and then checking the altimeter reading by 
correcting for instrument error, static location error, and deviations from stan-
dard pressure and temperature. The agreement between these two independent 
methods proved quite good, differing only 200 feet between the true altitude 
as measured from the photographs and that calculated from the indicated 
pressure altitude.11
As altitude increased, the margin between the aircraft’s stalling speed and 
its maximum speed quickly diminished. This created a hazardous situation 
because poor aerodynamic control-surface response in the thin upper atmo-
sphere made stall recovery difficult. Excess speed could be a serious problem. 
The sleek U-2 had been designed to slice through the air with very little drag, 
but this beneficial characteristic could also pose a danger. At low altitudes, 
the early model U-2 airframes were restricted from exceeding 190 knots in 
smooth air or 150 knots in rough air. At operational cruising altitudes, where 
the atmosphere was less dense, later models of the airplane had a maximum 
cruising speed of 410 knots (Mach 0.72). Speeds in excess of these limits would 
subject the airplane to structural failure. U-2 pilots had to be extremely careful 
to keep the airplane in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at operational 
altitudes. If the nose dropped as little as a few degrees into a nose-down atti-
tude, the airplane gained speed at an alarming rate, exceeding the maximum 
permitted speed within a matter of seconds. Since there was no physical sensa-
tion of speed at 65,000 feet due to the lack of nearby objects to provide visual 
reference, the pilot had to pay close attention to the airspeed indicator. In 
fact, airspeed was such a critical factor that the difference between stall speed 
and never-to-exceed speed differed by only 6 knots at maximum altitude for 
the early U-2 models and 20 knots for later models. Pilots called this narrow 
range of acceptable airspeeds the “coffin corner” because it represented the 
point at which the U-2 was constantly on the brink of falling out of the sky. 
Too little speed could result in stalling, and the sudden drop might overstress 
the airframe to the point of structural failure. The same could happen at speeds 
high enough to induce Mach limit buffet.12 If a pilot turned too sharply, the 
airplane might be subjected to both conditions simultaneously as the inside 
wing entered stall buffet while the outside wing experienced Mach buffet. The 
fact that these two sources of buffet feel very much the same made it difficult 
for the pilot to make a proper corrective response.13
11. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” pp. 38–39.
12. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 76–79.
13. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” p. 23.
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One example of exceeding the speed envelope occurred on February 25, 
1966, while Robert E. “Deke” Hall was flying Article 342 on an aerial-refueling 
training mission. Hall completed a series of nine dry hookups with a KC-135 
tanker as planned, terminating the exercise with a practice emergency break-
away from the tanker. Flight conditions were smooth with no noticeable turbu-
lence. After the final breakaway, Hall dropped back, then pulled up alongside 
the KC-135, about 200 to 300 feet off the tanker’s right wingtip. He then 
retracted the U-2’s speed brakes and began a steep, climbing turn to the right. 
As soon as he began the maneuver, Hall felt a slight shudder and heard a loud 
crunching noise. Crewmembers on board the tanker watched in horror as the 
U-2’s left wing snapped off. Its right wing came off as well, and the airplane 
disintegrated into several pieces, including the cockpit and nose section, aft 
fuselage, tail, and engine. Hall managed to eject despite being battered inside 
the tumbling wreckage. He parachuted to safety while pieces of the U-2 fell 
around him.14
The demanding requirements of flying the U-2 made use of an autopilot 
almost a necessity, particularly during long flights. Without the benefit of 
an autopilot during initial flight trials, test pilots found flying the airplane 
14. CIA, “Aircraft Accident Investigation, U-2F N800X (342), 25 February 1966,” CIA-
RDP74B00447R000100010064-1 (March 1966), approved for release June 18, 2002,.
A U-2A makes a steep initial climb during ascent to cruise altitude. (Lockheed Martin)
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excessively challenging. Lockheed eventually provided an autopilot that could 
hold the airspeed to within a few knots, but it was still incumbent on the 
pilot to ensure that the aircraft remained within the proper speed regime.15 
Ernie Joiner recalled one of the first long-duration test flights, in which Ray 
Goudey was aloft for 6 hours: “He didn’t have an autopilot and was really 
tired when we helped him out of the cockpit.”16 Flying without the autopilot 
was not advisable, according to test pilot Robert Schumacher: “It was as dif-
ficult as hell, especially around 70,000 feet, where you are near the Mach and 
stall buffets and must fly precisely.” On one occasion he flew the aircraft for 
4 hours without using the autopilot and found it very challenging to control 
the airplane while simultaneously peering through the driftsight, activating the 
camera controls, and attempting to carry out a variety of other tasks. It was 
particularly difficult “because your hands must be on the [control] column…
you can’t let it alone for a second.”17
For operational purposes, the three most important flight characteristics 
were altitude, range, and endurance. The original J57-P-37 engine limited the 
15. Jenkins, Dressing for Altitude: U.S. Aviation Pressure Suits—Wiley Post to Space Shuttle, p. 
151.
16. Joiner, “Testing the U-2,” p. 23.
17. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 27.
 A U-2D, foreground, and a U-2A make a graceful turn over Edwards Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force)
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U-2A to maximum operational altitudes between 65,000 and 73,000 feet. 
It had a range of 3,775 nautical miles and an endurance of about 9 hours. 
Improved performance with the J57-P-31 increased the altitude capability 
to around 72,500 feet with a 4,000-nautical-mile range and 10-hour endur-
ance. The U-2C, equipped with the J75-P-13B engine and slipper tanks, had 
a maximum range of 4,600 nautical miles and could stay aloft for more than 
11 hours at altitudes up to 76,000 feet. These early models of the U-2 had a 
maximum gross takeoff weight of between 20,000 and 24,000 pounds. The 
much heavier U-2R and TR-1 family weighed in somewhere between 35,000 
and 40,000 pounds depending on aircraft configuration. The U-2R in a 
clean configuration (no wing tanks or pods) could climb above 75,000 feet 
and fly for 15 hours with a range of 6,300 nautical miles. The later TR-1, 
ER-2, and U-2S were all capable of exceeding 70,000 feet altitude; but with 
its GE-F118-GE-101 turbofan engine, the U-2S had a range of more than 
7,000 nautical miles and a maximum flight duration exceeding 14 hours.18
Maximum range was determined by conducting several test flights during 
which the pilot cruised at normal speeds until the low-fuel warning light came 
on. Airspeeds selected for maximum endurance flights were chosen for ease of 
flying and minimum fuel consumption. The J57-P-31 engine demonstrated a 
10 percent improvement in fuel economy over the J57-P-37. It was possible 
to fly the airplane at idle above 40,000 feet with the P-37 and above 50,000 
feet with the P-31.19 At high altitudes, the U-2 was capable of gliding for vast 
distances in the event of engine failure. During readiness exercises in the spring 
of 1956, a westward-bound U-2 experienced a flameout over the Mississippi 
River near the Tennessee border. After restarting the engine, the pilot reported a 
second flameout and violent engine vibrations that caused him to abort further 
attempts to start the engine. It was clear that he would be unable to return to 
the test site, so he began preparations for landing at a contingency airfield. By 
now, he was over Arkansas and, given the prevailing winds and the airplane’s 
glide ratio, he believed that he could safely reach Albuquerque. Pentagon offi-
cials who had been monitoring the flight’s progress called the commander of 
Kirtland Air Force Base, informing him that an airplane would make a dead-
stick landing at his airfield within abut 30 minutes and would require special 
security. After a half-hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to 
inquire as to the status of the crippled aircraft. As he was speaking, the U-2 
glided silently to a landing on the Kirtland runway. Security police officers were 
startled to see what looked like a “man from Mars” emerging from the cockpit 
18. Ibid., p. 399
19. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 69.
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wearing a “space suit.” The pilot later reported that from the beginning of the 
first flameout through landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had flown more than 
900 miles, including more than 300 miles by gliding.20
Stability and Control
Early flight tests indicated that the U-2 had no inherent stability, control, or 
handling problems. The airplane’s flight characteristics generally proved to be 
about as expected, though the U-2 was susceptible to the same tuck and buzz 
tendencies associated with most subsonic aircraft. Mach tuck results from an aft 
shift in the center of lift that causes the airplane’s nose to pitch down. Usually 
not dangerous, aileron and rudder buzz is a very rapid oscillation encountered 
at certain critical airspeeds and often caused by shock-induced boundary layer 
separation. Tests of the U-2A were conducted in cruise condition with the 
gust controls both faired and shifted. The airplane’s center of gravity was kept 
between 26 and 28 percent mean aerodynamic chord in accordance with design 
parameters for the primary mission: aerial photography. Lockheed engineers 
anticipated that equipment bay loading would range from a minimum of 450 
pounds to a maximum of 760 pounds.21
The airplane configuration initially had a zero stabilizer incidence, but this 
was later changed to a positive 1.5-degree incidence to reduce elevator deflec-
tion at cruise speeds and altitudes, thus reducing trim drag. The airplane had 
positive stability with both settings, but with positive incidence, less downward 
elevator was required throughout the speed range. At high altitudes with gust 
controls faired, the elevator angle was close to neutral between 110 and 130 
knots indicated airspeed. Test pilots also reported that the U-2 felt more stable 
at higher Mach numbers when the elevator had a positive incidence.22 Mach 
number characteristics were evaluated for both the faired and shifted configura-
tions at various altitudes up to 70,000 feet. In order to obtain necessary data, 
the pilot gradually increased Mach number while maintaining approximately 
constant altitude. The maximum Mach number was determined by the sever-
ity of the tuck, buffet, or buzz phenomena encountered, and each test was 
terminated at the pilot’s discretion before the condition became excessive.23
20. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, pp. 78–79.
21. Klinger, “Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” p. 118.
22. Ibid., p. 125.
23. Ibid., p. 130.
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At lower altitudes, between 35,000 and 50,000 feet with gust controls 
shifted, pilots noted excessive rudder buzz but only slight tuck at Mach num-
bers varying from 0.78 to 0.83. Fairing the gust controls and increasing speed 
to between 0.83 and 0.85 Mach number resulted in moderate tuck and buffet. 
At altitudes between 60,000 and 65,000 feet and Mach numbers between 0.80 
and 0.84, the airplane experienced moderate tuck and buffet and some aileron 
buzz, although fairing the gust controls resulted in milder tuck phenomena. 
Tests conducted at 70,000 feet at Mach numbers from 0.80 to 0.82 indicated 
better performance with the gust controls shifted. Some data were also obtained 
during high-speed descents. It was during such tests that the U-2A attained a 
maximum speed of Mach 0.87 at 62,000 feet. The pilot noted both excessive 
aileron buzz and Mach tuck under these conditions. Ultimately, the U-2A was 
placarded to a nominal Mach number of 0.80, though it was possible with 
some configurations to extend the maximum speed to Mach 0.85 with only 
moderately adverse effects. At altitudes below 35,000 feet, no difficulties due 
to Mach effects were experienced up to the placarded airspeed of 260 knots.24
24. Ibid., pp. 130–134.
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A U-2A painted in spurious NACA markings at the test site. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)
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The NACA and the U-2 
Use of the U-2 as a civilian research platform had its dubious start in February 
1956. Anticipating a surge in off-range training sorties and eventual deploy-
ment overseas, the CIA devised a cover story to explain the airplane’s unique 
capabilities and disguise its true mission from the world. This necessary fic-
tion did, however, contain elements of truth that served as a foundation for 
later research efforts.
Initially, there was some debate as to whether the Air Force’s Air Weather 
Service or the NACA—NASA’s predecessor—should be named as the airplane’s 
prime sponsor for cover purposes. Ultimately, Bissell felt it best to use the 
civilian agency and to paint the project aircraft in NACA markings.1 NACA 
officials then drafted a press release at the request of CIA Headquarters, and 
on May 7, 1956, NACA director Hugh L. Dryden announced a program in 
which U-2 aircraft would conduct high-altitude weather research with Air 
Force support while operating from Watertown Strip, NV. In order to explain 
the presence of U-2 operations elsewhere, Dryden added that “USAF facilities 
overseas will be used as the program gets underway, to enable gathering research 
information necessary to reflect accurately conditions along the high-altitude 
air routes of tomorrow in many parts of the world.”2 This statement was timed 
to coincide with deployment of the U-2 to Europe and emphasized the use of 
civilian planes with civilian pilots conducting meteorological studies.
In June 1956, the initial operational detachment, masquerading as Weather 
Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional) One, or WRSP-1, was deployed to 
Lakenheath, England, where its stated purpose was met with skepticism. 
Two sarcastic editorials in the British Flight magazine belittled the weather 
research cover story and questioned the excessive security surrounding the U-2 
 1. Memorandum for Project Security Officer, “Cover Meeting with AWS and NACA,” CIA-
RDP33-02415A000200390051-1 (March 20, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA 
April 11, 2000.
 2. Hugh L. Dryden, “NACA Announces Start of New Research Program,” May 7, 1956, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters Washington, DC.
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operation.3 A spokesman for the NACA announced on July 9 that preliminary 
data-gathering flights had been made from Lakenheath. He also reported that 
the initial high-altitude weather data gathered by the U-2 had been processed 
and that it had proved the value of the aircraft as a research tool.4 The most 
significant element of the cover story was the fact that the airplanes actually car-
ried NACA weather instrumentation during training and proficiency flights. 
Real data were being collected within a flight regime previously unattainable 
by conventional aircraft. Transferring these data to scientists would not only 
bolster the cover story but also yield a treasure trove of information applicable 
to civil and military aviation.
Turbulent Relationship
Not everyone at the NACA seemed enthusiastic about supporting the U-2 
cover story. In August, the Aquatone project cover officer expressed some 
concern to Richard Bissell over the need for publication of NACA research 
papers based on data collected at altitudes within the range that had been 
admitted. Such documents would serve as unimpeachable proof that the 
U-2 was being used in a research capacity. But Harry Press, chief aeronauti-
cal research scientist of NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory’s 
Gust Loads Division, had shown a pronounced lack of enthusiasm with 
regard to publishing such material. The CIA officer recommended putting 
pressure on NACA Headquarters to “emphasize to Mr. Press the need for his 
taking immediate action toward preparing our much needed research study 
with completion at a very early date.” Agency officials subsequently drafted 
a letter for the NACA assistant director for research, Richard V. Rhode, to 
emphasize the need “for a counterpropaganda weapon for use in the event 
of a compromise to one of our aircraft.”5
The Aquatone Project assistant security officer met with Rhode on November 
16 to request that he expedite publication of NACA research studies being pre-
pared with data obtained during U-2 weather research missions and to request 
additional instrumentation for use in project aircraft. The CIA provided Rhode 
 3. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 51.
 4. Peter W. Merlin, “U-2 Cover Story Timeline,” NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center historical 
reference collection, July 2004.
 5. Memorandum for Project Director, “Cover Research Releases (NACA),” SAPC-8675, CIA-
RDP33-02415A000200390031-2 (August 22, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA 
April 11, 2000.
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with all weather data accumulated thus far by the various U-2 detachments 
for inclusion in the planned research papers. During the meeting, the proj-
ect security officer also suggested that U-2 pilots “should carry some NACA 
documentation else their story would not hold up when they are required to 
identify their association with NACA to friends, military establishments, etc.”6
The NACA cover story was put to its first test when a deployed U-2 crashed 
near Wiesbaden, Germany, on September 17, but the incident caused little 
sensation in the media. When CIA pilot Robert J. Ericson was forced to bail out 
over Arizona 3 months later, he was identified to inquiring reporters as “Robert 
J. Everett, a civilian pilot for NACA.” As with the earlier Wiesbaden incident, 
an Air Force spokesman stated that the plane was owned by the NACA and 
was “engaged in high altitude research jointly with the Air Force studying air 
turbulence and the jet stream.”7
First Research Data
In January 1957, Richard Bissell and his staff coordinated plans to publicly 
surface the U-2 for the first time. This entailed the release of photos and pub-
lication of research data. After discussions with CIA officials, Hugh Dryden 
arranged for the first official picture to be released by the NACA in early 
February.8 In order to further support the cover story, the photo depicted 
the airplane with the tail number NACA 320 painted below a yellow and 
black band with the NACA’s winged shield insignia. The following month, 
Langley gust loads researchers Thomas L. Coleman and Jack Funk published 
NACA Research Memorandum No. L57A11, “Preliminary Measurements of 
Atmospheric Turbulence at High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration 
 6. Memorandum for the Record, “Cover Discussions with NACA,” CIA-RDP33-
02415A000200390025-9 (November 19, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA  
April 11, 2000.
 7. “Research Plane Explodes; Altitude Pilot Bails Out,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, 
December 20, 1956, p. A2, Clotaire Wood files, NASA Headquarters Historical Reference 
Collection.
 8. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum for Deputy Project Director, “Arrangements with 
NACA and Kelly Johnson re Release of U-2 Photographs,” SAPC-12313, CIA-RDP33-
02415A000200390023-1 (January 26, 1957), declassified and released by the CIA 
April 11, 2000.
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Measurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane.”9 Several months later, Coleman 
wrote a second report with Emilie C. Coe, this time comparing turbulence 
data taken over the United States with that collected over England and 
Western Europe.10
These reports included an analysis of turbulence data obtained using veloc-
ity, gravity, and height (VGH) recorders carried aboard the U-2. Developed 
at Langley for collecting gust-loads data, these instruments provide time-
history records of airspeed (velocity, or v), acceleration (measured in g units), 
and altitude (indicated as height, or h) for continuous periods up to 100 
hours. A strip of photographic paper moved through each VGH recorder 
at sufficient speed to permit statistical determination of gust distribution 
and also provide, on a condensed time scale, general operational data. VGH 
data collected during flights over England and Western Europe indicated a 
substantial reduction in the number and intensity of atmospheric gusts with 
increasing altitude. These results were in agreement with atmospheric turbu-
lence models developed using data previously obtained with other airplanes 
and balloon-borne instrumentation.11
Up to this point, the collection of detailed scientific information on atmo-
spheric turbulence and other meteorological conditions had been limited by 
aircraft performance to altitudes below approximately 45,000 feet. Use of bal-
loons permitted limited measurements up to about 60,000 feet. In addition 
to altitude limitations, previous methods (particularly balloon-borne instru-
ments) were limited in regard to geographic areas covered and were largely con-
fined to the United States. With the U-2, NACA scientists now had access to 
information on turbulent conditions around the world and at higher altitudes 
than previously available. Such data were useful for aircraft design studies and 
operational analysis, especially in regard to structural loads and stability and 
control problems.12 Unfortunately, as long as the U-2 was acknowledged to be 
capable of reaching only 55,000 feet, researchers were unable to use any data 
collected at the airplane’s maximum cruising altitudes (upward of 70,000 feet).
9. Thomas L. Coleman and Jack Funk, “Preliminary Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence at 
High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration Measurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane,” NACA 
Research Memorandum L57A11 (March 1957).
10. Thomas L. Coleman and Emilie C. Coe, “Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence for 
Altitudes Between 20,000 and 50,000 Feet Over the Western Part of the United States,” NACA 
Research Memorandum L57G02 (August 1957).
11. Ibid., p. 1.
12. Ibid.
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Initial research missions had taken place over the United States during 
training flights, and then over England and Western Europe in conjunction 
with the first operational deployments. Data collected during these operations 
included measurements covering approximately 22,000 flight miles. VGH 
measurements were obtained on 17 flights between May and September 1956. 
A typical flight profile consisted of an initial climb to 45,000 feet followed by 
a slower ascent to higher altitudes as fuel load decreased, and then descent to 
landing. Research flight opportunities were dictated entirely by operational 
priorities, and no attempt was made to schedule flights to sample turbulence 
associated with specific meteorological conditions. U-2 pilots avoided adverse 
weather, such as heavy cumulus clouds or thunderstorms, meaning that the 
VGH data represented only clear-air turbulence. “Although this sample is 
small,” Coleman wrote, “the initial results appear to be of sufficient interest to 
warrant publication.”13
The U-2 not only provided a platform for gathering badly needed 
high-altitude meteorological data, but it also gave NACA and Air Force 
researchers the opportunity to test new, lightweight instrumentation pack-
ages under operational conditions. The NACA-developed VGH recorder 
took continuous readings of airspeed, altitude, and acceleration. Another 
13. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
The U-2 was ideally suited to collecting data on high-altitude turbulence. (Lockheed Martin)
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instrument traced peak acceleration values and a turn-meter recorded 
pitch and yaw rates. Instrumentation provided by the Air Force Wright Air 
Development Center included a turbulence recorder, a vortex temperature 
probe, temperature and humidity sensors, and an infrared hygrometer for 
accurate measurement of dew point.14
Throughout the spring of 1957, NACA officials continued to promote 
the U-2’s research capabilities. Dryden released a statement announcing 
publication of the first research paper and claiming that the Gust-Loads 
Research Panel of the NACA’s Technical Subcommittee on Aircraft Loads 
had originally recommended using the high-altitude research program for 
statistical studies of turbulence. He explained that the primary goal was 
collection of data on turbulence associated with the jet stream, convective 
clouds, temperature variations at different altitudes, wind shear, and other 
weather phenomena. Such a program, he said, would not have been possible 
without substantial cooperation from the Air Weather Service, which had fur-
nished state-of-the-art meteorological instrumentation, and the Geophysical 
Research Directorate, which would use the data for developing methods 
of forecasting meteorological phenomena important to high-altitude flight. 
Dryden also described expected future benefits to commercial air travel. 
“Research which we are gaining on a global basis,” he said, “will make it 
reasonable for tomorrow’s air traveler to expect degrees of speed, safety, and 
comfort beyond the capabilities of today’s air transport.”15
In July, Dryden and NACA Public Information Officer Walter T. Bonney 
met with CIA officials to discuss modifications to the U-2 cover story, which 
now included details of the High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP). This 
effort, sponsored by Strategic Air Command and the Armed Forces Special 
Weapons Project (AFSWP), involved the collection of atmospheric particulate 
samples from radioactive fallout resulting from testing of nuclear weapons. The 
modified U-2 cover story stated that operationally ready facilities of NACA 
would be used for HASP activities. “Rather than for HASP to establish their 
own facilities and organization in areas where NACA has been conducting its 
meteorological research, AFSWP has arranged for use of these facilities overseas 
to collect data as required for HASP. AWS will remain, as before, the executive 
14. CIA, “Proposed NACA Press Release,” CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390018-7 (April 24, 1957), 
declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000, pp. 1–4.
15. Ibid., p. 2.
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agent. The pilots for the U-2 will continue to be civilians under contract with 
NACA, but will be reimbursed by AFSWP funds.”16
Bonney had previously received a memo outlining a cover story for the 
unusual appearance of U-2 aircraft that bore the Project Rainbow anti-radar 
treatments, as some of those had been deployed despite the associated aerody-
namic penalties. The unclassified nickname, Thermos, was to be used in lieu 
of the classified code word, Rainbow. If queried, Bonney was to say that the 
unusual configurations were part of “a data gathering program…designed to 
measure…certain physical phenomena which could be affected by nuclear 
explosions.” The high-frequency-band radar-absorbent material was described 
as a special impregnated, plasticized coating applied directly over various 
parts of the aircraft to reduce the effects of glare, blast, and radiation damage 
from nuclear explosions. The cover story accounted for the wires associated 
with the low-frequency-band anti-radar system by describing it as a unique 
antenna system to record thermal phenomena under varying conditions at 
high altitude. The project was said to be a joint effort involving participa-
tion by the ARDC, AFSWP, and NACA. Associating the project with ARDC 
16. Chairman of the Planning Group, Memorandum for Project Director, “Planning Group Report,” 
CIA-RDP33-02415A000400040001-9 (July 15, 1957), p. 3.
For the HASP mission, the U-2 was configured with a particulate sample in the nose and other 
instruments. (U.S. Air Force)
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organizations at Edwards Air Force Base served to explain the presence of the 
U-2 at the Edwards North Base facility. To explain the presence of the specially 
configured U-2 aircraft at overseas detachments, the Rainbow cover story also 
asserted that the location of overseas units afforded a wide range of climatologi-
cal and other desirable environmental conditions for study.17
Despite these and other misleading statements regarding the U-2’s mission 
and capabilities, the airplane continued to serve as an occasional platform 
for bona fide meteorological research. On November 14, 1957, a CIA pilot 
assigned to Detachment C, known for cover purposes as the 3rd Weather 
Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional), flew over the eye of Typhoon Kit in 
the western Pacific Ocean north of the Philippine island of Luzon. He used a 
Perkin-Elmer Model 501 tracking camera to photograph the storm, produc-
ing, for the first time, photos of a tropical cyclone from directly overhead. Lt. 
Col. Robert C. Bundgaard of the Air Weather Service publicized the results in 
a magazine article several months later.18
Breaking Cover
The U-2 cover story could not last forever and, in fact, began to erode as 
early as May 1957, when the North American Newspaper Alliance published 
a syndicated article stating that Lockheed U-2 aircraft routinely operated at 
ceilings above 65,000 feet and were being used by the U.S. Air Force to map 
large areas of Earth’s surface for use in guided-missile warfare. This was the first 
reasonably accurate description of the airplane’s capabilities published by the 
news media. The article’s unnamed writer also claimed that the “Air Force is 
reliably reported to be using the Lockheed U-2 in West Germany to monitor 
the stratosphere for evidence of Soviet nuclear tests, and presumably in the 
cartography project.”19 By the end of the month, the London Daily Express 
had reported, “Lockheed U-2 high-altitude aircraft of the U.S. Air Force have 
been flying at 65,000 feet, out of reach of Soviet interceptors, mapping large 
areas behind the Iron Curtain with revolutionary new aerial cameras. They are 
making mathematically precise maps essential to bombardment with missile 
17. Memorandum describing Project Rainbow cover story, Walter Bonney files, NASA Headquarters 
Historical Reference Collection, June 21, 1957.
18. Robert C. Bundgaard, “The First Flyover of a Tropical Cyclone,” Weatherwise 11, no. 3 (June 
1958): pp. 79–83.
19. North American Newspaper Alliance, “U.S. Mapping World for Missile War,” May 19, 1957, NASA 
Headquarters historical reference collection.
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weapons.” Despite this exposure, U.S. officials stubbornly refused to admit any 
connection between the U-2 and airborne reconnaissance.20
At CIA Headquarters, Aquatone administrative officer James Cunningham 
reacted strongly to suggestions that more information be made public regard-
ing the airplane’s altitude capabilities. “I am inclined to believe,” he wrote in 
one memo, “that while having considerable value in theory, a move of this 
sort…would ultimately involve us in a series of inquiries which would be dif-
ficult to handle without giving away the fact that our capability was in excess 
of the announced record altitude figure.” He noted with some alarm that 
Kelly Johnson had apparently told NACA officials at the Lewis Propulsion 
Laboratory in Cleveland that the U-2 was capable of reaching 70,000 feet. 
Cunningham further noted that releasing an altitude figure greater than previ-
ously admitted but less than the actual capability could lead to some embar-
rassment and might still not have the desired effect. Intelligence sources had 
suggested that the Soviet air defense radar was capable of tracking the U-2 with 
sufficient accuracy that the new cover altitude would fail to deceive “the only 
opposition activity that we are basically attempting to defraud.”21
20. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 51.
21. James A. Cunningham, Memorandum for Project Director, “Proposed Cover Modifications,” 
SAPC-18216, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390016-9 (August 6, 1957), declassified and 
released by the CIA April 11, 2000, pp. 1–2.
Some U-2s deployed to Atsugi, Japan, bore NACA markings and others Air Force weather 
squadron insignia. The airplanes carried special weather research instrumentation during 
training flights. (Lockheed Martin)
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Another matter under consideration was whether to make available to 
researchers any data collected at altitudes above 55,000 feet. Richard Bissell sent 
a memorandum to the Aquatone Project Cover Officer stating that he could 
not agree to the “declassification or general dissemination of data obtained at 
altitudes from 55,000 to 70,000 feet or to the granting of Aquatone clearances 
to a wider circle of individuals who might be interested in having access to this 
data.” He suggested instead downgrading the data from Top Secret to Secret 
and making the information available to a limited number of contractors 
who might make good use of it, providing that “a suitable explanation can be 
devised of the way in which the data was collected which will attribute it to 
some source or sources other than the U-2.” As an example, Bissell suggested a 
story in which a variety of NACA research aircraft were instrumented to collect 
turbulence data. This new story would make it clear that such data resulted 
from aircraft flights rather than from balloons or rockets; but stating that a 
number of different aircraft were involved “would tend to divert attention away 
from speculation concerning what particular aircraft was used.”22
Propaganda and stories of the deception surrounding the U-2 operation 
tend to overshadow the very real scientific and technical accomplishments of 
22. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum for Project Cover Officer, “Release of NACA Top Secret 
Research Data to Select Contractors,” SAPC-25666, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390014-1 
(March 25, 1958), declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000, pp. 1–2.
Two images of Super Typhoon Ida taken from a U-2 near Taiwan in July 1958. (National 
Hurricane Center)
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the program. While officials in Washington debated how much information to 
release, U-2 pilots flying out of Atsugi, Japan, took advantage of opportunities 
to collect weather data and photos unlike any previously taken. In July 1958, 
several flights were made over Super Typhoon Winnie off the coast of Taiwan 
(then known as Formosa). Winnie’s powerful winds exceeded 175 mph, caus-
ing severe damage to the western end of the island. From a perch high above 
the raging storm, a U-2 pilot took pictures as Winnie tore across the Taiwan 
Strait and struck the southeastern coast of mainland China. A few months later, 
while awaiting clear weather in which to conduct tactical reconnaissance cov-
erage of Chinese troop movements and naval operations, additional missions 
were flown over Super Typhoons Ida and Helen. Photographs of spectacular 
cloud structures and the aircraft’s capacity to look straight down into the eye 
of each storm bolstered the weather reconnaissance cover story while providing 
a credible reason for the presence of the U-2 in the region.23 
23. David Reade, “U-2 Spyplanes: What You Didn’t Know About Them!,” http://www.roadrunnersin-
ternationale.com/u-2/u-2_science_3.html, accessed April 4, 2013.
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Francis G. “Frank” Powers, right, discusses U-2 performance with Kelly Johnson. (Lockheed Martin)
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NASA and the U-2 
After the NACA became the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
in October 1958, the Agency continued to maintain the U-2 cover story. A 
NASA press release issued in June 1959 reaffirmed that the airplane was being 
used for weather research missions. In order to provide an explanation for 
U-2 operations in Turkey, which happened to be a CIA staging area for over-
flights of the Soviet Union, NASA published Memorandum No. 4-17-59L, 
“Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence for Altitudes Between 
20,000 and 55,000 Feet for Four Geographic Areas,” by Thomas Coleman 
and May T. Meadows. This report built upon the two previous NACA reports, 
adding data collected during missions flown from Japan and Turkey.1 The fact 
that U-2 missions had produced very real weather data fooled no one as to 
the airplane’s true mission. George Carroll, aviation editor of the New York 
Journal-American, wrote in the November 1959 issue that the U-2 was being 
used for reconnaissance over Russia, and the following month an article in 
Soviet Aviation discussed U.S. strategic reconnaissance with the U-2 and gave 
some design details of the aircraft. But the worst was yet to come, as the cover 
story was soon to be irrevocably blown in one of the most infamous incidents 
of the Cold War.2
Secrets Exposed
In the spring of 1960, the CIA detachment at Incirlik, Turkey, attempted 
the most ambitious U-2 mission yet. Article 360 was deployed to Peshawar, 
Pakistan, to begin a nonstop flight over Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush, Aral 
Sea, Baikonur Cosmodrome (the primary Soviet space launch complex), 
Chelyabinsk, Sverdlosvk, Kirov, Arkhangelsk, the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk, 
 1. Thomas L. Coleman and May T. Meadows, “Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence 
for Altitudes Between 20,000 and 55,000 Feet for Four Geographic Areas,” NASA Memorandum 
4-17-59L (June 1959).
 2. Merlin, “U-2 Cover Story Timeline.” 
CHAPTER 8
Unlimited Horizons
180
and eventually land in Bodø, Norway. With a planned duration of approxi-
mately 9 hours, the flightpath would cover some 3,800 miles, a true test of 
the airplane’s range. Logistical and technical difficulties aside, there was also 
significant risk involved because more than three quarters of the route was 
over the Soviet Union.3
Frank Powers flew the mission on Sunday, May 1, 1960. At first, all went as 
planned, but while making a turn southeast of Sverdlovsk, there was a bright flash 
and a dull thump, and the airplane lurched forward. Powers instinctively grabbed 
for the throttle and scanned his instruments. The engine was functioning nor-
mally and the ailerons seemed effective, but the nose began to drop precipitously. 
Aerodynamic loads increased until the wings snapped and the airplane began 
to tumble wildly, shedding parts. The pilot’s suit inflated as the airplane’s cabin 
depressurized, and Powers activated his emergency oxygen supply. The cockpit 
was now pointed upward and spinning. Centrifugal force made ejection nearly 
impossible because Powers could not completely retract his legs into escape posi-
tion. Instead, he jettisoned the canopy manually and bailed out.4
When the U-2 failed to arrive at Bodø as expected, the recovery crew began 
to worry. After waiting 5 hours, they finally called CIA Headquarters to report 
that Powers was missing. It was assumed that the U-2 had crashed or been 
shot down over Russia, and by Monday morning, officials were scrambling to 
modify the cover story. The details were revised to make a convincing claim 
that a NASA weather reconnaissance mission had strayed off course after the 
pilot reported having difficulties with his oxygen system somewhere in the 
vicinity of Lake Van, Turkey. Officials backstopped the story by providing a 
flight plan for release to the media and by deploying search aircraft to the Lake 
Van area. Representatives of the CIA and Department of State also discussed 
preparing a question-and-answer brief, principally for use by NASA in the 
event of Soviet disclosure, but designed to be circulated to all affected parties. 
This consisted of answers to hypothetical questions that might be asked by 
the press regarding the airplane and the NASA upper atmosphere research 
program, and it also provided details supporting the cover story mission for 
Powers’s flight.5 By Wednesday, the Soviets had yet to make any announcement 
acknowledging the incident.
 3. Powers and Gentry, Operation Overflight, pp. 73–74.
 4. Ibid., pp. 82–84.
 5. Memo from Acting Deputy Director of Plans, “Chronological Account of Handling of U-2 
Incident,” CIA-RDP33-02415A000300300007-7 (August 10, 1960), declassified and released 
by the CIA August 21, 2000, pp. 1–5.
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The following day, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that an 
unmarked American aircraft had crossed into Russian airspace and had been 
shot down. He gave no further details and did not mention the fate of the 
pilot. Afterward, CIA and State Department officials met and decided that 
President Eisenhower should not be personally involved and that the State 
Department would handle all publicity regarding the incident. White House 
Press Secretary James C. Hagerty had already drafted a release stating that 
Eisenhower had ordered an investigation of the entire matter, and he suggested 
to Walter Bonney that NASA hold a press conference as soon as possible. 
Unfortunately, notification that press relations were to be handled entirely 
by the State Department did not reach NASA in time to prevent the press 
conference from taking place. Bonney reiterated the cover story and included 
a brief description of the flight plan, the pilot’s alleged oxygen problems, and 
the search for the missing plane. He also said that the remaining U-2 aircraft 
had been grounded for equipment checks, which subsequently resulted in 
emergency messages being sent to all U-2 detachments to stand down until 
further notice. In response to reporters’ queries, Bonney—apparently unaware 
that Powers was flying an unmarked plane—described the aircraft’s NASA 
markings in great detail. With the airplane accounted for, the dummy air 
search was called off.6
As a result of arrangements made by the CIA with Lockheed to meet insis-
tent press demands for detailed information on the plane and to further sup-
port the innocuous uses of the airplane, a U-2 assigned to the CIA was painted 
with a fictitious serial number and NASA markings and shown to news media 
representatives at the NASA Flight Research Center at Edwards on May 6. That 
same day, the State Department held two radio and press briefings. In one, 
State Department spokesman Lincoln White stated that there was “absolutely 
no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace, and there never has been.”7
This seems to be precisely what Khrushchev had been waiting for. In a 
speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 7, he announced that the American 
pilot had been captured and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet 
Union. He also produced identifiable parts of the U-2 and the pilot’s equip-
ment, clearly exposing the true nature of Powers’s mission. As CIA Director 
Allen Dulles later testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the cover 
 6. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
 7. Ibid., p. 4.
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story had been masterfully outflanked.8 Under the circumstances, President 
Eisenhower decided to suspend U-2 fights over the Soviet Union indefinitely.
At a meeting of senior CIA, NASA, and State Department officials later 
that month, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan said that NASA “would 
be well advised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible.”9 
Dulles, however, in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
lauded the scientific value of the weather data collected with the airplane and 
justified NASA’s interest. “NASA was very much concerned with the scientific 
advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowl-
edge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes.” He asserted 
that the aircraft had “undertaken many weather and related missions and their 
functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has 
been distributed freely to the world.”10
NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden testified in executive session 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the NASA rela-
tionship to the U-2 program. “In this program which began in 1956, there have 
been 200 weather flights of U-2 aircraft with NASA and Air Weather Service 
 8. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, “Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee,” May 31, 1960, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conver-
sions/89801/DOC_0000009190.pdf, accessed April 21, 2013, p. 18.
 9. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, note 39, p. 182.
10. Dulles, “Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” p. 16.
One of the CIA U-2s from Detachment G, painted in fictitious NASA markings, was displayed to 
the press to bolster the cover story. (NASA)
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instrumentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles,” he said. 
Dryden admitted knowledge of classified intelligence operations involving the 
U-2, but he said that the NACA (and later NASA) saw an opportunity to take 
advantage of technical capabilities that were not otherwise available to the 
agency.11 As might be expected, NASA subsequently received harsh criticism 
for its role in the U-2 affair. Robert Hotz, a senior editor of Aviation Week & 
Space Technology magazine, wrote that NASA researchers had “their hard-won 
reputation for scientific integrity shredded overnight by exposure of their role 
as unwitting dupes of the Central Intelligence Agency.” He further asserted 
that the “damage to NASA’s scientific integrity may count for little in the cal-
loused calculations of CIA supersleuths, but it will do irreparable harm in the 
international scientific community… .”12
11. Jeremiah A. O’Leary, “NASA Issued U-2 Cover Story on CIA Advice,” Washington Star, June 1, 
1960, p. 1.
12. Robert Hotz, “Lockheed U-2 Over Sverdlovsk: A Study in Fabrication,” reprinted in Congressional 
Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 86th Congress, Second Session, vol. 106, Part 9 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1960), p. 11,976.
In this humorous cartoon, NASA graphic artist Jerry Lyons brilliantly captured the awkwardness 
of the U-2 cover story’s exposure. (NASA)
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Such dire predictions proved unfounded, however, as NASA suffered no 
long-term consequences from the incident. Administrator Glennan and the 
Agency as a whole were spared intimate involvement in the U-2 affair by 
Dryden’s assumption of full responsibility for his role in originating the cover 
story. Nor did the Powers debacle end the Agency’s association with the U-2. 
In 1968 and 1969, U-2 aircraft were tasked with photographing portions of 
the Western United States for comparison with pictures taken by the Apollo 
astronauts, and eventually NASA would have its own small fleet of U-2 air-
planes to conduct dedicated research missions.13
A U-2 for NASA
By the late 1960s, Government officials were looking at ways to transfer U-2 
technology to civil applications. Thus far, both CIA and Air Force U-2 airplanes 
had supported civilian agencies only occasionally, when schedules permitted. 
The CIA did sometimes provide a limited amount of classified overhead pho-
tography to other Government agencies, and in 1968 Arthur C. Lundahl, 
director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, recommended 
creating a new center to provide declassified imagery for emergency manage-
ment purposes.14 This idea gained further traction as it became apparent that 
the U-2R attrition rate was less than had been predicted. A number of older 
U-2C and U-2G models retained in storage for use as replacements were now 
considered surplus.15
In early 1970, two study groups chaired by Dr. F. Robert Naka, deputy 
director of the National Reconnaissance Office, reviewed requirements and 
utilization of the U-2R. These studies concluded that the existing fleet of 12 
U-2R airframes was sufficient to meet both NRO and Air Force requirements. 
There were at that time a total of eight U-2C/G airframes in both flyable and 
nonflyable storage conditions. The annual cost for storing these aircraft was 
relatively low, but the analysts recognized that the Government had made a 
substantial investment with regard to acquisition of the early model U-2 air-
craft, along with ground support equipment, spare parts, and miscellaneous 
hardware. Estimates from the maintenance depot indicated that there were 
13. Pedlow & Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, p. 254.
14. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 370.
15. Bernard L. Bailey, draft memo to NASA from John L. McLucas, Director, National 
Reconnaissance Office, “Subject: U-2C/G Aircraft,” May 16, 1970, http://www.nro.gov/foia/
declass/NROStaffRecords/1055.pdf, accessed April 2, 2013.
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ample stocks on hand to support the entire U-2C/G fleet for between 6 and 9 
months without any additional purchases. At least one study indicated a poten-
tial requirement for two of the aircraft to be used for transitional training and 
test purposes in support of the U-2R fleet. Otherwise, they determined that 
there were no known NRO, CIA, or Air Force requirements with sufficiently 
high priority to warrant reactivating the stored aircraft in the near future. Based 
on the aircraft’s unique capabilities, possibility of future utilization, low annual 
upkeep support costs, and the substantial investment in depot stocks, the study 
groups recommended exploring the possibility of transferring the airplanes and 
associated materiel “to another agency such as NASA.”16
On March 16, 1970, Col. Bernard Bailey, director of operations for 
NRO aerial reconnaissance programs, drafted a memo to be sent to NASA 
Headquarters by NRO Director John L. McLucas. The memo outlined the 
status of the U-2C/G fleet and suggested that by virtue of the airplane’s unique 
altitude, airspeed, and loiter capabilities, the U-2 might serve as a valuable col-
lection platform for the NASA Earth Resources program.17 NASA officials were 
eager to take advantage of the offer, and they drafted a plan to take responsibil-
ity for two of the aircraft. Carl Duckett, CIA deputy director for science and 
technology, reviewed the plan and found that it lacked a proper appreciation 
for how complicated it could be to conduct U-2 flight operations. He sub-
sequently approached Marty Knutson, a 15-year veteran of the agency’s U-2 
program who had accumulated 4,000 hours of flight time, to request that he 
lend his expertise to the NASA project. Knutson had been planning to retire, 
but he was soon persuaded to sign on as project manager. He helped NASA 
officials redraft their plan and made arrangements for Lockheed to overhaul 
two U-2G models. Additionally, Lockheed was contracted to provide pilots and 
field maintenance, including physiological support. Kelly Johnson immedi-
ately hired three of Knutson’s former colleagues, Jim Barnes, Bob Ericson, and 
Ivor “Chunky” Webster. Frank Powers also applied, but he was turned down 
due to his notoriety from the U-2 incident in 1960. Senior NASA officials 
wished to downplay the U-2’s reputation as a spy plane as much as possible.18
The two airplanes, articles 348 and 349, were moved from storage at 
Edwards to Lockheed’s Palmdale facility. There, technicians removed the 
special carrier landing modifications peculiar to the U-2G along with other 
16. Frank W. Hartley, Jr., draft of memo to John L. McLucas, Director, National Reconnaissance 
Office, “Subject: U-2C/G Storage Costs,” February 26, 1970, http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/
NROStaffRecords/1056.pdf, accessed April 2, 2013.
17. Bailey, draft memo to NASA from John L. McLucas.
18. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 370.
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unnecessary items, reducing the airplane’s empty weight to 13,800 pounds. 
Now reconfigured as U-2C models, the Air Force serial numbers on the tails 
were replaced with civil registrations. Webster flew functional checkout flights 
on each airframe and then delivered them to Ames Research Center at Moffett 
Field, CA, in early June 1971. By midsummer, they were ready for operational 
missions and, following a number of familiarization sorties, the first data flight 
occurred on August 31.19
 By 1978, the two airplanes were flying an average of 100 sorties annually 
and had logged more than 4,000 flight hours. Although based at Ames, they 
routinely flew Earth Resources missions from NASA’s facility at Wallops Island, 
VA, as well as being deployed to Hawaii, Alaska, Texas, Maine, South Dakota, 
and Panama. The versatile U-2 provided a wide range of capabilities including 
resource studies, disaster assessment, land-use surveys, sensor development, 
stratospheric sampling, and satellite support. For example, during drought 
years, the California Department of Water Resources used photos taken from 
the U-2 to measure water levels in rivers and reservoirs. Similarly, high-altitude 
19. Ibid.
Marty Knutson spearheaded the effort to acquire two U-2 airplanes for use as NASA research 
platforms. (NASA) 
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aerial imagery of the San Francisco Bay aided the U.S. Geological Survey in a 
study of tidal patterns and water movement. Firefighters used infrared imagery 
for faster containment of wildfires, more efficient use of personnel and equip-
ment, and protecting forest watersheds and wildlife habitat. Survey pictures of 
areas affected by floods and earthquakes were useful in assessing damage and 
assigning repair priorities. In another experiment, researchers used U-2 imagery 
to develop a land-use-management database for both the public and private 
sectors. Such data have been valuable for evaluating urban growth, traffic pat-
terns, and pollution, as well as in preparing environmental impact statements. 
Sensors on board the U-2 were used to measure the distribution of gases and 
aerosol particles at altitudes up to 65,000 feet to develop a better understanding 
of the effects of natural and humanmade actions on the atmosphere’s protec-
tive ozone layer. Additionally, comparison of U-2 imagery to that taken with 
NASA’s Landsat satellites supported investigations in forestry, water manage-
ment, coastal-zone processes, rangeland management, and land use.20
Sensor Platform
NASA researchers routinely used the U-2 to carry a variety of sensors, includ-
ing aerial mapping cameras, electronic scanners, and atmospheric sampling 
20. NASA Ames Research Center staff, High Altitude Perspective (Washington, DC: NASA SP-427), 
1978, pp. 2–3.
A U-2C during deployment to Wallops Island, VA. (NASA)
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devices. Taking advantage of the airplane’s original design characteristics, the 
NASA U-2 aircraft were also used extensively to carry out photographic mis-
sions. There were several different camera configurations, affording researchers 
the opportunity to employ a variety of focal lengths, film types and formats, 
and multispectral capabilities. Additionally, the U-2 could carry a range of non-
photographic sensors. Most equipment was palletized to allow technicians to 
easily switch payloads in or out of the aircraft or from one aircraft to the other.21
During the 1970s, NASA maintained an inventory of cameras at Ames 
that had been used extensively in Earth observation studies. Much of this 
equipment had been used in support of satellite missions such as Landsat, 
which eventually became the longest-running enterprise for the acquisition 
of space-based Earth imagery. Ground coverage and resolution are functions 
of lens focal length and film format. Higher-resolution imagery was obtained 
using large-format (9- by 9-inch or 9- by 18-inch) film and 6-inch, 12-inch, 
24-inch, or 36-inch focal-length lenses. A single frame taken from an altitude 
of 63,000 feet with a Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 camera using a 12-inch focal 
length lens covered 80 square miles at resolutions ranging from 59 to 157 
inches. The highest resolution was provided by the Research Camera System, 
21. Ibid., p. 7.
The U-2C was capable of carrying a variety of research instruments and cameras. (NASA)
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which was equipped with a 24-inch, 3.5 focal ratio lens capable of resolving 
objects significantly less than 40 inches across. Depending on the intended use 
of the resulting imagery, the cameras were equipped with standard or infra-
red color or black-and-white film. Infrared imagery highlights details that are 
beyond the range of human vision and effectively penetrates atmospheric haze 
by filtering out blue light. Color infrared film is sensitive to the green, red, 
and near-infrared portions of the spectrum, which makes it particularly useful 
for aerial and space photographic surveys for land-use and vegetation studies. 
Researchers used infrared images to distinguish between healthy vegetation 
and that which was diseased or stressed.22
Nonphotographic sensors were typically supplied and funded by outside 
researchers and organizations. All such equipment was installed in specific 
areas of the airplane subject to load factors, safety standards, and technical 
constraints (size, weight, materials, power requirements, etc.). Most of these 
sensors fit within several categories. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center 
in Greenbelt, MD, and the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory (LBL) sponsored astronomy and astrophysics research with the 
U-2. LBL physicists supplied two microwave radiometers for mapping the 
temperature of deep space and examining fundamental questions about the 
origin of the universe. Investigators at Goddard installed an instrument 
for measuring solar spectral radiance and its variation with the solar cycle. 
Scientists at Goddard and Ames used the U-2 as a workhorse for Earth 
observation studies and to evaluate instrumentation that would later be used 
on spacecraft. The Heat Capacity Mapping Radiometer was used to evaluate 
thermal pollution, wetlands environments, and soil moisture. An instrument 
called the Ocean Color Scanner, forerunner of the Nimbus satellite’s Coastal 
Zone Color Scanner, was a multispectral imager for detecting subtle varia-
tions in upwelling spectral radiance of seawater.23
A multispectral scanner made available through a cooperative agreement 
between NASA and the Environmental Protection Agency gave scientists an 
11-channel digital system with 10 channels in the visible to near-visible spectral 
region and 1 in the thermal infrared. This device was primarily used in support 
of Landsat investigations. Ames also supplied a thermal infrared roll-stabilized 
line-scanner video system and a line-scan camera visible-imaging system that 
provided real-time imagery to a ground receiving station via telemetry link 
for use in disaster response. Finally, the U-2 served as a platform for conduct-
ing stratospheric and atmospheric studies with a variety of sensors. The Ames 
22. Ibid., pp. 9–16.
23. Ibid., pp. 17–20.
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Stratospheric Air Sampler used chemiluminescent reactions to measure seasonal 
variations in atmospheric gases. Another instrument contained four cryogeni-
cally cooled samplers plus two whole-air samplers for measuring ozone-deplet-
ing compounds such as halocarbons, nitrous oxide, and carbon tetrachloride. 
Other methods for measuring atmospheric pollutants included use of an infra-
red scanning spectrometer and a high-speed interferometer. Samples of halogen 
compounds and aerosols were also collected using a variety of filters exposed 
to the airstream by pilot command. Scientists from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) analyzed data collected with a radiom-
eter in order to determine the total amount of atmospheric water vapor above 
the U-2 at cruise altitude. A downward-looking infrared radiometer measured 
By 1978, the two NASA U-2s were flying an average of 100 missions annually and had 
logged more than 4,000 flight hours. (NASA)
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atmospheric non-uniformities in order to better understand convective instabili-
ties and atmospheric mixing processes.24
One NASA research effort with the U-2C involved acquiring small-scale, 
low-resolution, multispectral photography over selected representative eco-
systems to simulate the Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) data system then being 
developed for the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS, later named 
Landsat 1). Instrumentation technicians installed four 70-millimeter framing 
cameras in the airplane’s Q-bay to take simultaneous images of the same target 
area on the ground. Three cameras were equipped with 1.75-inch-focal-length 
lenses and black-and-white emulsion film, spectrally filtered to image the green, 
red, and near-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. The fourth 
camera carried color infrared film. Researchers selected five target areas: Feather 
River Basin in Northern California was chosen as representative of western U.S. 
forests, mountainous, and agricultural areas; the San Francisco Bay region and 
Los Angeles Basin as representative of urbanized areas; Phoenix and Tucson in 
southern Arizona as characteristic of arid regions; and the Chesapeake Bay region, 
representing wetland ecosystems. Survey missions were flown over each target 
region every 18 days to simulate the ERTS’s planned orbit cycle. In early 1972, 
the research team added a single 24-inch-focal-length, 9- by 18-inch Type A-1 
film camera, along with an accompanying trimetragon array of 6-inch-focal-
length cameras. A multispectral scanner built at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 
Center was also integrated into the aircraft, providing complete ERTS sensor 
simulation capability. Concurrent integration of a Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 film 
camera into the satellite simulation package resulted in a five-instrument system 
that saw extensive use on later research flights.25
In the summer of 1972, scientists at NASA and the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) initiated a cooperative program with the state of Arizona to 
produce improved mapping imagery for developing a land-use-management 
database. The primary goal of the Arizona Land Use Experiment was the 
acquisition of cloud-free black-and-white panchromatic metric photography 
in addition to the standard ERTS simulation multispectral photography. The 
USGS used this imagery to produce 7.5-minute, 1:24,000-scale orthophoto 
quadrangle sheets. Unlike standard topographic maps that represent terrain ele-
vation with contour lines and depict humanmade features with simple graph-
ics, the orthophoto maps show land features using either black-and-white or 
color-enhanced photographic images that have been processed to show details 
24. Ibid., pp. 17–20.
25. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History,” http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/
AirSci/ER-2/history.html, accessed July 8, 2013.
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in their true positions. Such imagery depicts terrain and cultural features in a 
more true-to-life manner than conventional line maps. This was the first dem-
onstration of the use of high-altitude aircraft data for quadrangle map produc-
tion over large areas. With the launch of ERTS-1 on July 23, 1972, investigators 
began requesting that the U-2 overfly specific target sites, often simultaneously 
with the satellite overpass. Most of these flights carried a Vinten/RC-10 system 
This infrared image shows flood damage following a break in the California Aqueduct on October 
12, 1971. The rupture released 100 million gallons of water, damaging roads, farm fields, and 
widely scattered homes west of the city of Lancaster. (NASA)
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that provided small-scale satellite simulation data along with larger-scale, larger-
format data. Throughout the remainder of the year, NASA expanded the scope of 
the U-2 project. Flights over the eastern and western regions of the United States 
were flown in support of crew training for the Skylab space station. Resulting 
imagery was used in the Skylab simulator in Houston. Additionally, the U-2 was 
flown for disaster-assessment missions, with data-collection flights over areas 
damaged by hurricane and wildfire.26
In early 1973, researchers equipped the U-2 with a trimetragon array of 
24-inch-focal-length, 9- by 18-inch film format cameras called the A-3 con-
figuration. Mounted vertically, the A-3 provided a multi-emulsion, multispec-
tral photographic capability. This system was employed over Roseville, CA, 
following a munitions train explosion in a railroad classification yard, as well 
as over a number of wilderness fires in support of firefighting efforts by the 
California Department of Forestry. Later that year, researchers embarked on 
the first systematic development of a global stratospheric model. In the summer 
of 1974, NASA deployed a U-2 equipped with two specialized instruments, 
the Stratospheric Air Sampler and the Aerosol Particulate Sampler, to Eielson 
Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, AK. From there, six flights were made over 
the northern polar region to collect air samples and to acquire high-altitude 
26. Ibid.
Infrared image of San Diego taken from an altitude of 65,000 feet. (NASA)
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photographic data over a number of Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystems in sup-
port of ERTS investigations. Additional stratospheric sampling missions took 
place near equatorial latitudes with a deployment to Hickam Air Force Base, 
HI, in October. These two deployments, along with local sampling flights over 
California, provided scientists with the first comprehensive sampling of strato-
spheric constituents in the northern hemisphere and aided in the development 
of latitudinal distribution models of the upper atmosphere. In late 1974, NASA 
acquired additional instrumentation for the U-2. This included an Itek Optical 
Bar Camera, a 120-degree-field-of-view, 24-inch-focal-length panoramic camera 
similar to the Lunar Mapper instrument carried aboard the Apollo spacecraft; a 
thermal scanner developed by HRB-Singer; and Goddard Space Flight Center’s 
Heat Capacity Mapper. The following year, further stratospheric air-sampling 
deployments were conducted from Eielson and Hickam and from Wallops 
Island, VA. Sampling missions were expanded in 1976 to include deployments 
to Howard Air Force Base, Panama, and Loring Air Force Base, ME, further 
widening the database.27
Sensor development continued in 1977 with integration of the Aether 
Drift astrophysics experiment. The instrument package consisted of a pair of 
27. Ibid.
Exclusive homes in the Hollywood Hills as seen from 12 miles above the ground. Some California 
citizens saw U-2 imagery as an invasion of privacy. (NASA)
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upward-looking microwave antennae and associated processing and recording 
systems that were carried to altitudes well above terrestrial sources of radiation. 
During numerous missions flown over the span of 2 years, scientists observed 
background radiation differentials from the two antennae in order to validate 
or reject a catastrophic evolutionary (Big Bang) theory of the formation of the 
universe. The project entailed multiple deployments over several years, including 
flights from Lima, Peru, to collect data in the southern hemisphere.28
In 1978, the NASA U-2 aircraft took part in the Alaska High-Altitude 
Photography Program. Faced with responsibility for the administration, map-
ping, surveying, and conveyance of Federal lands to the state and to native 
corporations, a consortium of Federal and state agencies requested NASA’s 
assistance in acquiring both black-and-white and color infrared imagery of the 
entire state of Alaska. This program spanned 8 years and resulted in 95-percent 
coverage of the state’s total area. Most impressive was the fact that the imagery 
was accomplished with less than 10-percent cloud cover. Technicians at Ames 
integrated the Daedalus Multispectral Scanner onto one of the aircraft in 1979, 
providing the U-2 for the first time with a digitally recorded multispectral instru-
ment. Stratospheric sampling continued in 1979 and 1980 from Ames, Alaska, 
and Panama, along with continued efforts in support of Landsat. Additionally, 
the NASA U-2 was used to collect photographic data for the National Wetlands 
Inventory. This covered the Prairie Potholes region within portions of Minnesota, 
Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana, an important breeding habi-
tat for migratory birds and other wildlife.29 All imagery collected by the NASA 
U-2 was available for public inspection at Ames via a computerized data retrieval 
system, and anyone could purchase high-resolution prints of any frame through 
the USGS in Sioux Falls, SD. Not everyone was happy about this development. 
Images commissioned by the Coastal Conservation Commission for a wetlands 
survey also revealed unlicensed construction in the coastal zone. Citizens of the 
town of Bolinas, north of San Francisco, saw the U-2 imagery as an invasion of 
privacy. “I do have this gut reaction to this eye in the sky able to look at all the 
little things in people’s backyards,” said one local attorney.30
By this point, NASA had been flying the U-2C for nearly a decade and 
would continue to do so until the late 1980s. But as soon as Lockheed received 
a contract to restart U-2 production, NASA officials were quick to order one 
of the new models.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 373.
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An ER-2 and U-2C fly over San Francisco Bay and the Golden Gate Bridge. (NASA)
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ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons 
NASA’s high-altitude capabilities expanded after Marty Knutson delivered 
the first ER-2 to Ames Research Center, on June 10, 1981. While technicians 
readied the new airplane to join the science fleet, the older models remained 
engaged in important work. For example, the U-2C was employed in a mul-
tiyear cooperative effort among NASA, the U.S. Forest Service, and several 
eastern seaboard states to detect and monitor Gypsy Moth caterpillar infes-
tations in the northeast region of the country and assess the effectiveness of 
insecticide-spraying programs. Researchers used high-resolution color infrared 
photography to evaluate the severity of infestation from New York to North 
Carolina on an annual basis. Data had to be acquired within a narrow biologi-
cal window dictated by latitude, elevation, and annual weather conditions in 
order to successfully discriminate the severity of defoliation attributable to the 
Gypsy Moth.1
NASA U-2 and ER-2 aircraft also took part in a variety of missions in sup-
port of Department of Defense projects, most notably Teal Ruby, a satellite 
designed to detect and track aircraft from space by measuring their infrared sig-
natures. The greatest challenge was separating these signatures from the normal 
background signal. In order to build a database of background measurements, 
the ER-2 was equipped with a multiwavelength infrared sensor similar to that 
to be carried by the spacecraft. Throughout the yearlong Highly Calibrated 
Airborne Measurements Program (Hi-CAMP), researchers used the special 
instrument to collect precise measurements of infrared background clutter 
caused by atmospheric, terrestrial, and oceanic phenomena. During a series 
of highly coordinated missions over the Western United States and Europe, 
they also tested the Hi-CAMP sensor’s capabilities for tracking aircraft rang-
ing in size from a T-38 trainer to a C-15 cargo transport.2 The results assisted 
engineers in developing data-processing algorithms and provided useful infor-
mation for future programs. Unfortunately, following a string of management 
problems, cost overruns, and delays, the planned launch of the Teal Ruby 
 1. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History.”
 2. Ibid., pp. 374–375.
CHAPTER 9
Unlimited Horizons
198
satellite was postponed and eventually canceled altogether. In the absence of 
Teal Ruby, the Hi-CAMP database became the single most comprehensive 
source of infrared air-vehicle detection data for designing and testing detec-
tion algorithms, selecting spectral passbands, and sizing air or missile defense 
systems that operate within the relevant spectral regions.3
A Hi-CAMP deployment to Alconbury, England, in 1985 was followed 
in early 1987 with a deployment to Darwin, Australia, for the Stratosphere-
Troposphere Exchange Project (STEP), a continuation of earlier atmospheric 
sampling efforts using the U-2C. NASA and NOAA jointly funded STEP to 
obtain more data on the mechanisms and rate of transfer of particles, trace 
gases, and aerosols from the troposphere into the stratosphere. That same year, 
scientists from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA, oversaw 
engineering and integration test flights of the Airborne Visible and Infrared 
Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS). The ER-2 served as a convenient and cost-
effective platform for testing the instrument, a 224-band multispectral scanner 
designed primarily for use on satellites.4
With its unique capabilities, the ER-2 was ideally suited to play an impor-
tant role in Earth Science research focused on the study of ozone depletion 
over Antarctica and the Arctic. In late summer 1987, the aircraft was deployed 
to South America for subpolar stratospheric sampling over the Antarctic con-
tinent while operating from Punta Arenas, Chile. The most significant data 
collected during these missions confirmed the existence of an “ozone hole” over 
the southern polar region and provided information suggesting that human-
made chemical compounds, specifically chlorofluorocarbons, were primarily 
responsible for ozone depletion over the Antarctic region. The data also repu-
diated long-held theoretical polar symmetry models of the upper atmosphere. 
Researchers moved their efforts to the opposite side of the globe in January 
1989, when the ER-2 was deployed to Stavanger, Norway, in support of the 
Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition. This stratospheric sampling program 
included multiple flights over northern Europe.5
Researchers at Ames also employed the ER-2 in a continuing NASA effort 
to leverage high-altitude, long-range, and sensor capabilities for fighting wild-
fires. In 1988, wilderness fires devastated much of Yellowstone National Park 
as several different blazes merged into a single conflagration that became the 
 3. Richard H. Van Atta, Sidney G. Reed, and Seymour J. Deitchman, “IR Surveillance: Teal Ruby/
Hi-CAMP,” DARPA Technical Accomplishments Vol. II: An Historical Review of Selected DARPA 
Projects, chapter 9, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1991, pp. 1–7.
 4. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History.”
 5. Ibid.
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largest wildfire in U.S. history. In a groundbreaking moment in fire-manage-
ment strategy, Chief Naturalist George Robinson requested that NASA provide 
high-altitude imagery of the region. In response, NASA tasked Landsat-4 to 
collect images from orbit while additional types of aerial surveillance were 
accomplished from high and medium altitudes using the ER-2 and C-130B 
aircraft. Both aircraft were equipped with infrared sensors capable of penetrat-
ing smoke and haze to assist in delineating and mapping the multiple fire 
complexes. Operating from Moffett Field, the aircraft flew multiple missions 
over the greater Yellowstone area, relaying thermal and near-infrared imagery 
data in real time to a ground receiving station in West Yellowstone, WY.6 
Resulting data provided firefighters with their first comprehensive view of the 
multiple fire fronts and their interrelationships. Detailed information about 
the fire’s location, size, rate of spread, and intensity allowed incident com-
manders to battle the blaze while simultaneously protecting firefighters on the 
ground from what had proved to be an aggressive and unpredictable fire. This 
effort served as the blueprint for future programs such as the Western States 
Fire Missions in 2006 and 2007, which employed NASA’s Altair and Ikhana 
remotely piloted aircraft.
As the ER-2 received an expanded role on such vital missions, the two U-2C 
models were rapidly approaching the end of their 30-year flying careers. The 
first NASA U-2C was retired at Moffett Field in mid-1987 after logging 10,000 
 6. Ibid.
The ER-2 can accommodate payloads in nose and fuselage compartments as well as within 
wing and centerline pods. (NASA)
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hours of service. It was immediately replaced with a former TR-1A, on loan 
from the Air Force and temporarily converted to an ER-2. The second NASA 
U-2C—that last of the original U-2 models still flying—was retired in the 
spring of 1989, but not until Lockheed secured permission to attempt two last 
recordbreaking flights. Jerry Hoyt took off from Edwards on April 17, 1989, 
with only 395 gallons of fuel on board. Reaching 9,842 feet in 52 seconds, and 
eventually attaining 49,212 feet within 6 minutes 15 seconds, the U-2C easily 
broke previous world time-to-climb records and sustained altitude records for 
its weight category. This was three times faster than a previous record set with 
a Learjet that had ultimately topped out at 54,370 feet. Hoyt passed through 
65,617 feet in a little over 12 minutes. A mere 16 minutes after takeoff, the U-2 
reached a maximum altitude of 73,700 feet. The following day, Ron Williams 
broke records in a higher weight category, taking off with the aircraft fueled to 
a gross weight of 20,900 pounds. Observers from the Federation Aeronautique 
Internationale (FAI) verified the records, and the airplane was subsequently 
returned to Lockheed in Palmdale, where it was painted black for its final role 
as a museum exhibit. Shortly afterward, Doyle Krumrey flew the final sortie 
in an original U-2 while delivering the aircraft to Robins Air Force Base, GA, 
for permanent display.7
Meanwhile, research missions with the Airborne Science fleet continued 
at a blistering pace. An ER-2 deployed to Alconbury in June 1991, bringing 
the AVIRIS, Thematic Mapper Simulator, and RC-10 Camera to Europe. 
Multiple sorties were flown over Iceland, Wales, England, France, Italy, Spain, 
Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. After returning to the United States, 
the aircraft was used to conduct stratospheric sampling from Alaska to the 
North Pole.8 Next, the airplane was equipped with the Moderate-resolution 
Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS), a modified 
Daedalus Wildfire scanning spectrometer designed to provide spectral informa-
tion similar to that which was to be provided by the MODIS, then scheduled 
for launch aboard the EOS-AM satellite. Researchers conducted initial test-
ing in coordination with other aircraft and satellites over Coffeyville, KS, and 
along the Texas and Louisiana coast in November 1991. The modified wildfire 
instrument was converted to MAS configuration in January 1992 and was then 
flown over portions of the Atlantic Ocean in the region of the Azores. Each 
mission combined coordinated satellite, airborne, and surface observations 
 7. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 377–378.
 8. NASA Fact Sheet, “ER-2 Program History.”
 ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons
201
with modeling studies to investigate cloud properties and physical processes 
of cloud systems.9
Several ER-2 research projects in 1992 and 1993 contributed to the devel-
opment of commercial aeronautics. At the time, NASA was investigating 
whether emissions from future fleets of supersonic transports (SSTs) might 
deplete the ozone layer. During one project, an ER-2 carried instruments to 
measure known ozone depletion catalysts along projected air routes for the 
SST. In another, an ER-2 flew through the wake of an Air France Concorde 
to collect particulate samples. Researchers concluded that there would be little 
impact on the ozone layer as a result of additional SST traffic. In an unusual 
low-altitude mission for the ER-2, the aircraft was used to measure the effect 
of the world’s growing fleet of subsonic airliners on cirrus cloud formation.10
Perhaps ironically, the ER-2 was used to gather significant data for weather 
research. In early 1993, one aircraft was deployed to Townsville, Australia, to 
 9. Michael D. King and Paul Menzel, “First ISCCP Regional Experiment (FIRE) NASA ER-2 
Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS) Langley 
DAAC Data Set Document,” Atmospheric Data Science Center, October 1996, https://eosweb.
larc.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/project/fire/guide/base_fire_ci2_er2_mas_dataset.pdf, 
accessed July 27, 2013.
10. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 378.
The U-2C resided at Ames Research Center for nearly two decades. (NASA)
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carry a suite of nine sensors over a warm region of the Pacific Ocean northeast of 
Papua New Guinea where tropical storms frequently developed. Research results 
were intended for application in development of future satellite sensor systems 
for predicting storm formation and movement. In 1994, researchers at Ames 
equipped an ER-2 with the Lidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment (LASE), 
a 1,000-pound instrument built by NASA Langley at a cost of $20 million. 
The LASE system fired a 20-megawatt burst of laser energy straight downward 
to analyze water vapor in the atmosphere. During sorties from Wallops Island, 
researchers conducted coordinated experiments using lidar instruments on the 
ER-2, the Space Shuttle, and aircraft at lower altitudes to characterize water vapor 
levels throughout the atmospheric cross section.11
For a time, NASA was operating three ER-2 aircraft simultaneously. One 
was returned to the Air Force in 1995 and the other two eventually received 
new F118 engines while undergoing routine maintenance over the next 2 years. 
Lockheed (now Lockheed Martin, following a March 1995 merger with Martin 
Marietta) provided four pilots under contract to NASA, along with maintain-
ers and physiological support personnel. In 1998, as part of a cost-saving effort 
to consolidate NASA aircraft fleets, both remaining ER-2s were transferred to 
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (now NASA Armstrong Flight Research 
Center) at Edwards. Later that same year, the ER-2 was used to set a new world 
altitude record in the mid-weight class, with a gross takeoff weight totaling 
between 26,455 and 35,274 pounds. The previous record of 62,500 feet had 
been set 10 years earlier using the Russian P-42, a stripped-down version of the 
Su-27 twin-engine jet fighter that had been built specifically to beat time-to-
climb records. The new record was set on November 19, during a scheduled 
airborne science mission to measure water vapor, ozone, and other atmospheric 
particles. Although the ER-2 routinely operated at 70,000 feet and above, this 
flight to 68,700 feet was the first time the aircraft’s performance was documented 
by the FAI and made public. While emphasizing that the science mission was the 
flight’s primary goal, pilot Jim Barrilleaux expressed his opinion that “achieving 
the world altitude record verifies all of the outstanding efforts by the people who 
have worked on the NASA ER-2s and U-2s throughout the years—designers, 
builders, operators, maintainers and scientists.”12
The following winter, the NASA Airborne Science team deployed an ER-2 
to Kiruna, Sweden, north of the Arctic Circle, as part of the SAGE III Ozone 
Loss and Validation Experiment (SOLVE). Besides investigating the processes 
11. Ibid.
12. NASA, “NASA Aircraft Sets New World Altitude Record,” ScienceDaily, November 24, 1998, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/11/981124064046.htm, accessed July 27, 2013.
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that control polar and mid-latitude winter and spring ozone levels, scientists 
hoped to validate measurements from the satellite-based Stratospheric Aerosol 
and Gas Experiment (SAGE) instrument. Although SAGE III was not launched 
on schedule, researchers were able to take advantage of other satellite assets. 
Managed by the Upper Atmosphere Research Program of NASA’s Office of Earth 
Science, the intensive effort also involved a DC-8 flying science platform and 
was the largest international field experiment ever conducted to measure ozone 
in the Arctic stratosphere. Scientists hoped that stratospheric measurements col-
lected during the SOLVE campaign would provide a better understanding of the 
complicated chemistry involved with ozone loss. Unusually low levels of ozone 
over the Arctic during previous winters raised concerns that an ozone hole was 
developing just as in the Antarctic region. Research teams included more than 
350 scientists from the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and Canada.13
13. NASA, “NASA ER-2 Flies Over Russia on Ozone Research Mission,” News Release 00-14, 
January 27, 2000, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/NewsReleases/2000/00-14.
html, accessed August 1, 2013.
During the early 1990s, NASA operated three ER-2 aircraft simultaneously. One was returned to 
the Air Force in 1995. (NASA)
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The first SOLVE mission was a flight from Kiruna to the North Pole and 
back, a dangerous feat in a single-engine plane over an extremely hostile envi-
ronment. In order to reduce potential risks, the ER-2 was equipped with 
backup communications systems, and the JP-TS fuel was specially refined for 
extreme cold weather use. Arctic survival instructors assured pilot Dee Porter 
that if he had to eject at altitude, where the air temperature was expected to 
be approximately –117 °F, survival would not be an issue because he would be 
frozen long before reaching the ground. Porter made the entire flight in total 
darkness, successfully accomplishing all science goals without experiencing any 
technical problems with the aircraft.14
The most unusual aspect of the SOLVE campaign was that it required 
multiple ER-2 sorties over Russia. Since this was to be the first flight of a U-2-
type aircraft through Russian airspace since the downing of Frank Powers in 
1960, the missions were closely coordinated with Russian observers. While 
preparing for his first such flight Dee Porter asked a Russian Air Force general 
for assurance that all air traffic control centers and air defense sites along the 
planned route would be notified in advance. The general told him not to worry, 
insisting, “There will not be a second incident.”15
Porter piloted the first 6-hour sortie across Russia on January 27, 2000, 
flying a straight line from the Finnish border southeast past Moscow to the 
Ukrainian border and back. Per prior agreement, he had to enter and exit 
Russian airspace at strictly defined navigational waypoints. The airplane was 
loaded with more than a ton of scientific instruments that would be used to 
perform 17 different environmental experiments. A second flight on February 
5 lasted 8 hours and required a more complicated route across the Barents Sea 
and over northern Russia. Jan Nystrom piloted additional flights over Russia 
in March during the third and final phase of the campaign.16
The ER-2 team was deployed to warmer climes in the summer of 2000 for the 
Southern African Regional Science Initiative (SAFARI), based in Pietersburg, 
Republic of South Africa. This time, researchers used the MAS multispectral 
scanner in an effort to increase understanding of southern African ecological 
and climate systems. After returning to the U.S., the airplane prepared for 
deployment the following summer to Jacksonville, FL, for the Convection And 
Moisture EXperiment (CAMEX). This series of field research investigations 
focused on the study of tropical cyclone development, tracking, intensifica-
tion, and landfall impacts. Measurements of cloud microphysics were aimed at 
14. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 379–380.
15. Ibid., p. 380.
16. Ibid., pp. 380–381.
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improving hurricane predictions. A similar campaign in July 2005 was based 
in Costa Rica, with the ER-2 carrying instruments to measure the buildup 
and behavior of tropical storm systems over Mexico and Central America, and 
in the eastern Pacific Ocean, Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. During the 
course of CAMEX-4, researchers had the opportunity to fly the aircraft over 
several hurricanes, including Emily and Dennis, both violent Category 4–5 
storms, and collect information on their entire vertical structures. Additional 
data were collected regarding the temperature, humidity, precipitation, and 
wind related to tropical cyclones and other phenomena that lead to the devel-
opment of powerful storms at sea.17
The ER-2 also served as a test bed for direct detection Doppler lidar systems. 
In September 2009, researchers at Dryden integrated the Tropospheric Wind 
Lidar Technology Experiment (TWiLiTE) into the ER-2 to measure vertical 
wind profiles. The primary objectives of the TWiLiTE program were to develop 
technologies and subsystems for a future space-based Global Wind Mission, 
conduct engineering flight tests of a fully autonomous airborne Doppler lidar, 
and demonstrate tropospheric wind profile measurements from a high-altitude, 
downward-looking, moving platform to simulate spaceborne measurements 
using similar instruments.18 The following December, the ER-2 carried the 
Multiple Altimeter Beam Experimental Lidar (MABEL) to simulate instru-
ments to be carried by the second Ice, Cloud and land Elevation Satellite 
(ICESat-2). In a second series of tests, in March 2011, the MABEL instrument, 
developed at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, was again mounted in the 
airplane’s nose for flights over a variety of different terrains. In April 2012, 
the ER-2 carried MABEL to study Greenland’s ice sheet, glaciers, and sea ice. 
The deployment, based at Keflavik, Iceland, included more than 100 hours of 
flying during 16 sorties, including 14 data collection flights over Greenland 
and surrounding sea ice areas. Several missions were conducted concurrently 
and on the same flight tracks as flights of other NASA environmental science 
aircraft involved in the Arctic IceBridge campaign in order to compare data 
being recorded by the MABEL with instruments on the other aircraft. This 
challenging effort ended on April 27 with a lengthy transit flight from Keflavik 
to the Dryden Aircraft Operations Facility in Palmdale. Pilot Stu Broce landed 
17. NASA, “ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft,” NASA Fact Sheet FS-2007-4-046-DFRC, 
2007, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf, 
accessed July 27, 2013.
18. Bruce Gentry et al., “Flight Testing of the TWiLiTE Airborne Molecular Doppler Lidar,” http://
ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100026400_2010028473.pdf, accessed  
July 27, 2013.
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the ER-2 in California after being airborne for nearly 10.5 hours, during 
which time he collected MABEL data over the broadleaf deciduous forests 
of Wisconsin.19
In a continuing effort to develop instruments for space-based platforms, the 
ER-2 was configured for the Polarimeter Definition Experiment (PODEX) in 
January 2013. The primary goal was the development of instruments for use 
with the Aerosol-Cloud-Ecosystem (ACE) satellite mission. During the course 
of seven flights over 3 weeks, research teams collected data using a new class 
of polarimeters, instruments that provide detailed information about clouds 
and their interaction with tiny airborne particles from a variety of sources, 
including automotive emissions, dust, and sea spray lofted by the wind. These 
aerosols can remain suspended in the atmosphere for up to a week, affecting 
human health, cloud formation, precipitation, and Earth’s radiation budget.20
Similar particles and their behavior were investigated in the summer of 
2013. During the Studies of Emissions, Atmospheric Composition, Clouds 
and Climate Coupling by Regional Surveys (SEAC4RS) campaign, more than 
19. Alan Brown and Beth Hagenauer, “NASA’s ER-2 Completes MABEL Validation Deployment,” May 
1, 2012, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/ER-2_completes_MABEL_deployment.
html, accessed July 24, 2013.
20. Kathryn Hansen, “PODEX Experiment to Reshape Future of Atmospheric Science” January 16, 
2013, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/qa-starr.html, accessed July 29, 2013.
The icy expanse of Greenland seen from 62,000 feet during a MABEL research mission on April 
2, 2012. (NASA)
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250 scientists, engineers, and flight personnel examined the ways in which air 
pollution and natural emissions affect atmospheric composition and climate. 
ER-2 and DC-8 aircraft involved in SEAC4RS carried sensors to probe the 
atmosphere from top to bottom at a critical time of year when weather systems 
were sufficiently strong and regional air pollution and natural emissions were 
prolific enough to pump gases and particles high into the atmosphere. The 
results may provide new insights into the effects of gases and aerosol particles 
on Earth’s atmosphere and climate. The mission targeted two major regional 
sources of summertime emissions: intense smoke from wildland fires in the 
Western United States and natural emissions of isoprene, a carbon compound, 
from forests in the Southeast.21
Over the years, NASA U-2 and ER-2 aircraft have supported airborne 
research in the United States and around the globe. Worldwide deployments 
have made it possible to acquire extensive digital multispectral imagery and 
aerial photography from altitudes achievable by no other aircraft. U-2 and 
ER-2 missions tested prototype satellite-imaging sensors and acquired Earth 
resources data for application to projects sponsored by NASA and Federal agen-
cies such as the Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the Army Corps of Engineers. By using airplanes like the 
U-2 and ER-2 for high-altitude research, NASA scientists gained knowledge of 
advanced aircraft capabilities and technologies and aerospace physiology, and 
they expanded their understanding of how humans interact with the environ-
ment. Research results may yield improved weather forecasts, tools for manag-
ing agriculture and forests, information for fisheries and local planners, and the 
ability to predict how climate will change in the future. Additionally, engineers 
will use lessons learned in future designs for aircraft and aerospace vehicles.22
21. NASA, “NASA SEAC4RS Mission Targets How Pollution, Storms And Climate Mix,” June 6, 2013, 
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/seac4rs_2013.html, accessed August 1, 2013.
22. NASA, “ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft,” NASA Fact Sheet FS-2007-4-046-DFRC, 
2007, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf, 
accessed July 27, 2013.
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Contrary to popular belief, the U-2 is not yet ready to fly off into the sunset. (U.S. Air Force)
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Conclusions 
Over the span of more than six decades, the U-2 evolved from a relatively 
basic, high-altitude camera platform for performing clandestine reconnais-
sance missions into a complex, multisensor platform that has been adapted 
for a multitude of civil and military roles. Variants in more than a dozen 
configurations have been used for intelligence gathering, strategic and tacti-
cal reconnaissance, communications relay, battle-damage assessment, treaty 
monitoring and verification, disaster relief, environmental and Earth resources 
studies, and a wide variety of scientific research. Born of a Cold War necessity 
to maintain the balance of power between East and West, the U-2 now serves 
equally well as a high-altitude tool for tracking terrorists in the mountains of 
Afghanistan or for tracking the migration of destructive spruce bark beetles 
through the forests of Alaska.
Perhaps most surprising is the seemingly unending span of the U-2’s service 
life. Those who conceived of and designed the airplane anticipated that it would 
remain viable for only a few years at most, but it has surpassed expectations with 
relatively modest changes to the basic configuration. Since its earliest days, the 
U-2 was consistently characterized as a delicate aircraft, designed for minimal 
aerodynamic stress. The airframe had been manufactured for optimum alti-
tude performance at the expense of strict adherence to military specifications. 
Surprisingly, up until the late 1990s, no systematic study had been made to 
determine the consequences of this engineering approach. So, to ascertain 
the fatigue life of the U-2S, strain gauges and accelerometers were installed in 
several aircraft. The astonishing results of these measurements indicated that 
the U-2S could likely withstand 750,000 hours of operation. At the time of 
the study, those airframes with the most flight time had less than 30,000 hours. 
This meant that if the flight rate remained unchanged, the airplanes would be 
flyable for another 150 years. This low airframe wear can be attributed in part 
to the relatively benign high-altitude environment, where stresses from gusts 
and turbulence are minimal. But the most important factor ensuring the U-2’s 
longevity may be its innovative design. Fred Carmody, a Lockheed field service 
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manager who spent 25 years helping to maintain the U-2, said in 1994, “The 
key is good initial design, maturity of the design, and proper maintenance.”1
At one time, the Air Force slated the U-2 for retirement in 2015, but 
Department of Defense cutbacks and rising costs of its proposed replacement, 
the RQ-4, gave Kelly Johnson’s angel a new lease on life. The Global Hawk’s 
price tag had gradually risen to $176 million per airframe, according to Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter at a January 2012 news conference, and 
Pentagon analysts determined that continuing to operate the U-2 would be less 
expensive for the foreseeable future. Through the various upgrade programs 
(engine, electrical, cockpit, etc.), the Air Force has already invested a substan-
tial sum—at least $1.7 billion since 1994—to modernize the U-2, so it makes 
sense to leverage this investment rather than spend money on a new platform.2
Not surprisingly, officials from Northrop Grumman, builder of the Global 
Hawk, contested this decision, arguing that by flying into hostile airspace, 
the U-2 exposes pilots to danger, and that the airplane has limited mission 
 1. Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, pp. 334–335.
 2. William J. Hennigan, “U-2 spy plane to linger overhead a bit longer,” Los Angeles Times, January 
28, 2012.
U-2 imagery of an SA-2 missile site at La Coloma, left, provided valuable intelligence during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962; pictures of a collapsed freeway interchange helped 
California officials plan disaster-relief efforts following the Sylmar Earthquake in February 
1971. (CIA)
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endurance and limited sensor capacity. Nevertheless, U-2 pilots have flown 
more than 95,000 hours since 2003, providing vital intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance data to military planners and soldiers in the field. Each 
year, the Air Force trains approximately 18 new U-2 pilots and 60 new RQ-4 
operators. “They might want to start training more U-2 pilots,” said Lexington 
Institute defense policy analyst Dr. Loren B. Thompson in a 2012 interview 
with the Los Angeles Times. Thompson estimated that the U-2 would probably 
not be retired before 2023. “There’s still a lot of fight in that aircraft.”3
Indeed there is. Pentagon officials have expressed a desire to continue flying 
the U-2 beyond 2040, and, presumably, NASA will fly the ER-2 as long as pos-
sible. Six decades after its conception, the U-2 remains a viable reconnaissance 
and research platform, but it will inevitably succumb to obsolescence. Perhaps 
somewhere in a windowless building at Palmdale, Skunk Works engineers are 
brewing up the next high-altitude craft to probe the sky’s unlimited horizons.
 3. Ibid.
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Aircraft Specifications 
U-2A/C/G
Length: 50 feet
Span: 80 feet
 Wing Area: 600 square feet
Height: 15 feet
 Zero-Fuel Weight: 13,071–14,250 pounds
 Max. Gross Takeoff Weight: 22,542–24,150 pounds
 Max. Unrefueled Range: 2,500 nautical miles
 Cruise Duration: 8.0 hours
 Operational Ceiling: above 70,000 feet
 Cruising Speed: 400 knots (460 mph) at 65,000 feet
APPENDIX 1
 Aircraft Specifications
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Early model U-2 general configuration. (U.S. Air Force)
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U-2R/TR-1/U-2S/ER-2
Length: 62 feet
Span: 103 feet
Wing Area: 1,000 square feet
Height: 15 feet
Zero-Fuel Weight: 14,900–17,800 pounds
Max. Gross Takeoff Weight: 30,700–41,000 pounds
Max. Unrefueled Range: 4,270 nautical miles
Cruise Duration: 10.4 hours
Operational Ceiling: above 70,000 feet
Cruising Speed: 413 knots (475 mph) at 65,000 feet
 Aircraft Specifications
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Late model U-2 general configuration. (Lockheed Martin)
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The U-2 fleet was produced in several batches. The first production run was 
built for the CIA with 20 airframes constructed at Burbank, CA, under con-
tract SP-1913. A second batch of 29 airframes was constructed at Oildale, 
CA, under contract SP-1914. An additional airframe was built as part of this 
batch, possibly using parts from crash-damaged airframes. Each U-2 airframe 
was identified by a three-digit Lockheed construction number, called an article 
number. Air Force serial numbers were assigned in 1956. The original proto-
type (Article 341) never received a U.S. Air Force serial number. Article 390 
was allocated a serial number that had been previously assigned to Article 357, 
which was lost in a nonfatal accident. The Air Force ordered a supplementary 
batch of five airframes in 1958. In 1967 and 1968, the CIA and Air Force 
received 12 U-2R airframes, four of which survived to be converted to U-2S 
configuration. Between 1981 and 1989, a total of 37 new airframes were built 
under the designations TR-1A, TR-1B, U-2R, and ER-2. The TR-1 series 
aircraft were redesignated U-2R in October 1991 and later converted to U-2S.
Original Production Batch
Article No. Serial No. Model User History
341 N/A U-2A Lockheed
CIA
Prototype was delivered to 
the test site on July 25, 1955, 
for test and development 
flights. First flight on August 1, 
1955. Crashed April 4, 1957, 
killing Lockheed test pilot 
Robert Sieker.
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Article No. Serial No. Model User History
342 56-6675
N800X
U-2A
U-2C
U-2F
Lockheed
CIA
Delivered to test site on 
September 11, 1955. Used 
for developmental testing. 
Converted to U-2C prototype 
and first flown in new 
configuration on May 13, 1959. 
Converted to U-2F prototype 
in May 1961. Deployed to CIA 
operating locations overseas 
and at Edwards Air Force Base. 
Crashed February 25, 1966, 
following refueling practice. 
CIA pilot Robert “Deke” Hall 
ejected safely.
343 56-6676 U-2A
U-2F
CIA
USAF
Delivered to test site on 
October 16, 1955. Used for 
training in 1956–57, and then 
for test and development. 
Converted to U-2F in 1961. 
Loaned to USAF during Cuban 
Missile Crisis and shot down 
over Cuba on October 27, 1962, 
killing Maj. Rudolph Anderson.
344 56-6677
N315X
U-2A
U-2F
CIA
USAF
Delivered to the test site on 
November 20, 1955. Used 
in test and development 
work though most of 1956. 
Converted to U-2F by October 
1961. Crashed near Edwards 
AFB during refueling trials on 
March 1, 1962, killing Capt. 
John Campbell.
345 56-6678 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on 
December 16, 1955. Crashed 
during training flight on May 
15, 1956, killing Wilburn 
“Billy” Rose.
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Article No. Serial No. Model User History
346 56-6679 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on 
January 13, 1956. Deployed 
to Europe with Detachment 
A. Crashed near Wiesbaden, 
Germany, killing Howard Carey.
347 56-6680 U-2A
U-2E
U-2F
U-2C
CIA
USAF
Delivered to the test site on 
February 8, 1956. Transferred 
to SAC in late 1957. Converted 
to U-2E in mid-1962. First SAC 
U-2 to be painted all black in 
1964. Converted to U-2F in 
1966. Placed in flyable storage 
in 1969. Converted to U-2C 
for Advanced Location Strike 
System project in 1972. Stored 
in 1980 and transferred to 
the National Air and Space 
Museum, Washington, DC, 
in 1985.
348 N801X
56-6681
N708NA
U-2A
U-2G
U-2C
CIA
USAF
Lockheed
NASA
Delivered to the test site on 
March 5, 1956. Deployed with 
Detachment A in April 1956. 
Returned to U.S. in November 
1957. Transferred to SAC but 
retained by Lockheed for testing 
through January 1959. Returned 
to CIA in 1963 for conversion to 
U-2G. Placed in flyable storage 
in 1969. Transferred to NASA 
in 1971 and returned to U-2C 
configuration. Retired in August 
1987. Initially displayed at Ames 
Research Center, Moffett Field, 
CA. Later transferred to Moffett 
Field Historical Society Museum.
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349 56-6682
N709NA
U-2A
U-2H
U-2G
U-2C
CIA
USAF
NASA
Delivered to the test site on 
March 29, 1956. Damaged 
in April 1960 forced landing 
in Thailand. Repaired and 
transferred to Air Force Flight 
Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA. 
Returned to CIA in 1964 for 
conversion to U-2H. Converted 
to U-2G in August 1965. 
Placed in flyable storage in 
1969. Transferred to NASA in 
1971. Retired in April 1989 
and transferred to Museum of 
Aviation, Robins AFB, GA.
350 56-6683 U-2A
U-2F
CIA
USAF
Delivered to the test site on 
April 24, 1956. Transferred to 
SAC in 1957. Used in flight-test 
activity in 1962. Returned to 
CIA in 1963 for conversion to 
U-2F. Loaned to SAC for Cuba 
reconnaissance. Crashed in the 
Gulf of Mexico on November 
20, 1963, killing Capt. Joe 
Hyde, Jr.
351 56-6684 U-2A
U-2C
CIA Delivered to the test site on May 
18, 1956. Converted to U-2C 
by 1959. Crashed at Taoyuan, 
Taiwan, on March 19, 1961, 
killing Maj. Yao-Hua Chih.
352 56-6685
N315X
U-2A
U-2C
CIA
Lockheed
Delivered to the test site on 
June 13, 1956. Converted to 
U-2C by September 1959. Used 
for test and development by 
Lockheed and Detachment G 
at Edwards in 1963. Crashed 
near Taiwan on October 22, 
1965, killing Maj. Cheng-Wen 
“Pete” Wang.
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353 56-6686 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on July 
6, 1956. Moved to Detachment 
G in June 1957. Destroyed in 
crash landing at Edwards on 
September 14, 1961. Buster 
Edens escaped unharmed.
354 56-6687 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on July 
27, 1956. Crashed on August 
31, 1956, during a training flight, 
killing Frank Grace.
355 56-6688 U-2A
U-2C
CIA Delivered to the test site on 
August 16, 1956. Damaged in 
landing accident on August 30, 
1956. Converted to U-2C by 
September 1962. Shot down over 
China on November 1, 1963. Maj. 
Chang-Di “Robin” Yeh survived.
356 56-6689 U-2A
U-2F
CIA
USAF
Delivered to the test site 
on September 5, 1956. 
Transferred to SAC in 
November 1957. Damaged 
by typhoon at Guam in late 
1962. Transferred to CIA for 
conversion to U-2F in 1963. 
Crashed in Taiwan Straits on 
March 23, 1964, killing Maj. 
Teh-Pei “Sonny” Liang.
357 56-6690 U-2A CIA Delivered to the test site on 
September 21, 1956. Crashed in 
Arizona on December 19, 1956. 
Robert Ericson survived.
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358 56-6691 U-2A
U-2C
CIA Delivered to the test site on 
October 8, 1956. Returned 
to Lockheed in September 
1958 for conversion to U-2C 
and to be used in flight-test 
and development activity. 
Returned to CIA in August 
1959. Shot down over China 
on January 10, 1965. Maj. 
Li-Yi “Jack” Chang survived 
but was captured.
359 56-6692 U-2A
U-2F
U-2C
U-2CT
CIA
USAF
Lockheed
Delivered to the test site on 
October 22, 1956. Transferred 
to SAC in December 1960. 
Returned to CIA in July 
1962 for conversion to U-2F. 
Loaned to SAC for Cuba 
reconnaissance in 1963. 
Used for testing in support 
of U-2R development from 
1965 to 1967. Transferred to 
Air Force Flight Test Center in 
July 1968. Modified for Project 
TRIM in 1972. Converted to 
U-2C configuration in 1974. 
Returned to Lockheed in 
1975 for conversion to U-2CT 
trainer and redelivered to 
SAC in January 1976. Retired 
in December 1987. Used as 
battle-damage-repair training 
airframe at Royal Air Force 
(RAF) Alconbury, England, 
in 1988. Restored to U-2C 
configuration, and transferred 
to Imperial War Museum, 
Duxford, England in 1992.
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360 56-6693 U-2A
U-2C
CIA Delivered the test site on 
November 5, 1956. Used for 
test and development activities 
until May 1959. Converted 
to U-2C. Shot down near 
Sverdlovsk, Russia, on May 1, 
1960. Frank Powers survived 
but was captured.
Second Production Batch
Article No. Serial No. Model User History
361 56-6694 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 
September 1956. Moved 
to Laughlin AFB, TX, in 
June 1957. Crashed during 
maintenance flight on 
September 26, 1957. Col. Jack 
Nole bailed out.
362 56-6695 U-2A
U-2G
USAF
CIA
Delivered to the test site in 
November 1956. Moved to 
Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 
Transferred to CIA in 1963 for 
conversion to U-2G. Shot down 
over Fujian, China, on July 7, 
1964, killing Lt. Col. Nan-Ping 
“Terry” Lee.
363 56-6696 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 
December 1956. Moved to 
Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 
Crashed near Tucson, AZ, 
on March 22, 1966. Capt. 
Huang-Di “Andy” Fan ejected.
364 56-6697 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site 
in January 1957. Moved to 
Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 
Crashed near Del Rio, TX, on 
August 6, 1958, killing Lt. Paul 
L. Haughland.
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365 56-6698 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site 
in January 1957. Moved to 
Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 
Crashed near Tucumcari, NM, 
on July 9, 1958, killing Capt. Al 
Chapin, Jr.
366 56-6699 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 
February 1957. Moved to 
Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 
Crashed near Abilene, TX,  
on June 28, 1957, killing Lt. 
Leo Smith.
367 56-6700 U-2A
U-2C
USAF
CIA
Delivered to the test site in 
February 1957. Transferred  
to the CIA in June 1957. 
Returned to SAC in 1960. 
Converted to U-2C in October 
1966. Placed in flyable 
storage in 1969. Returned to 
flight status in 1972 for the 
Advanced Location Strike 
System (ALSS) project. 
Crashed May 29, 1975, near 
Winterberg, Germany. Capt. 
Robert T. “Terry” Rendelman 
escaped unharmed.
368 56-6701 U-2A
U-2C
USAF Delivered to the test site in 
March 1957. Transferred to 
ARDC at Edwards in June 
1957, and then to SAC in 
1966. Converted to U-2C 
by November 1966. Placed 
in flyable storage in 1969. 
Returned to flight status in 
1972 for ALSS project. Retired 
to SAC Museum, Offutt AFB, 
NE, in 1980.
369 56-6702 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in 
March 1957. Moved to Laughlin 
AFB in June 1957. Crashed near 
Abilene, TX, on June 28, 1957, 
killing Lt. Ford Lowcock.
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370 56-6703 U-2A
U-2E
USAF Delivered to the test site  
in April 1957. Moved to 
Laughlin AFB in June 1957. 
Modified for SIGINT mission 
by mid-1959. Converted 
to U-2E in August 1962. 
Destroyed in crash landing 
at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, 
on September 18, 1964. Maj. 
Robert L. Primrose perished.
371 56-6704 U-2A USAF Delivered to the test site in  
April 1957. Moved to Laughlin 
AFB in June 1957. Crashed 
near Del Rio, TX, on November 
28, 1957, killing Capt. Benedict 
A. Lacombe.
372 56-6705 U-2A
U-2F
USAF
CIA
Delivered to the test site in  
April 1957. Moved to Laughlin 
AFB in June 1957. First U-2 
equipped for High-Altitude 
Sampling Program. Transferred 
to CIA in 1964. Converted to 
U-2F by May 1965 and  
assigned to Detachment G. 
Transferred to Detachment H 
in November 1965. Crashed at 
Taichung, Taiwan, on February 
17, 1966, killing Capt. Tse-Shi 
“Charlie” Wu.
373 56-6706 U-2A
U-2C
USAF
CIA
Delivered to test site in May 
1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB in 
June 1957. Transferred to CIA in 
August 1966 and converted to 
U-2C. Shot down over China on 
September 9, 1967, killing Maj. 
Jung-Bei “Denny” Hwang.
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374 56-6707 U-2A
U-2E
U-2F
U-2C
USAF Delivered to test site in May 
1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB 
in June 1957. Modified for 
SIGINT mission by mid-1959. 
Converted to U-2E in 1962. 
Converted to U-2F by November 
1966. Placed in flyable storage 
in 1969. Converted back to 
U-2C for ALSS project in 1972. 
Stored at Lockheed Palmdale 
in 1980. Later transferred to 
Laughlin AFB for static display.
375 56-6708 U-2A
U-2C
USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
June 1957. Converted to U-2C 
in March 1966. Crashed near 
Pineville, LA, on July 1, 1967. 
Capt. Sam Swart ejected.
376 56-6709 U-2A Lockheed 
USAF
Ready for delivery by June 
1957 but retained at factory 
until November for SIGINT 
modifications. Crashed near 
Picayune, MS, on January  
2, 1962. Capt. Charles  
Stratton ejected.
377 56-6710 U-2A
U-2D
USAF Delivered to ARDC in June 1957. 
Modified to U-2D by January 
1958. Crashed at Edwards on 
September 11, 1958, killing 
Capt. Hugh P. “Pat” Hunerwadel.
378 56-6711 U-2A
U-2C
CIA Delivered to Detachment G in 
July 1957 and used for test 
and development. Converted to 
U-2C in 1962. Shot down over 
China on September 9, 1962, 
killing Lt. Col. Huai-Sheng Chen.
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379 56-6712 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
July 1957. Moved to Davis-
Monthan AFB in 1963. Crashed 
on December 18, 1964, near 
Tucson after Capt. Shih-Li 
“Steve” Sheng ejected.
380 56-6713 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB  
in July 1957. Crashed July  
8, 1958, near Wayside, TX, 
killing RAF Sq. Ldr. Christopher 
H. Walker.
381 56-6714 U-2A
U-2G
U-2C
USAF
CIA
Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
August 1957. Transferred to 
CIA in 1965 and converted 
to U-2G. Later transferred to 
SAC and eventually placed 
in flyable storage in 1969. 
Converted to U-2C in 1972. 
Damaged beyond repair in 
crash near Oroville, CA, on 
January 31, 1980. Capt. 
Edward Beaumont survived. 
Aircraft was later rebuilt for 
display at Beale AFB.
382 56-6715 U-2A
U-2G
USAF
CIA
Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
August 1957. Transferred to 
CIA in 1964 and converted to 
U-2G in 1965. Crashed near 
Edwards AFB on April 26, 
1965, killing Buster E. Edens.
383 56-6716
N805X
U-2A
U-2C
USAF
CIA
Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
September 1957. Transferred 
to CIA in June 1965 and 
converted to U-2C. Transferred 
to SAC in 1971. Placed in 
storage in May 1980. Later 
transferred to Davis-Monthan 
AFB for permanent display.
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384 56-6717 U-2A
U-2C
USAF
CIA
Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
September 1957. Transferred 
to CIA in June 1964 and 
converted to U-2C. Crashed 
near Taiwan on June 21, 1966, 
killing Maj. Ching-Chang 
“Mickey” Yu.
385 56-6718 U-2A
U-2G
USAF
CIA
Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
September 1957. Transferred 
to CIA in August 1964 and 
converted to U-2G. Crashed 
into Yellow Sea on January  
5, 1969, killing Maj. Hseih 
“Billy” Chang.
386 56-6719 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB 
in October 1957. Crashed in 
Bolivia on July 28, 1966, killing 
Capt. Robert Hickman.
387 56-6720 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
October 1957. Crashed near 
Uvalde, TX, on July 14, 1960. 
Maj. Raleigh B.J. Myers ejected.
388 56-6721 U-2A
U-2D
USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
October 1957. Damaged in 
forced landing at Cortez, CO, 
on August 5, 1959. Repaired 
and transferred to ARDC and 
modified to U-2D. Delivered to 
Edwards AFB in 1960. Retired 
in 1978 and moved to March 
Field Air Museum and later to 
Blackbird Airpark in Palmdale, 
CA, for display.
389 56-6722 U-2A USAF Delivered to USAF in November 
1957. Assigned to ARDC as 
first aircraft to carry IR sensor. 
Used for numerous test and 
development projects. Retired 
in 1978 and moved to National 
Museum of the U.S. Air Force at 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.
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390 56-6690 U-2A
U-2C
USAF Assigned serial number 
previously used for another 
airframe that crashed. 
Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
December 1957. Converted to 
U-2C in 1966. Crashed in South 
Vietnam on October 8, 1966. 
Maj. Leo Stewart ejected.
Supplementary Production Batch
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391 56-6951 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
December 1957. Crashed  
at Davis-Monthan AFB on 
October 17, 1966. Capt. Leslie 
White survived.
392 56-6952 U-2A
U-2C
USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
January 1958. Converted to 
U-2C in 1966. Destroyed in crash 
landing on November 18, 1971, 
killing Capt. John Cunney.
393 56-6953 U-2A
U-2C
U-2CT
USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
February 1959. Converted to 
U-2C in 1966. Placed in flyable 
storage in 1969. Reactivated 
in 1971 as training aircraft. 
Damaged in landing accident 
in 1972. Rebuilt as U-2CT 
trainer in 1973. Retired in 1987. 
Converted back to single-seat 
U-2C and displayed in Cold 
War Museum, Bodø, Norway, 
in 1994.
394 56-6954 U-2D
U-2C
USAF Delivered to Edwards AFB 
as U-2D in March 1959. 
Transferred to SAC in 1966 and 
converted to U-2C. Crashed 
near Benson, AZ, on May 31, 
1968. Maj. Vic Milam ejected.
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395 56-6955 U-2A USAF Delivered to Laughlin AFB in 
March 1959. Transferred to 
Davis-Monthan AFB in 1963. 
Crashed near Boise, ID, on 
August 14, 1964. Capt. Shih-Li 
“Steve” Sheng ejected.
Original U-2R Production
Article No. Serial No. Model User History
051 N803X
68-10329
U-2R
U-2S
Lockheed
CIA
USAF
Prototype U-2R. First flight 
at Edwards AFB on August 
28, 1967. Used for test and 
development. Configured 
to production standard and 
delivered to CIA in March  
1969. Reallocated to flight 
testing in 1974. Transferred to 
Beale AFB in 1981. Converted 
to U-2S in 1995.
052 N809X
68-10330
U-2R USAF
Navy
First flight December 29, 1967. 
Delivered to Davis-Monthan 
AFB July 25, 1968. Test bed for 
Senior Lance and Navy EP-X 
trials. Transferred to Beale AFB 
in 1976. Crashed at Akrotiri, 
Cyprus, on December 7, 1977, 
killing Capt. Robert Henderson.
053 N800X
68-10331
U-2R
U-2S
CIA
USAF
First flight February 17, 1968. 
Delivered to CIA on November 
22, 1968. Transferred to Davis-
Monthan AFB in 1974 and to 
Beale AFB in 1976. Converted to 
U-2S in August 1996.
054 N810X
68-10332
U-2R CIA
USAF
First flight March 29, 1968, and 
subsequently delivered to CIA. 
Transferred to Davis-Monthan 
AFB in 1975 and to Beale AFB in 
1976. Crashed off Korean coast 
on January 15, 1992, killing 
Capt. Marty McGregor.
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055 N812X
68-10333
U-2R CIA
USAF
First flight May 8, 1968, and 
subsequently delivered to CIA. 
Transferred to Davis-Monthan 
AFB in 1974 and to Beale AFB 
in 1976. Crashed at Osan, 
South Korea, on May 22, 1984. 
Capt. David Bonsi survived.
056 N814X
68-10334
U-2R USAF First flight May 18, 1968. 
Delivered to Davis-Monthan 
AFB on June 10, 1968. 
Crashed in Gulf of Thailand on 
August 15, 1975. Capt. Jon 
Little survived.
057 N815X
68-10335
U-2R CIA
USAF
First flight July 30, 1968. 
Delivered to CIA on August 29, 
1968. Crashed at Taoyuan, 
Taiwan, on November 24, 
1970, killing Maj. Chi-Hsien 
“Denny” Huang.
058 N816X
68-10336
U-2R
U-2S
USAF First flight August 20, 1968. 
Delivered to Davis-Monthan 
AFB on August 29, 1968, 
and to Beale AFB in 1976. 
Eventually transferred to 
test activities at Palmdale. 
Converted to U-2S in 1996.
059 N817X
68-10337
U-2R
U-2S
USAF First flight on September 9, 
1968. Delivered to Davis-
Monthan AFB on September 
21, 1968, and to Beale AFB in 
1976. Converted to U-2S in 
June 1998.
060 N818X
68-10338
U-2R USAF First flight on October 2, 1968. 
Delivered to Davis-Monthan 
AFB on October 17, 1968,  
and to Beale AFB in 1976. 
Became first U-2 to reach 
20,000 flight hours, in August 
1994. Crashed at Fairford, 
England, on August 29, 1995, 
killing Capt. David Hawkens.
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061 N819X
68-10339
U-2R USAF First flight October 22, 1968. 
Retained at Palmdale for 
testing until delivered to 
Davis-Monthan AFB in 1972. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
1976. Crashed at Beale on 
December 13, 1993, killing 
Capt. Rich Snyder.
062 N820X
68-10340
U-2R USAF First flight November 26, 1968. 
Delivered to Davis-Monthan 
AFB on December 19, 1968. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
1976. Crashed in Korea on 
October 5, 1980. Capt. Cleve 
Wallace survived.
Later Production
Article No. Serial No. Model User History
063 80-1063
N706NA
N806NA
ER-2 NASA First flight May 1, 1981. 
Delivered to NASA Ames 
Research Center in June 1981. 
Transferred to NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center in 1998.
064 80-1064 TR-1B
U-2RT
U-2ST
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 
as TR-1B in March 1983. 
Redesignated U-2RT in 
October 1991. Converted to 
U-2ST in October 1994.
065 80-1065 TR-1B
U-2RT
U-2ST
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 
as TR-1B in May 1983. 
Redesignated U-2RT in 
October 1991. Converted to 
U-2ST in August 1995.
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066 80-1066 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF First flight August 1, 1981. 
Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in September 1981. 
Redesignated U-2RT in 
October 1991. Converted to 
U-2S in November 1997.
067 80-1067 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in July 1982. Transferred 
to flight test in Palmdale in 
1989. Redesignated U-2R in 
October 1991. Converted to 
U-2S in 1998.
068 80-1068 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
U-2ST
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 
as TR-1A in July 1982. 
Transferred to RAF Alconbury, 
England, in February 1983 and 
to Beale AFB in April 1987. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Converted to U-2S in 
July 1998. Converted to U-2ST 
in 2004.
069 80-1069
N708NA
TR-1A
ER-2
U-2S
USAF
NASA
Delivered to Beale AFB 
as TR-1A in July 1982. 
Transferred to Alconbury in 
July 1983 and damaged in 
ground accident 3 months 
later. Eventually repaired 
and loaned to NASA as ER-2 
in March 1987. Returned 
to Beale AFB as U-2R in 
1995. Converted to U-2S in 
September 1997.
070 80-1070 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in October 1982. 
Transferred to Alconbury in 
February 1983. Returned 
to Beale AFB in May 1988. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Converted to U-2S in 
February 1995.
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071 80-1071 U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in November 1983. 
Transferred to flight test in 
Palmdale in 1985. Returned 
to Beale AFB in 1988. 
Redelivered as first U-2S 
production conversion on 
October 28, 1994.
072 80-1072 TR-1A USAF Delivered as TR-1A to 
Alconbury in November 1983. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
March 1984. Crashed at Beale 
on July 18, 1984. Capt. Tom 
Hubbard survived.
073 80-1073 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in February 1984. 
Transferred to Alconbury in 
January 1991. Redesignated 
U-2R in October 1991. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
September 1992. Converted to 
U-2S in February 1996.
074 80-1074 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in February 1984. 
Transferred to Alconbury in 
December 1990. Redesignated 
U-2R in October 1991. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
October 1992. Converted to 
U-2S in May 1996.
075 80-1075 U-2R USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in 1984. Crashed in 
Korea on October 8, 1984. 
Capt. Tom Dettmer survived.
076 80-1076 U-2R USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in 1984. Converted to 
U-2S in August 1997.
077 80-1077 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in March 1985. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
November 1989. Converted to 
U-2S in June 1996.
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078 80-1078 TR-1A
U-2ST
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in March 1985. 
Damaged on April 24, 1990, 
and returned to Palmdale for 
storage. Converted to U-2ST in 
October 1994.
079 80-1079 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in March 1985. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
January 1991. Redesignated 
U-2R in October 1991. 
Converted to U-2S in  
May 1997.
080 80-1080 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 
as TR-1A in May 1985. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Converted to U-2S in 
March 1997.
081 80-1081 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 
TR-1A in October 1985. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
August 1991. Redesignated 
U-2R in October 1991. 
Converted to U-2S in  
October 1996.
082 80-1082 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in November 1985. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Converted to U-2S in 
January 1997.
083 80-1083 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in March 1986. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 
in December 1991. Converted 
to U-2S in September 1996.
084 80-1084 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in April 1986. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
1988. Redesignated U-2R in 
October 1991. Converted to 
U-2S in March 1998.
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085 80-1085 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 
TR-1A in August 1986. 
Transferred to Beale AFB  
in February 1991. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Converted to U-2S in 
June 1997.
086 80-1086 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A in 1986. Transferred 
to Alconbury in April 1987. 
Returned to Beale in August 
1991. Redesignated U-2R in 
October 1991. Converted to 
U-2S in December 1997.
087 80-1087 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 
as TR-1A in May 1987. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Converted to U-2S in 
February 1998.
088 80-1088 TR-1A
U-2R
USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 
TR-1A in December 1987. 
Transferred to Beale AFB in 
August 1991. Crashed near 
Oroville, CA, on August 7, 
1996, killing Capt. Randy Roby.
089 80-1089 U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in 1988. Converted to 
U-2S in December 1995.
090 80-1090 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Built as TR-1A in 1988 and 
retained at Palmdale for test 
and development. Served as 
U-2S prototype in May 1989 
and subsequently delivered to 
Beale AFB.
091 80-1091 U-2RT
U-2ST
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB 
as U-2RT in March 1988. 
Converted to U-2ST in 
December 1998.
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092 80-1092 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in April 1988. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 
in December 1991. Converted 
to U-2S in September 1998.
093 80-1093 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury 
as TR-1A in June 1988. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 
in April 1992. Converted to 
U-2S in June 1995.
094 80-1094 TR-1B
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Alconbury as 
TR-1B in September 1988. 
Redesignated U-2R in October 
1991. Transferred to Beale AFB 
in December 1991. Converted 
to U-2S in June 1995.
095 80-1095 U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in 1988. Converted 
to U-2S in January 1996. 
Crashed near Seoul, South 
Korea, on January 26, 2003. 
The pilot ejected.
096 80-1096 U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in 1989. Converted to 
U-2S in April 1996.
097 80-1097
N709NA
N806NA
ER-2 NASA Delivered to NASA Ames 
Research Center in 1989. 
Transferred to NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center  
in 1998.
098 80-1098 U-2R USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
U-2R in 1989. Crashed on 
landing at Osan, South Korea, 
in August 1994. Capt. Cholene 
Espinoza survived.
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Article No. Serial No. Model User History
099 80-1099 TR-1A
U-2R
U-2S
USAF Delivered to Beale AFB as 
TR-1A on October 3, 1989. 
Transferred to Alconbury in 
March 1990. Redesignated 
U-2R in October 1991. 
Converted to U-2S in  
August 1995.
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Milestone dates in the history of the U-2
Date Milestone
May 18, 1954 Lockheed submits unsolicited proposal to Air Force for CL-282
June 7, 1954 Lockheed notified that Air Force rejected the CL-282 proposal
November 19, 1954 Kelly Johnson discusses CL-282 with CIA
November 24, 1954 U-2 project approved by President Eisenhower
December 9, 1954 Lockheed receives $54 million contract for U-2 production 
(first 20 airframes)
June 10, 1955 USAF and CIA sign agreement on Project Aquatone
July 1955 First U-2 (Article 341) delivered to test site
August 1, 1955 Unofficial first flight of U-2 to 35 feet altitude following 
inadvertent takeoff during taxi test
August 4, 1955 First planned flight of U-2 to 8,000 feet
August 8, 1955 Official first flight for VIP visitors (third planned flight)
September 1955 Second U-2 (Article 342) delivered to test site, Phase I 
(Contractor) testing completed
October 18, 1955 U-2 achieves design altitude of 73,000 feet
December 1955 Lockheed approved to build 30 additional airframes
May 7, 1956 NACA director Hugh L. Dryden announces existence of U-2 
aircraft, same date as first operational CIA detachment deployed
June 20, 1956 First flight over Eastern Bloc countries
July 4, 1956 First flight over Russia
August 20, 1956 Second CIA detachment deployed
September 11, 1956 First U-2 flight over Middle East
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Date Milestone
February 1957 Third CIA detachment deployed
June 11, 1957 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron receives first six 
aircraft at Del Rio, TX
November 14, 1957 First high-altitude weather photos (Typhoon Kitt)
May 13, 1959 First flight of U-2C
May 1, 1960 Last flight over Russia, Frank Powers shot down in Article 360
October 26, 1960 First flight over Cuba
October 5, 1962 50th and final CIA U-2 flight over Cuba
May 20, 1964 First operational mission from aircraft carrier
September 1966 Lockheed receives order for 12 U-2R airframes
August 28, 1967 First flight of U-2R
December 1968 Final U-2R airframe delivered
June 3, 1971 NASA receives first U-2C for Earth Resources research
August 1, 1974 CIA U-2 program comes to an end. Remaining assets 
transferred to USAF
November 16, 1979 Production line reopens to build ER-2, TR-1, and additional 
U-2R airframes
May 11, 1981 First flight of ER-2 and delivery to NASA
August 1, 1981 First flight of TR-1
April 1989 NASA retires U-2C
October 1991 TR-1 is redesignated U-2R
August 12, 1994 First flight of U-2S (new engine)
December 2000 Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability Program (RAMP) 
upgrades initiated
April 15, 2002 First RAMP U-2 delivered to Beale AFB
June 2013 Introduction of Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort (CARE)
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These two photos of the Space Shuttle Atlantis were among those taken from an 
Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flying high above Kennedy Space Center, 
FL, on May 4, 1989. The need for such pictures arose after the Shuttle suffered 
an unusual number of debris strikes during mission STS-27 in December 
1988. After landing, technicians discovered more than 700 instances of damage 
to the orbiter’s thermal protection tiles. Because this was approximately seven 
times the normal number of hits, NASA engineers wanted to know if the 
damage was unique to Atlantis or was part of a fleet-wide trend that began 
with STS-27. They needed to identify debris sources (ice, insulation from 
the external tank, ablative material falling off the solid rocket boosters, etc.), 
determine how much material was lost, and identify the point at which the 
damage occurred during flight. Residual material on the damaged tiles from 
STS-27 included traces of ablator and paint from the solid rocket booster 
(SRB) forward assemblies, but viewing the SRB nose caps during the first few 
minutes of flight was nearly impossible because ground-based tracking cameras 
were aimed only at the aft end and sides of the vehicle. In response to a NASA 
request, the Air Force provided a U-2 from a detachment at nearby Patrick Air 
Force Base to take high-resolution black-and-white photos during the first 2 
minutes after liftoff. The first attempt was made during the launch of STS-29 
on March 13, 1989. The pilot flew a racetrack circuit at an altitude of approxi-
mately 20,000 feet at a standoff distance of about 5 miles to keep clear of the 
Shuttle’s flightpath. Timing was crucial because the spacecraft climbed very 
quickly following SRB ignition, and a wide-angle lens had to be used because 
there was no way for a telescopic camera to rapidly track the Shuttle. Due to 
a launch delay, the U-2 was not at the optimal point at liftoff and the photos 
were not very useful. A second attempt during STS-30 on May 4 was more 
successful. The U-2 pilot was able to achieve a better position and optimum 
slant angles for photography, but the resolution was still not sufficient to resolve 
enough detail to determine what was happening to the nose cones.1
1. Glen Swanson, photo caption, Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 4, no. 3 (summer 
1995): p. 1.
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U-2 imagery of Space Shuttle Atlantis taken on May 4, 1989. The resolution was insufficient for 
determining the source of debris from the SRB nose caps. (U.S. Air Force)
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The Skunk Works Method 
Since the early 1940s, the Skunk Works (now a division of Lockheed Martin) 
has become synonymous with innovative aerospace design and manufactur-
ing techniques. In the beginning, this was due in large part to Kelly Johnson’s 
unique management approach. Designed to foster creativity and innovation, 
his method established principles for the development and production of 
highly complex aircraft in a relatively short time and at as low a cost as could 
be practically achieved. Johnson’s successor, Ben Rich, and others who followed 
in their footsteps continued to use and refine the Skunk Works methods. 
Although not easily applied in the corporate world of the early 21st century, it 
is worthwhile to study this innovative business model. If implemented, it can 
be used to reduce development and life-cycle costs for acquisition programs 
involving rapid prototyping or low-rate production.
APPENDIX 5
In 1975, Ben Rich, left, succeeded Kelly Johnson as head of the Advanced Development 
Projects division. (Lockheed Martin)
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Kelly’s Rules
Johnson often summed up his method in just seven words: Be quick. Be quiet. 
Be on time. Eventually, however, he wrote a set of 14 rules addressing program 
management, organization, contractor/customer relationships, documenta-
tion, customer reporting, specifications, engineering drawings, funding, cost 
control, subcontractor inspection, testing, security, and management compen-
sation. These became the Basic Operating Rules of the Skunk Works:
1. The Skunk Works manager must be delegated practically com-
plete control of his program in all aspects. He should report to 
a division president or higher. (It is essential that the program 
manager have authority to make decisions quickly regarding 
technical, finance, schedule, or operations matters.) 
2. Strong but small project offices must be provided, both by the 
customer and contractor. (The customer program manager 
must have similar authority to that of the contractor.)
3. The number of people having any connection with the project 
must be restricted in an almost vicious manner. Use a small 
number of good people: 10 to 25 percent compared to the so-
called normal systems. (Bureaucracy makes unnecessary work 
and must be controlled brutally.)
4. A very simple drawing and drawing release system with great 
flexibility for making changes must be provided. (This per-
mits early work by manufacturing organizations, and schedule 
recovery if technical risks involve failures.)
5.  There must be a minimum of reports required, but important 
work must be recorded thoroughly. (Responsible management 
does not require massive technical and information systems.)
6. There must be a monthly cost review covering not only what 
has been spent and committed, but also projected costs to 
the conclusion of the program. Don’t have the books 90 days 
late and don’t surprise the customer with sudden overruns. 
(Responsible management does require operation within the 
resources available.)
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7. The contractor must be delegated and must assume more than 
normal responsibility to get good vendor bids for the subcon-
tract on the project. Commercial bid procedures are very often 
better than military ones. (Essential freedom to use the best 
talent available and operate within the resources available.)
8. The inspection system as currently used by the Skunk Works, 
which has been approved by both the Air Force and Navy, meets 
the intent of existing military requirements and should be used 
on new projects. Push more basic inspection responsibility back 
to subcontractors and vendors. Don’t duplicate so much inspec-
tion. (Even the commercial world recognizes that quality is in 
design and responsible operations – not inspection.)
9. The contractor must be delegated the authority to test his final 
product in flight. He can and must test it in the initial stages. 
If he doesn’t, he rapidly loses his competency to design other 
vehicles. (Critical, if new technology and the attendant risks 
are to be rationally accommodated.)
10. The specification applying to the hardware must be agreed 
to in advance of contracting. The Skunk Works practice of 
having a specification section stating clearly which important 
military specification items will not knowingly be complied 
with and reasons therefore is highly recommended. (Standard 
specifications inhibit new technology and innovation, and are 
frequently obsolete.)
11. Funding a program must be timely so that the contractor 
doesn’t have to keep running to the bank to support govern-
ment projects. (Rational management requires knowledge of, 
and freedom to use, the resources originally committed.)
12. There must be mutual trust between the customer project 
organization and the contractor with very close cooperation 
and liaison on a day-to-day basis. This cuts down misunder-
standing and correspondence to an absolute minimum. (The 
goals of the customer and producer should be the same – get 
the job done well.)
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13. Access by outsiders to the project and its personnel must be 
strictly controlled by appropriate security measures. (This is a 
program manager’s responsibility even if no program security 
demands are made – a cost avoidance measure.)
14. Because only a few people will be used in engineering and 
most other areas, ways must be provided to reward good 
performance by pay not based on the number of personnel 
supervised. (Responsible management must be rewarded, 
and responsible management does not permit the growth 
of bureaucracies.)1
This management approach offers a proven, efficient method for develop-
ing new technologies, executing engineering and manufacturing development 
programs, procuring limited production systems at low rates, and upgrading 
current systems.
Ben’s Rules
Ben Rich became head of the Skunk Works in 1975. A highly capable engineer 
in the field of thermodynamics and propulsion, he had been with Lockheed 
since 1950. After joining the Skunk Works in 1954 as a senior design engineer 
on the U-2, he worked on the A-12 and SR-71 and oversaw pioneering devel-
opment of stealth aircraft. Although Rich followed the Basic Operating Rules 
of the Skunk Works, he also developed his own management philosophy:2
1. Strong leadership. Maintain awareness of the big picture. Rely 
on key staff to describe the situation and alternatives. Ask 
appropriate questions, weigh the alternatives, and make a deci-
sion. (Be a benevolent dictator.)
2. Teamwork. Select people who can work well together Assemble 
the team and allow it to work with minimum interference.
 1. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, pp. 210–211.
 2. Ben R. Rich, “The Skunk Works Approach,” in Ben R. Rich Papers, The Huntington Library, San 
Marino, CA, July 25, 1990, p. 11.
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3. Learn to delegate both authority and responsibility. Give 
people a job to do and then let them do it. (You’ll be surprised 
at the results.)
4. Manage by charisma; be flexible, and allow people to show 
their capability. Provide goals and objectives, not step-by-step 
procedures. Let workers have a say in what is going on.
5. Be both practical and tolerant. Don’t take too big a step. (Walk 
before you run.) Expect mistakes and learn from them when 
they occur. (Sometimes a mistake is just the wrong approach 
at the time.)
6. Maintain a tight schedule because time is money. (Give your-
self less time than you think you’ll need.)
7. Demand and expect results. Rely on people who know how to 
prioritize. Workaholics don’t make the best employees. Hire 
people who can organize their work and communicate to sub-
ordinates how to make the most of their time. (You can’t make 
up in time what you don’t have in brains.)
8. Always be ethical. Demand integrity of yourself and those who 
serve under you. (No one is smart enough to lie.)
9. Always reward good performance, and never take credit for 
other people’s work. (A boss who is not stingy with praise will 
have a team of loyal employees.)
10. Don’t tolerate mediocrity and non-performance. Don’t tol-
erate unprofessionalism. Tell non-performers what they are 
doing wrong – you owe it to the rest of the team and to them. 
(Mistakes happen. Give people a chance, but if they repeat 
their errors, get rid of them.)
11. Enjoy your work. Take satisfaction in the results of your labor. 
Learn not to take your work home. Take vacations to rejuve-
nate both mind and body. (If you work hard, play hard.)
A comparison of the management styles of the first two Skunk Works chiefs 
reveals distinct similarities and differences. Kelly Johnson’s strong leadership 
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molded the Skunk Works into a lean, efficient organization. As a talented 
engineer, he was a technical leader as well as a manager. When engineering 
problems arose, Johnson took personal responsibility for addressing them. 
He motivated his staff through the strength of his personality, but he had a 
legendary temper and a tendency to micromanage. He succeeded because he 
encouraged creativity and rewarded accomplishments.3
Ben Rich was careful to preserve the essential character of Johnson’s operating 
philosophy, but since he lacked Johnson’s breadth of technical expertise, Rich 
tended to delegate more responsibility to his subordinates. Nevertheless, he had 
learned many things from his mentor. “Kelly taught me that integrity was the 
most important thing in all my dealings with people,” he said at his retirement 
from Lockheed in July 1991, “don’t do anything or build anything that you 
don’t believe in, and communicate with everyone from top to bottom.”4 
Wisely, none of the later Skunk Works chiefs ever tried to mimic Johnson, 
who was truly one of a kind. Instead, successive new leaders have integrated 
personal perspectives with a healthy appreciation for the Skunk Works legacy. 
According to Al Romig, who led the Skunk Works from June 2011 through 
July 2013, “The real secret to maintaining innovation is simple; it’s the 
people.” National imperatives of the Cold War spurred Kelly Johnson’s genius 
and that of the people gathered around him to produce a unique culture that 
continues to resonate within the company. The unique management structure 
empowers engineers and fosters a willingness to take prudent risks. “By allow-
ing that creative culture to perpetuate, the Skunks of today have been indoctri-
nated by the generations that have preceded them,” Romig acknowledged on 
the occasion of the Skunk Works’ 70th anniversary. “In a technical sense, our 
culture encourages doing things that have never been done before.”5
Lessons Learned
The Skunk Works management approach offers a proven way to develop new 
technology quickly and efficiently, execute engineering and manufacturing 
 3. David C. Aronstein and Albert C. Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A: Evolution of the Stealth 
Fighter (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1997), p. 225.
 4. Ben R. Rich, “B.R. Rich Retirement Speech,” in Ben R. Rich Papers, The Huntington Library, San 
Marino, CA, January 17, 1991, p. 2.
 5. “Interview with Al Romig, Chief Skunk,” Skunk Works Celebrates 70 Years of Innovation, 
July 2013, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2013/roming-interview.html, 
accessed July 30, 2013.
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development programs, procure production systems in limited quantities, and 
upgrade current systems. Any manufacturer can implement a Skunk Works 
management philosophy providing that both corporate leadership and the 
customer agree to abide by the rules. Otherwise, this approach will not work.
Success of this method is dependent on establishing cost as the number 
one priority. Current fiscal realities demand that every acquisition dollar be 
spent as wisely and efficiently as possible. Program cost estimates should not be 
based on historical precedents. Demand for enhanced performance capabilities 
should not be allowed to drive costs upward as this will inevitably push the 
program over budget and behind schedule.6 Expenditures should be tightly 
controlled, and unexpected cost overruns should not be tolerated. In order 
to avoid unpleasant surprises, the customer should be immediately informed 
of any cost growth as it is discovered. Managers should always adhere to a 
strict schedule but plan for some flexibility. If delays occur, it is important to 
identify the cause and implement corrective action expediently. Honest, open, 
and early communication between the contractor and the customer regarding 
any potential delays will provide opportunities for joint problem solving and 
maintain trust between both parties.7
According to Ben Rich, a successful engineering/production development 
program must have three things. First, the product must be able to perform 
the required mission. Second, it has to be delivered on schedule, as promised. 
Finally, the cost must stay within the anticipated funding. Aircraft performance 
requirements need to be well defined, reasonable, and stable. Constant changes 
can lead to failure by pushing the project behind schedule and driving up costs. 
Essential performance requirements must be separated from wish lists (i.e., 
those performance characteristics that are merely desirable, but not necessary). 
Any technical problems that arise should be identified as early as possible and 
solved quickly. Customer and contractor personnel should work together to 
find the best solution after examining any potential tradeoffs or alternatives.8
People are the most important asset. Managers should put the most quali-
fied available personnel on the program and keep the team as small as possible. 
The benefits of keeping both management and total personnel at a minimum 
include greater individual responsibility and satisfaction, improved commu-
nications, higher productivity, and reduced costs. According to Ben Rich, “A 
 6. Leland M. Nicolai, “Skunk Works Lessons Learned,” in Strategic Management of the Cost 
Problem of Future Weapon Systems, AGARD Conference Proceedings (AGARD-CP-602), 
September 1998, pp. 6–7.
 7. Ben R. Rich, “The Skunk Works Approach,” p. 8.
 8. Ibid., p. 7.
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large part of the success of the Skunk Works comes in the ability to develop a 
team and an attitude which favors getting the job done by jointly overcoming 
problems as they arise.”9
In order to give designers and managers as much freedom as possible, it 
is important for the manufacturer to tailor mission requirements, acquisi-
tion requirements, and manufacturing specifications. Only the most critical 
performance parameters should be specified as requirements. Whenever pos-
sible, peripheral standards and specifications should serve only as guidelines. 
Documentation should be streamlined and technical and program reviews kept 
to a minimum. Although held regularly, formal contractor-customer program 
reviews should be keyed to the pace of the program. Small program offices and 
close, regular communications minimize the need for formal reports, docu-
mentation, and more frequent reviews.10
Manufacturing personnel should influence the design from the very begin-
ning. The manufacturing group should be responsible for material and process 
specifications, establishing tolerances, and adopting best commercial practices. 
The design should be as simple as practical with a minimum part count and 
minimum necessity for touch labor. Assembly processes that most frequently 
result in rejected parts (such as drilling holes) should be minimized if pos-
sible. Components should have left-hand/right-hand interchangeability or self-
locating features for ease of installation. Room-temperature processes should 
be used as much as possible. Use of off-the-shelf components will reduce both 
acquisition and development costs.11
An aircraft should be designed for ease of maintainability. This includes 
sensible installation of equipment, adequate access panels, and a minimal 
requirement for unique tools. Designers should give consideration to future 
modifications and upgrades and provide easy access, extra volume (if possible), 
and growth power capability.12
Early design development can be achieved through the use of technology 
demonstrators or full-scale development (FSD) prototypes. A demonstrator 
may be a subscale version of the proposed design or a close approximation. 
Its sole purpose is to prove a concept or validate a critical system feature. FSD 
airframes more closely match the final production structural design and may 
 9. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
10. Nicolai, “Skunk Works Lessons Learned,” pp. 7–9.
11. Ibid., pp. 9–10.
12. Ibid., p. 10.
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be used to validate fabrication and assembly techniques and to verify structural 
weight and production costs.13
Keys to Success
Under the Skunk Works philosophy, a project should be organized around 
a manager who has total control of all aspects of the program, thus giving 
the manager the ability to control costs and meet rational milestones and 
objectives. Other functional organizations within the company such as human 
resources, information services, facilities, environmental health and safety, legal 
and other specialty areas provide on-demand support to the program manager.
The program’s organizational structure should be as simple as possible and 
contain built-in checks and balances. Overall staffing must be kept to a mini-
mum to provide clear lines of responsibility and maintain program security. The 
Skunk Works approach calls for the use of a small number of skilled personnel 
who are given broad responsibility and a substantial, but reasonable, workload. 
Keeping management and total staffing to a minimum results in greater indi-
vidual responsibility and job satisfaction, improved communications, higher 
productivity, and reduced costs.14
Success is dependent upon a cohesive team working closely together to 
achieve well-defined objectives. Tasks and responsibilities are clearly defined, 
and progress is measured and tracked using integrated plans and schedules. 
Managers of various subgroups must have a clear understanding of how their 
role contributes to the success of the overall program. Formal weekly program 
reviews track the program’s progress while smaller meetings provide a forum for 
ironing out differences of opinion or improving operating procedures. If the 
program involves development of new or unique capabilities, participants must 
be willing to accept failures and incorporate changes based on lessons learned.
The Skunk Works approach works only if the customer is committed to 
working in a similar manner. This starts with a small, high-quality, highly 
responsive customer program office, and a small supporting organization as 
needed. Like the contractor program manager, the customer program manager 
must also be given singular authority and broad responsibilities, reporting to a 
senior decision-capable management level. The contractor and customer teams 
should maintain open communications on program issues in order to foster 
teamwork, rapid joint problem solving, and mutual trust, rather than adversarial 
13. Ibid., p. 11.
14. Miller, Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years, pp. 210–211.
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relationships. Small program offices and regular communications minimize 
the need for formal reports, documentation, and frequent program reviews.15
If possible, contracts should be tailored to the specific procurements and 
eliminate restrictive and nonessential provisions while conforming to statu-
tory and regulatory requirements. Increasing demands by Government agen-
cies, however, for contract provisions requiring extensive reporting, prior 
Government approvals, and new administrative systems reduce a contractor’s 
ability to tailor contracts in such a fashion.
Specifications should be as simple and brief as possible. Skunk Works prac-
tice emphasizes what is to be accomplished rather than how it is to be accom-
plished, specifying only critical performance parameters as requirements. The 
original U-2 specification document was just 35 pages long. The later SR-71 
specification totaled 54 pages, relatively small and highly tailored compared 
to average procurement programs.
Manufacturing and quality assurance personnel should be involved early, 
working closely with design, structures, and materials engineers to ensure 
product criteria are met. An integrated product development process ensures 
the contractor will meet performance, quality, production, and affordability 
requirements. The engineering drawing system should readily accommodate 
change, and designers should be able to directly interface with manufacturers if 
changes are required. Modern computer-aided design techniques (not available 
when the U-2 was built) can reduce the need for full-scale mockups, and tool-
ing should be kept to a minimum, especially for prototype programs. During 
fabrication and flight test, critical inspections verify compliance of processes 
with engineering requirements.16
Flight-testing of prototype and full-scale development aircraft is conducted 
under the direction of a flight-test manager reporting directly to the program 
manager. Duties for this position include test planning, ground and flight test-
ing, data acquisition and analysis, flight vehicle maintenance and support, and 
test-data documentation. The primary objective is to get test results as quickly 
as possible and apply lessons learned. The contractor is entirely responsible for 
testing prototype vehicles. During FSD testing, the work is accomplished by 
an integrated team of contractor and customer personnel.
Historically, Skunk Works programs have met very stringent security 
requirements. Development of the Blackbirds began as a covert special-access 
program, and only personnel with a strict need to know were briefed in. This 
policy not only protected national security but also prevented interference 
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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from outsiders and thereby increased productivity. A restrictive access policy 
can be similarly implemented on unclassified programs to improve efficiency 
and reduce costs.
By following these practices, the Skunk Works has consistently demon-
strated the ability to design, develop, and produce highly advanced aircraft 
at low cost and in a minimal amount of time. The Skunk Works manage-
ment principles allow a contractor to shorten the acquisition cycle and 
increase efficiency.17
Any organization can apply these principles, but of course applying the 
principles does not guarantee success. Historically, Skunk Works projects suc-
ceeded through a combination of factors including personal leadership, strong 
Governmental support, organizational momentum, and a solid reputation 
based on a long history of achievement.
Growing Pains
Implementing a classic Skunk Works management policy has become increas-
ingly difficult. During a 1990 speech at the Air Force Academy, Ben Rich said, 
“I don’t honestly believe that you can take the Skunk Works approach and 
bottle it up and sell it as a cure-all for the acquisition problems of the DoD 
[Department of Defense]. I do believe that you can apply these basic principles 
in select acquisitions where all parties agree that the conditions are right. This is 
not limited, in my opinion, to covert programs. But, it does require a willing-
ness to create a small team and keep it small; to choose the right people, give 
them clear, stable requirements, and a job to do; and to be willing to let them 
alone to do that job, and to provide them with stable funding.”18
Such conditions are not easy to achieve. When Lockheed merged with 
Martin Marietta in March 1995, the new Lockheed Martin Corporation 
retained the Skunk Works as a company within a company in order to pursue 
innovative design and development work, but the once fiercely independent 
business unit had to adjust to a new corporate culture. Within the Skunk 
Works, there was movement away from simple, brief specifications, particularly 
whenever a program transitioned from the specialized management procedures 
used during the prototype/demonstrator phase to conventional production 
management procedures. This occasionally resulted in difficulties, as with the 
F-22 and F-35 fighter production programs. Alan Brown, former program 
17. Ibid.
18. Ben R. Rich, “The Skunk Works Approach,” p. 12.
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manager and chief engineer on the F-117A, suggested that the time it takes to 
get from initial design to operational use of a new airplane is directly propor-
tional to the size of the customer oversight committee responsible for guiding 
the design. “For the F-117 the Air Force team was a colonel and six other 
experts. The corresponding team on the F-22 was 130, and if you ratio the 
130 over seven, you’ll get just about the ratio of the time it took from starting 
the airframes to getting them in service.” Bob Murphy, who joined the Skunk 
Works in 1954, managed U-2 flight testing and was eventually promoted to 
deputy director of operations, laments the increased bureaucracy. “Once you 
get all these organizations involved, all the different Air Force bases across the 
country and every contractor that makes a screw for the airplane, everybody 
comes to every meeting and nothing ever gets settled.”19
Despite these growing pains, the Skunk Works continues to develop 
some of the most innovative aircraft ever built. Lockheed Martin’s Advanced 
Development Programs division has evolved from Kelly Johnson’s small shop 
in Burbank to some 2,000 people working on more than 600 programs in the 
company’s complex in Palmdale.20 Since approximately 90 percent of all work 
at the facility is classified, little is known about the group’s recent accomplish-
ments, but its legacy continues.
19. Angus Batey, “Inside The Skunk Works,” Classic Aircraft 45, no. 11 (November 2012).
20. William J. Hennigan, “Skunk Works: Developing top-secret weapons in SoCal for 70 years,” Los 
Angeles Times, June 20, 2013.
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